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Abstract
The three chapters which comprise my thesis are a collection of essays on the analysis of
the corporate governance and airline markets and of the federal appellate structure.
In Chapter 1, I use a discrete choice framework to analyze state design and firm choice
of the implications of incorporation: corporate governance laws, corporate taxes and court
structure. Firms - differentiated on ownership, management, industry concentration, fi-
nancial profile and unobservable dimensions - freely choose their preferred state of incorpo-
ration or reincorporation. The revealed preference embedded in this observable choice is
used as window into the heterogeneous preferences within and across firms, yielding several
findings: For example, I find, surprisingly, that firms are very responsive to incorpora-
tion and franchise taxes. In addition, on average, firms like antitakeover statutes, but,
consistent with an agency story, firms with an institutional shareholder block and venture
capital backed firms dislike them. On average, firms dislike mandatory governance statutes
restricting managerial power and facilitating the representation of minority shareholders,
but these laws are less restrictive for the choice of firms in concentrated industries. All
firms dislike well functioning courts, consistent with a litigation deterrence motive. The
recovered firm preferences are then taken to the simulation of recently proposed federal
reforms aimed at centralizing the domicile implications and restricting firm choice. They
are also related to the documented differential returns earned by firms with better inter-
nal governance in the 1990s, as well as to other (new) trading strategies that would have
yielded abnormal returns in the 2000s.
Chapter 2 begins with the observation that airlines choose the domestic markets - city
pairs - they serve and the prices they charge given the structure of their network and
the networks of rival airlines. I cast this choice into a dynamic oligopoly entry game to
recover airline fixed and variable operating costs, entry costs, and profits, using a panel of
20 quarters of DB1B and T-100 Domestic Segment Data. These estimates are then used
to analyze the strategic and cost saving effects of hubs, and LCC. I find that hubs are
valuable to consumers and increase the variable profits of the hubbing airline, but when
including fixed costs their desirability is much less clear. LCC, and especially Southwest
and JetBlue are especially attractive to consumers, have lower marginal costs and have a
strong negative impact on the profits of the incumbents in the markets they serve.
In Chapter 3, using data on all federal civil trial and appellate cases from 1992-2003, I
show that appeals are generally rejected and, for some case categories, can have negative
expected net present value. Appellate outcomes can be further related to the trial decision
being by judge or jury, the identity of the prevailing party (plaintiff or defendant, US or
private), and the form of representation. Some of these factors influence the propensity to
appeal, however, others, including whether trial was by judge or jury, go in the opposite
way. I discuss the implications of these findings for the modeling of the incentives to appeal
and settlement breakdown, and for appellate reform.
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Chapter 1
Revisiting Corporate Governance
Regulation: Firm Heterogeneity
and the Market for Corporate
Domicile
1.1 Introduction and Motivation
This paper focuses on state design and firm choice of corporate governance law. Corpo-
rate governance law is the set of rules in legislation or judicial precedent that "govern" the
internal and external agency problems that exist within a corporation. They govern areas
such as takeovers, shareholder voting rules and managerial liability, and provisions such as
supermajority requirements and antitakeover defenses. These laws represent the policies
instituted to combat the divergence of interests within a firm and to align managerial and
shareholder interests.
There are three crucial facts that form the background for this paper: First, the major-
ity of corporate governance issues are not regulated by the federal government; the 51 US
jurisdictions design their own distinct corporate environments. Second, state corporate
governance regimes are applied to a firm by way of incorporation in a certain state. Third,
firms are free to choose in which state to incorporate (or reincorporatel). The location of
incorporation does not need to be related to the firms' business locations. However, the
consequence of incorporation is submittal to the complete corporate governance regime in
a state. Firms generally cannot choose which provisions in a state's governance regime
they will be subject to - they must take all the provisions as a package. This package
generally includes a choice of the local judicial forum, since personal jurisdiction over the
internal conflicts in the firm generally goes to the state of incorporation. It also includes
the taxes that states impose as a consequence of incorporation within them.
State corporate governance laws, together with federal securities law, form the back-
ground against which firms exercise their residual freedom to design their corporate char-
ters2 . It is the combination of the laws and the firm charter that forms the firms' complete
governance structure. The responsibility for the regulation of corporate governance has
'American corporate law generally requires manager initiation and shareholder approval of a re-
incorporation decision, upon which firms can then change their state of incorporation freely.
2In this paper, for convenience, I often use the term charter to refer to the bylaws and all other internal
governance tools used by the firm.
been repeatedly granted to the states only to be taken back by the federal government in
times of crisis (see Mallette and Spagnola, 1994), and thus it is likely, given the current
economic crisis that the decentralized nature of corporate governance law will be revisited
once again. However, the current legal environment 3 engendered unprecedented diversity
in state corporate governance laws and consequently in the internal governance of firms.
There is also wide diversity in firm ownership and management and in industry structure.
These combined introduce diversity and complexity in the response to policy.
This paper begins by characterizing the diversity in state incorporation implications.
I find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the laws, taxes and performance of the
relevant state courts. Over the course of the entire time period covered (1990 - 2007),
there is legislative activity across many states, although at much lesser levels than that
which was present in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
I then find that there is much heterogeneity in the choices of firms as well. Figure
1 (sourced at the data discussed below) shows that there is a significant tendency to
incorporate in one of the 51 headquarter jurisdictions, as well as a growing trend - both
amongst IPO firms and the stock of public firms as a whole - for firms to shop for their
preferred incorporation venue. There is significant variance in the choice of the state of
incorporation both in the time series and in the cross section. Many states make little
effort and have little success in retaining firms headquartered therein and especially in
recruiting firms headquartered elsewhere. However, there are several incorporation "hot
spots", most notable amongst which are Delaware, Nevada and Maryland, and a number
of states that make sizeable efforts to increase the stock of firms they attract. Contrary
to what is commonly believed, it is not all about Delaware - the leader in incorporation
'Mallette and Spagnola, 1994, discuss how states surrendered their common law authority to the federal
government in the Great Depression era, took much of it back in the merger wave of the 1960s, were halted by
the Supreme Court Edgar vs. Mite (1982) decision which struck down protectionist statutes as constricting
interstate commerce, and then given new freedom in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of America
(1987) where the Supreme Court accepted review of the invalidation of Indiana's state takeover statute. It
is this decision that is seen as largely resposible for the huge wave of litigation, particularly concentrated
in the late 80's and early 90's.
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shares - which, in fact, recently has seen a significant decline in its shares. The dispersion
of incorporation shares in figure 7 in the appendix, and in the revenues from incorporation,
franchise and even corporate income taxes, in the cross section and the time series, nicely
displays the variance and concentration in incorporation choices4
The combination of the -variance in the laws, court characteristics and taxes that make
up the incorporation implications, as well as in the choices of the various firms, allows for
the recovery of the revealed preferences embedded in firm choice and the analysis of the
following two questions:
The first is how firms choose their incorporation state, or, in other words, what
matters to firms in their choice of corporate governance. This question can be divided
into two parts. The first is what drives the average firm's choice, or in other words which
of the incorporation implications: which laws, court features and taxes motivate firms in
their choice of incorporation state and what are the relative magnitudes of these different
incorporation implications. The second is what causes firms to choose differently, or in
other words why is it not (as is commonly perceived) "all about Delaware" - why is there
variance in firm choice. The differential firm choices are seen as a window into the firm
and allow for the analysis of the different features of firms that are instrumental in their
different choices in the selection of their governance regime.
In order to exploit this information revealed in the preferences displayed by the different
firms, a novel dataset with firm and incorporation characteristics is assembled and then
a random coefficient discrete choice model is specified. In the model, incorporation is
treated as a "product" that the states design, differentiated along all of the dimensions
of the implications of incorporation, including the direct "price" - the tax implications
incorporation imposes on each firm. In every one year period, each heterogeneous firm
chooses its preferred "product" by choosing to incorporate, to remain incorporated, or
to reincorporate in one of the 51 US jurisdictions. Firms are decomposed into their
4Figures on the dispersion of these measures will be available in an online appendix.
ownership patterns, director characteristics, industry concentration, financial profiles, the
geographical location of their headquarter states, and the residual unobservable dimensions
of heterogeneity within them. The choice of incorporation state is seen to be made based
on the preferences - resulting from these dimensions of firm heterogeneity - for the laws,
court characteristics and taxes that makeup the incorporation implications. I find that
all incorporation implications, the laws, the court characteristics and the incorporation
taxes matter. My findings are thus separated into these three groups of incorporation
implications:
Regarding the corporate governance laws, I find mean preferences consistent with the
expected (narrow) managerial preferences within a firm. Firms generally like antitakeover
legislation, dislike mandatory laws restricting managerial privileges and dislike laws re-
stricting the flexibility in making shareholder payouts. This "agency" view of mean firm
preferences is reinforced by looking at individual firm heterogeneity. I find, using a regres-
sion discontinuity approach and the structure of my model, that, controlling for selection
endogeneity, firms with sophisticated shareholders - institutional shareholders or venture
capital backed firms - and sizeable holdings in the firm, dislike antitakeover laws. In other
words, the mean preference for antitakeover laws is reversed in firms in which shareholders
are more powerful, thus reinforcing the view that when shareholders have more authority
they choose a more convenient regime for takeovers. Firms in more concentrated industries
do not display statistically significant different preferences for antitakeover laws, but, con-
trary to the mean firm, are not influenced by the existence of mandatory laws restricting
managerial freedoms. Unobserved heterogeneity plays an important role for these laws,
for which preferences are dispersed. In addition, there is a life cycle pattern in these pref-
erences, whereby older firms have an even stronger preference for antitakeover laws, but
are less constrained by the mandatory laws mentioned. Interestingly, the characteristics
of managers and directors are not instrumental in incorporation decisions.
The mean firm preference is for "bad" or backloaded courts, at the trial or appellate
i:_;;;;;l_;iiijj/___ii~lj~~r~ __rZi ^_L __~_
level. Here, looking inside the firm, I find that firms that are significantly held by insti-
tutional shareholders exhibit an even stronger preference for "bad" courts at the appellate
level, but prefer well functioning courts at the trial level.
Firms dislike taxes to such a degree that they respond to tax changes by reincorporation
even though the increases in taxes are very small. I show, both in my aggregate model -
which accounts for the changes over time in the tax rates and in the individual liability of
a given firm when its tax base changes - and specifically regarding two tax changes in 2003,
that firms are highly sensitive to the incorporation taxes, despite their relatively small
magnitudes. State corporate income taxes, which are related to incorporation only in very
limited settings, but suspected to be highly manipulated, are found to not be instrumental
in the incorporation choice.
The recovery of these firm preferences allows for the treatment of the second ques-
tion: the impact of federal interventions in state governance laws. Consistent with some
of the plausible federal reforms frequently discussed in the media 5, I simulate the choices
that would be made under counterfactual policies which limit the variance in legal struc-
tures across jurisdictions, eliminating the key antitakeover laws and imposing mandatory
limitations on managerial freedoms. I find that the laws change the aggregate shares and
impact the desirability of some of the popular incorporation alternatives. However, con-
sistent with the findings above, many of the incorporation implications matter. This can
help or hurt the various states. For example, the state of Delaware, the most popular in-
corporation hot spot, increases its share of firms; however, Maryland and Nevada decrease
theirs. Furthermore, since the patterns of incorporation are related to the characteristics
of the firm, any change would impact the distribution of shareholders holding the firms
incorporated in the various states. Thus, for example, a change in the distribution of anti-
takeover laws causing a jurisdiction that previously had antitakeover laws to no longer have
5 See for example claims made by (then) Senator Obama in the second presidential debate (Belmont
University, 10/2/2008); and Carl Ichan, "Capitalism Should Return to Its Roots" (WSJ, 2/9/2009).
them would be a drawback for the mean firm, but would attract firms with sophisticated
shareholders. When several changes are made simultaneously, it is the combination of
the specific firm preferences that shapes the overall firm specific effect, which often differs
substantially from that of the mean firm.
Finally, I connect these findings to the study of performance via returns earned by
stock market trading strategies. I relate this work to previous findings on the connection
between governance and performance and show the potential for other (new) strategies -
of sorting firms on some of the additional firm heterogeneity dimensions discussed - to be
tested against the background of this work. I find that trading strategies based on the
antitakeover and mandatory laws alone would have yielded abnormal returns in the 2000s.
Holding a zero cost portfolio, buying firms incorporated in states with many antitakeover
laws, and selling (short) firms in states with few antitakeover laws, would have yielded a
monthly abnormal return of 36 basis points. Alternatively holding a portfolio buying firms
in states with many of the mandatory laws and selling those in states with few mandatory
laws would have yielded abnormal returns of 46 basis points per month.
These findings relate to the existing literature regarding the impact and importance
of corporate governance, which largely rely on abnormal returns earned by the "better"
governed firms. This paper finds an interaction between the many dimensions of firm
heterogeneity and corporate governance in legislation. However, there is specificity in the
form of the interaction. Thus, for example, while the concentration of industry affects the
preferences for some laws, it is not instrumental regarding antitakeover laws. As will be
shown, these findings can be seen as complementary pieces in the puzzle of the impact of
governance rules on firms.
Furthermore, while this work addresses the divergence in preferences in the context
of the incorporation choice, my findings - as well as other potential findings concerning
other dimensions of firm heterogeneity - can be related to the broader issue of how these
dimensions affect our concept of the firm - as an equilibrium between all these competing
constituencies. Thus, for example, my findings regarding institutional shareholder prefer-
ences relate to the wide body of literature analyzing the impact of the general increases
in institutional shareholder holdings (see for example Aghion et al 2007). Similarly, my
findings on venture backed firms relates to the literature on the firms' life cycles in general
and the venture capital cycle in particular (see for example Gompers and Lerner 2004).
On the methodological side, this paper extends the canonical framework of a random
coefficients discrete choice problem in that individual firm choice and many degrees of
firm heterogeneity are observable. The product is the sum of observable characteristics
and thus the decomposition is very straightforward." In addition, there is variation in all
characteristics over time, which facilitates the controls for unobservables, and there is wide
variation in the base, schedule and rates of taxes across jurisdictions. The treatment of
endogeneity is done using instruments based on a regression discontinuity design, exploiting
the randomness inherent in the inclusion in the S&P 500 index, where the highly non-linear
choice structure is accounted for using a control function approach and, alternatively, in the
appendix, using two other methods of moments. Counterfactual policy analysis relates not
only to the changes in the aggregate shares, but also to the makeup of firm heterogeneity
in the various jurisdictions, under the various policies.
The paper is structured as follows. I begin, in section 2, by reviewing the relevant
legal and corporate finance literatures upon which I build in this work. Then, in section
3, I present and describe the data and characteristics that are inputs into my model and
methodology. Section 4 discusses the model and estimation strategies. In section 5 I
turn to my results. I first present and discuss the results from my full model. I then
grant incorporation taxes special treatment and provide a reduced form analysis of two tax
changes in 2003. Section 6 discusses the simulation of counterfactual policies. Section 7
discusses firm performance and trading strategies. Section 8 concludes and discusses some
future extensions.
6This, compared to the canonical examples of cars and cereals which are challenging to decompose.
1.2 Related Literature
1.2.1 The Choice of Law
The freedom offered to states in the design of law and the freedom offered to firms in the
choice of incorporation state has spawned a sizeable legal literature. This active literature
has not reached any consensus, despite the some 30 years over which it has developed.
Indeed, some see there to be "genius", active competition between states (or at least
some of them) to attract firms (for example Romano, 1985, 2006); some see the state of
Delaware - which has a sizeable share of the publicly traded firms - to have won and there
now not to be any "competition" (for example Kahan and Kamar (2002), and Bebchuk
and Hamdani (2002)) and some see the "competition" to be more with the interventions
(actual or potential) of the federal government. Furthermore, within the competition camp
as well, there is a debate as to whether this competition is positive - in the sense that it
is inducing states to generate "good" laws that promote firm (and shareholder) value ("A
race to the top") (Winter (1977), Easterbrook(1983), Fischel (1982)) - or negative - in that
it may induce states to cater to management, which potentially has more power in making
the incorporation choice, and may warrant federal intervention ("A race to the bottom",
Nader (1976), Cary (1974)).
Furthermore, Delaware's success has received specific attention. Daines (2001) finds
that controlling for firm financials, the share of director and officer ownership, and industry
and year dummies, Delaware firms have a higher Tobin's Q (in the cross section years
1981 - 1996). Daines' explanation is that these firms are more vulnerable to takeovers and
that this increases firm value. Subramanian (2004) finds this effect be decreasing and after
1996 eliminated (due to what he sees as antitakeover movements in Delaware combined
with a friendlier takeover attitude in the late 90s). In analyzing the incorporation decision
of firms at IPO, Daines (2002) looks at the influence of some of the legal variation in states,
and finds only the existence of national law firms to be a significant driving force (albeit
with questionable exogeneity). Marcel Kahan, in more recent work (2006) looks explicitly
at the effects of some of the state laws on the aggregate retention rate of states, i.e. the
proportion of firms located in the state that at IPO, in the years 1990 - 2002, also choose
to incorporate (or remain incorporated) there and finds this yearly retention rate to be
related to the governance laws, and to a court quality ranking.
1.2.2 Does Governance Matter?
There is now a growing corporate finance literature focusing on the final governance struc-
ture, the firm bylaws (that evolve from the legislative structure), that answers this ques-
tion in the affirmative. However, this is still a largely researched and debated question.
The standard approaches in this literature have been to use the stock market valuation
of publicly traded firms with heterogeneous governance mechanisms to evaluate internal
governance. These approaches generally pre-specify the "better" rules, identify the firms
operating with such rules in their charter, and then rank and price them relative to (compa-
rable) firms with (pre-specified) "worse" governance rules. Accordingly, these approaches
ask which arrangements and structures are correlated with higher shareholder value. This
is done in two ways: The first is to look at a cross section of prices and attribute some
of the added value of Tobin's Q to the existence of the "better" governance measures (for
example Brown and Caylor (2006)). The second, more influential approach, followed (or
led) by Gompers et al (2003, GIM), is the construction of profitable trading strategies
based on buying the "best" corporate governed firms (in terms of shareholder rights) and
selling the "worst" corporate governed firms. GIM also find these "better" firms to have
higher value, profits, sales and growth, lower capital expenditures and fewer corporate ac-
quisitions. Once again, the "best" and "worst" are determined (in what is now termed
the GIM index), using a cumulative score for the presence of the good and the absence
of the bad governance mechanisms out of the pool of 24 such mechanisms in their data.
This approach has been further refined. Cremers and Nair (2005) find the premiums to
result from buying and shorting firms with high ownership concentration (of large public
pension fund blockholders). Giroud and Mueller (2008) sort based on the competitiveness
of the industry and find that the GIM index matters primarily for firms in noncompetitive
industries. Masulis et al (2007) connect these governance provisions to acquirer returns
and find acquirers with "better" GIM firms, and those operating in more competitive in-
dustries, to experience higher abnormal returns. Note that these approaches often add
a Delaware dummy as an additional characteristic to test the importance of this popular
choice of venue, and this dummy is generally not significant.
While the results in these studies are very interesting, they present a challenge in
that it is the difficult to model and understand the origin of these provisions. Better
firms may have what are seen to be better internal bylaws, and it is very difficult to
model and thus isolate the effects of all the provisions in a firm and attributes of a firm
that make it better. Core et al (2006) push these points to examine the source of the
mispricing of firms with better GIM governance, and find that it cannot be attributed to
shareholder rights (in terms of analyst forecasts or surprise earning announcements), and
conclude that, most likely, it is a correlation with one of the "pricing" puzzles of the 90s.
Bebchuk et al (2005), criticize the Gompers measure claiming, based on some empirical
evidence, that only six of the measures drive the results. Brown and Caylor (2006) say it
is other measures, including new internal governance provisions as well as the ownership
composition. Furthermore, both the nature of the choice (i.e. what bylaws can be chosen),
and the implications of the choice (i.e. the manner in which the choice will be enforced in
courts) are affected by the legal environment. Thus, firms may be choosing a jurisdiction
because of its taxes, legal environment, or laws 7 and this may imply the choice of some of
the other internal provisions. As explained above, the choice of internal governance is by
no means independent from the choice of incorporation.
Note that including some or all of the laws is insufficient in that laws represent the entire equilibrium
result of legislative policy, which is implemented by the courts. However, bylaws resulting from laws may
indeed require a different weighting.
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The approach followed here is thus to combine the insights from both these litera-
tures. My model takes the attributes of firms found to be correlated with the differential
performance of better governed firms (as well as other measures not yet examined in the
literature, and the laws, which often are mechanically related to the bylaws) and relates
them to the fundamental choice of law and incorporation venue. I specify a model aimed
at capturing the relatively well defined key factors in the incorporation choice, and thus
facilitate the isolation of the preferences for the different laws and product characteris-
tics. Thus, for example, my finding of a shareholder-manager divide in the preference for
governance law, enriches the finding that governance matters differentially for firms with
more or less powerful shareholders. My finding on firm preferences changing based on the
concentration of industry complements the finding of governance mattering differentially
in the presence of more competition. And my finding on the differential preferences of
firms with different IPO characteristics suggests further trading strategies that could be ex-
plored. Furthermore, as shown below, the choice of law in itself suggests trading strategies
that do, especially in recent years, produce abnormal returns.
More broadly, introducing heterogeneity into the choice of incorporation produces in-
sights on the formal and real authority of the firm (i.e. Aghion and Tirole, 1997, Aghion
et al 2007), especially regarding some of the recently important trends in institutional
ownership, market power and the role of venture capital, which are interesting in them-
selves. My findings relate firm preferences to this important decision of incorporation
choice, while exploiting the structure of incorporation choice to analyze diverging interests
within a firm. Finally, as mentioned, this methodology is required in order to evaluate the
impact of counterfactual policies.
1.3 Data: The State Characteristics and the Attributes of
Firm Heterogeneity
In this section I describe the data used to capture the features of the incorporation package
as well as the attributes of firms relevant to their incorporation choices: What motivates
firms in their incorporation or reincorporation choices? Heron and Lewellen (1998) detail
some of the reincorporation motives expressed by management in proxy statements, identi-
fying them to be the establishment of takeover defenses, the reduction in director liability,
obtaining legal flexibility and predictability, achieving tax and franchise fee savings, recon-
ciliation of operating and legal domicile and (although to a lesser degree) the facilitation
of acquisitions. Similarly, I conducted an online search for "advice" on where to incorpo-
rate, to capture the practical and informal discussions of the important determinants of
firm choice. This search yielded many legal firms and organizations recommending that a
corporation consider its home state, and also other options such as Delaware, Nevada, and
Wyoming, in their comparison of the (pro and anti) business laws, the level of advance-
ment of the legal systems, the other identity and characteristics of the other successful
firms incorporated therein, and the "prestige" the various incorporation choices may carry,
as well as the tax (franchise tax and state corporate income tax) "mentality" and costs of
being incorporated away from home8 . Indeed, these considerations are - to a large degree -
an expression of preferences for governance mechanisms - both substantial and procedural,
and consequently it is on them that I collect my data and focus my analysis in the "demand
estimation".
What motivates states in the selection of laws, process and taxes? States undoubtedly
prefer to have higher tax revenues. However, they are bureaucracies serving many masters
or constituents with varying (often opposing) objectives. Indeed, there have been very
few legislative changes in governance laws in the past 18 years (the period of my analy-
8 For examples see www.mynewcompany.com/whichstate.htm; http://www.bizfilings.com/products/articles/
which state to inc.asp; and www.incnow.com/faq.shtml (all visited on 6/13/08).
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sis). States do, however, undoubtedly care about their budgets. Tax revenues are not
insignificant. The leading example is of course the state of Delaware, whose revenues from
franchise taxes alone account for roughly one third of its total revenue, thus constituting
a major piece of its budget. These revenues are almost entirely profits. Roberta Romano
(1998) estimates the costs of serving the incorporated firms in the state of Delaware to
be under 3% of these revenues. Indeed, the recent franchise tax increase it made in 2003
was explicitly motivated by the desire to shrink its expected budget deficit. As explained
below, state corporate income taxes - while not directly related to incorporation - may
be influenced by incorporation choices (in the most obvious sense where firms choose in-
corporation and location simultaneously, but even when they make separate decisions for
these two choices). State corporate income taxes (SCIT) are sizeable. Furthermore, states
do actively promote themselves (and their relative advantages) as a convenient place to
incorporate (and locate) 9 .
1.3.1 Public Firms
In this work I focus on publicly traded firms, which are easier to collect data for and are
traded. Compustat data treats incorporation and location as scalar variables which are
updated to the most recent value and consequently cannot be used for the time series.
Thus, the main data source on firm incorporations and reincorporations is the actual SEC
filings, as contained in the monthly SEC disclosure CD's. This data comes from the
10Ks and 10Qs filed by all public firms. For consistency, I pulled the data out of one
CD a year beginning in 1990. I supplemented this data with compustat back-tapes. I
use compustat financial information when available and the financial information in these
filings otherwise1 o. Thus, the thousands of reincorporations identified from the SEC filings
qSee for example http://www.wyomingcompany.com/ (visited 7/23/08).
'oThe only further potential step to track all reincorporations would be to look at the SDC merger
data and isolate mergers in which the accounting survior is the new firm created solely for the purpose
of reincorporation. This is not likely to be common, but I plan to explore this robustness check in later
versions of the paper.
are a subset of the full universe of reincorporations. In my data, I track firms using their
cusips, tickers and gvkeys. This implies that only reincorporations leaving one of these
intact are analyzed'1 . This excludes some movements, but keeps those that are more likely
to be directly related to a preference for the new state's product and not the result of
other restructuring done with different motivations and for other objectives 12 . Finally, I
supplement this data with the complete records of IPO data from Thompson SDC. IPO
data adds more variables (such as whether the firm was venture capital backed and the
share of insiders), and narrows in on firms that are at the critical private-public juncture.
I find roughly 2500 movements in my sample period. This is consistent with previous
literature using other approaches (such as sampling and checking a subset of the firms)13
1.3.2 Private Firms
Ideally, we would like to have a complete universe of public and private firms. Private
firms are smaller and thus are likely to respond differently to tax changes. However,
the agency problems faced by a (smaller) private firm and consequently the governance
of private firms are decidedly different. It would be especially interesting to track private
firms as they go through the initial IPO process. Unfortunately, the lack of mandatory
reporting for private firms greatly hampers the data collection process. Using Dun and
Bradstreet data, which tracks the larger private firms, I collected a full cross section of
the most recent private firm information, and find (see figure 2) patterns different from
those in public firms (compare Dammann and Schundeln (2007) that use similar data) .
However the collection and full analysis of a panel of private firms and the determinants of
private firm incorporation choices and their governance choices is left for future research.
11 This will not be the case if there is a merger in which the accounting survivor is a new firm created for
the reincorporation process.
12Following Daines 2001, the legal literature often drops all financial and utility firms, since many of them
face additional regulations and laws. I have experimented both with and without these firms and have
found (similar to the finding in the legal literature) that the results are similar in virtually all the analysis
in this paper. In the specifications that follow I generally choose to use the full sample.
13 Compare Rauh 2006 suggesting that about 5% of firms reincorporated over a 13 year period.
Figure 1-2: Shares of Private Firms Located and Incorporated in the 50 States.
1.3.3 Price - Incorporation and Franchise Taxes:
Overview
Taxes are the most direct price imposed on and paid by firms. States choose the taxes
imposed on all firms operating or domiciled therein. As a result, there is considerable
variance in the tax implications of incorporation in the different states. There are two main
taxes that are generally directly related to the choice of incorporation: the incorporation
or organization tax and the franchise tax. Both of these taxes generally have one of several
unusual bases: the amount of the firm's actual or assumed par value capital, the number
of authorized shares, or the total paid in capital. There is also variation across states and
over time in the maximum amount of tax levied and in the manner in which these taxes
are calculated. The difference between the taxes is that the first is paid upon incorporation
and any increase in this base. Thus, if a firm decides to increase its number of authorized
shares (the maximum number of shares management can issue without obtaining further
shareholder approval) it will generally pay (in states imposing an incorporation tax with
this base) a tax which is a function of the number of additional authorized shares. There
is, therefore, an implied penalty for moving to a different state that charges such a tax,
since in doing so the firm will have to pay the incorporation tax rate on the full amount.
since in doing so the firm will have to pay the incorporation tax rate on the full amount.
Franchise taxes are computed from a similar base, and paid annually.
Indeed, the unusual base of authorized shares, which can vary considerably from the
number of shares issued, is largely arbitrary. The number of authorized shares is in the
financial statement, but is not collected by compustat or any other electronic database I
am aware of. It does, perhaps, somewhat reflect the power and flexibility management has
in making large expenditures without issuing debt, and in combating takeovers. However,
it is difficult to see the connection between this firm choice of base and the potential
implications it has on the balance of shareholder-management power. It also seems to be
rather easy to manipulate. There is, however, a methodological advantage of using tax
as a price in that there is significant price variation, stemming not only from the cross
section and time series variation, but also from different firms being subjected to different
prices (across the different jurisdictions), depending on their tax base and their location
in the previous period. Compare Kahan and Kamar (2001) who discuss some of this price
variation.
The variance in the incidence of these taxes on incorporated firms stems not only from
the variance in rates, but also - more importantly - from the fact that in many states
these taxes do not differentiate in the rates charged to domestic firms - incorporated in the
state - and foreign firms - incorporated in a different state - but conducting business in the
state. In these states, the base is (for domestic and foreign firms) the capital which can
be attributed to the state. Thus, the tax base is often related proportionally to the place
of income generation, a location assumed exogenous to the incorporation choice in this
work. Thus, for many states (and consequently for many choice alternatives) the choice of
incorporation conditional on fixed business locations, will not entail any tax implications
at all. Finally, these taxes are very small. Even for the large public firms considered, the
taxes generally do not exceed a few hundred thousand dollars a year, and are often much
less. In fact, most jurisdictions do not impose a tax at all.
Do these taxes matter? The legal literature generally treats these taxes as di minimus
(and thus they have not been analyzed) as they generally do not exceed several hundred
thousands of dollars a year for large firms (and are often much less). However, if these taxes
do not matter, they are a distortion free way for states to collect hundreds of millions of
dollars (at least) in taxes. Alternatively, if they do matter, or, in other words, if they are (at
least in some jurisdictions) high enough to have real effects on (at least some) firm behavior,
if firms have non-zero elasticities to these taxes, these elasticities can be used to price the
preferences for the governance arrangements that firms care about. Indeed, franchise
taxes do not seem to be irrelevant even for public firms. In Delaware, the maximum
annual franchise tax is now (after a 10% increase in 2003) $165,000. Firms that have
a minimum of $660M in assets and $26.4M in authorized shares will pay the maximum
tax. However, since the tax base depends on authorized (not issued) shares, firms with a
high ratio of authorized to issued shares (a common phenomenon) could have significantly
fewer assets and still pay the maximum rate. In the case of Delaware, the Bar commonly
bemoans the adverse effects of tax increases on the number of incorporations. Firms
also cite differential franchise tax rates as a reason for migrating out of Delaware. And
finally, perhaps consequently, Delaware invests significant resources in justifying the taxes,
claiming investments in improving the quality of its system, particularly in the time periods
close to tax increases (compare Barzuza 2004). Indeed, we would expect that a source of
revenue responsible for such a large share of the state budget would be carefully calibrated.
Incorporation and Franchise Tax Rates: Data
I manually constructed the time series of all incorporation and franchise taxes for the 51 US
jurisdictions, by locating the state laws in which the taxes are imposed and then looking
back at all their amendments since 1990. The CCH research network and their (older)
paper volumes were useful in this regard, as well as the Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw databases.
Appendix 314 details the incorporation and franchise tax rates for the jurisdictions that
14Will be available on my website.
impose them differentially for firms incorporated therein. In cases where incorporation
has no effect on the tax, I omit the rates. When the cap on the tax is lower than 10, 000
dollars I just list the cap. I have gone back as far as 1990 and thus list any previous rates
that may have been in effect since then. Note that while the tax is often a small percent of
the base, the base for the public firms is often in the hundreds of millions or billions. Data
for the firm tax base is taken from compustat (or disclosure CDs). Note, however, that
the authorized shares are approximated by the total number of shares issues. Thus the
tax amounts are biased downward. The necessary assumption made here is therefore that
there is no clear systematic bias (correlated with the price elasticities) in the gap between
authorized and issued shares.
1.3.4 SCIT: A Product Characteristic
SCIT: Background
The third tax considered, the State Corporate Income Tax (SCIT), is different in that it
is not closely linked to incorporation. The SCIT is apportioned between the states with
which the firm has "nexus", which, while generally established by incorporation, can also
be established by having property or a place of business in the state (a commonplace
reality when conducting business therein) - using a formula weighting sales, employment
and property. The apportionment base largely overlaps with the nexus base. Non business
income is taxed at the home state. This home state is also not necessarily the state of
incorporation. Furthermore, some states have a "throwback rule", 15 which stipulates
that if there is no tax in the states in which the income is generated (usually where the
product or service is sold), then the income is "thrown back" for tax purposes, to the state
from which the product or service was shipped or provided. Here too, the determination
1 5Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming do NOT have this
rule.
of this state will likely be related to the place of income generation and not incorporation.
There is a physical presence criterion. Finally, there is the issue of the difference in
reporting criteria across states. For example, Delaware does not tax intangible property,
which incentivizes firms to establish a subsidiary in Delaware with trademark rights and
to funnel significant earnings into this (untaxed) subsidiary. These types of phenomenons
have encouraged states 16 to pass combined reporting laws by which all income from all
subsidiaries is reported together and taxed together. This may facilitate more deductions of
losses across firm parts, but also combats questionable transfers of income to subsidiaries
located in favorable (tax) jurisdictions. However, once again, this is all related to the
corporate income base, and therefore should not directly affect incorporation.
There is, however, likely a connection between the location and domicile of a corpo-
ration. These decisions are often made together. In other words, firms may weigh the
incorporation features jointly with the location features. The SCIT also do affect many of
the "tax ratings" of the states, which do not explicitly and transparently separate taxes
by their varying incidences (i.e. by whether they require physical activity in the state).
They contribute to the overall "feel" of the tax burden therein - a factor which may have
an effect as well 17 . Firms may also "punish" states that are taxing them at high rates by
leaving. Furthermore, there are situations in which a firm may not have nexus to the state
(other than through incorporation), but may still owe the state a significant amount of
taxes should nexus be established. Such may be the case if sales made in the state are the
only connection to it"s . In these cases incorporation may indeed have an effect. Finally,
it is commonly perceived that there is gaming of the system in a myriad of ways, some of
which may indeed relate to this choice of incorporation.
'
6 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York (recently adopted), North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vermont
and West Virginia (recently adopted), have combined reporting laws.
1 7 See for example www.learnaboutlaw.com (visited 7/31/08)
'
8 The Commerce Clause in the Constitution is generally seen as prohibiting states to tax firms from other
states soley due to their selling to residents of the state.
SCIT: Data
The SCIT rate were manually collected and coded from the hard copies of each year's Book
of States. A look at the data in Appendix 419, reveals wide variance in the cross section of
rates, and many changes over time.
1.3.5 State Laws
Background
The governance laws take the form of directly granting shareholders more voting power
and say in the corporation and limiting the benefits and discretion of management and
also of making takeovers - which can be seen as alternatives to the current management
- more or less difficult. See definition of all laws in appendix Al. State laws can be
categorized into those that are more or less pro shareholder rights. However, there is
some theoretical ambiguity in the overall potential effects of the laws (compare Kahan
(2006)). Thus, for example, provisions like control share cash-out or fair price provisions,
protect shareholders, but in doing so also make takeovers more costly. There is a trade-off
and such provisions are harmful only if their bite is primarily regarding shareholder wealth
enhancing takeovers. It would indeed be surprising to find so many uniformly good or
uniformly bad laws successfully passed in many states. It is of course possible that at
least some of these laws would increase shareholder premiums conditional on a takeover
occurring and in expectation be value enhancing. However, the prevalent opinion in
the legal literature (which likely shapes perceptions in firms), largely resulting from event
studies of the stock market reaction to the passing of takeover laws, is that the laws are
shareholder wealth decreasing (see Romano, 1983, Karpoff and Malatesta 1989).
Furthermore, there is variation in the status of laws - mandatory or enabling - and even
within the enabling laws there are differences in terms of the quorum required within a firm
"
1Will be available on my website.
to opt out of them. I stress, however, that even flexible enabling laws are likely to have
effects. Firstly, opting out of these laws is very rare (see for example Subramanian 2001).
Secondly, we know from much other economic research that defaults behaviorally do matter
(compare for example Madrian and Shea, 2001). Corporate law - by and large - is enabling,
and few claim that corporate law is irrelevant. Laws represent the political consensus
reached in the state and the foundation and direction upon which other legislation and
judicial decisions and interpretations are made. These laws serve as the background for
negotiations between managers and shareholders (when there are - as there often are -
conflicts of interest).
Data
The current versions of state laws can be found in Lexis and Westlaw. Westlaw is partic-
ularly good in that it tracks many of the changes over time in the laws and so it facilitates
the construction of a panel. Given the incompleteness of these sources, as well as the vary-
ing structure and language of the laws in the 51 US jurisdictions, I used a variety of other
sources as well: For some of the laws, the Model Business Corporations Act: Annotated,
has (incomplete) comments on the states adopting the provisions of, or similar provisions
to, those included in this codex. Many of the laws related to takeovers are also tracked
by the State Takeover volumes published by the IRRC (see for example, Pinnell 2000).
There are also up to date takeover watch databases (including for example SharkReppel-
lent.net), which track some of the laws relating to takeovers. Following the previous legal
literature, and my own preliminary disaggregate research, I found it useful to reduce the
dimensionality and exposition of my results by combining two groups of laws into indices:
The first, the ATS index, is composed of the five antitakeover statutes found to be
important by Bebchuk and Cohen (2003). These include control share acquisitions, ex-
panded constituencies, fair price, business combination and poison pill endorsement laws.
As explained in the appendix, these laws, while often relating to shareholder rights more
generally, offer protections to firms from takeovers. Control share acquisition laws require
a disinterested shareholder vote to grant a new large shareholder voting rights. This share-
holder vote is an impediment to takeovers, but does provide some protection to sharehold-
ers against coercive bids, and thus some see this law as positive despite its antitakeover
nature. Expanded constituency laws grants management discretion to consider other
firm constituencies, such as employees and suppliers when considering a takeover offer.
This provides an easily manipulable legal base directors can use to resist value enhancing
takeovers20 . Fair price provisions limit the range of prices bidders can pay in two tiered
offers and thus reduce the bargaining power of bidders. Shareholders are more likely to
resist takeovers since they do not risk facing a significantly lower price in the second round.
This constrains potentially beneficial acquirers in situations in which the stock price is in
decline. Business combination laws impose a moratorium on certain transactions between
large shareholders and the firm, unless the transaction is approved by the board of direc-
tors. This grants management the power to limit the benefits and synergies of mergers and
thus reduces the overall desirability of the takeover. Finally, poison pill endorsements are
a seal of approval given by the state for the use of poison pills, which are a host of mech-
anisms that grant the holders of target stock the ability to make takeovers more difficult.
Poison pills are seen as a crucial component in modern takeover resistance strategies.
The second, the MAND index, follows, Kahan 2006, and includes four laws relating
to the shareholder-manager balance of power, where states differ in the flexibility given
to firms to opt out of them. Following Kahan 2006, states are coded as having the
law if they impose the provision as a mandatory rule. These include cumulative voting,
limits on loans to officers to directors, the restriction of limits on the personal liability of
20 This interpretation follows that common in the legal literature. However, recent research has suggested
that there are situations in which broadening the firms' objective can be beneficial (see for example Allen
and Gale 2002, Allen, Carletti and Marquez 2007). The assumption thus made here is that the laws as
they are written and applied in the US (or at least as they are construed by firms and shareholders), are
prone to managerial manipulation. Future research is needed to better determine the precise effects of
such laws and the scenarios in which they are desirable.
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directors, and merger vote majority requirements. Cumulative voting allows shareholders
to concentrate their vote and thereby facilitates the ability of minority shareholders to
elect directors. These provisions are thus seen to increase shareholder rights. Limits on
loans to officers and directors often impose personal liability on the recipients of loans or
procedural requirements for the approval of these loans. The restriction of limits on the
personal liability of directors are laws which do not allow firms to eliminate the personal
liability of directors for a breach of duty. Finally, merger vote majority requirements are a
limitation on the procedure by which mergers are approved2 1
Following Wald and Long, 2007, I also track the laws relating to the requirements of
asset to liability ratios to make payouts to shareholders (found there to influence firm
incorporation decisions). Finally, I look at the presence of laws recognizing actions of
managers that are made outside the scope of their authority, ultra vires, as "firm actions"
for which the firm is responsible. In the absence of these laws, claims could be made
regarding the voidability of corporate actions beyond the scope of the charter. Thus the
existence of these laws imposes more responsibility on corporations for the actions of their
agents22
Indeed, while most of the changes in these laws were made in the late 1980s and early
1990s, there are changes over the entire time period studied. One of the most interesting
changes concerns the special rules regarding loans made to officers and directors. The
federal intervention in the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley act introduced a general prohi-
bition on such loans, thereby imposing this restriction across jurisdictions. This is an
example of a (limited) federal intervention which has the effect of reducing the variance
2 1This law is somewhat different in that it could also be conceivably coded as an antitakeover statute.
However, the difference here is that a state is coded as having the law if it imposes it as a mandatory
provision.
22I also experimented with other laws including antigreenmail restrictions, compensation restrictions,
control share cash out provisions, the adoption of the Model Business Corporation Act, severance pay, and
labor contract provisions (see definitions in the appendix). However, I omit these from the analysis since
they generally were not significant, or lacked sufficient cross section variability. I plan to revisit some of
these laws in future research.
in incorporation implications, an intervention we are likely to see more of if the current
regulatory proposals materialize. I return to this in section 6 below in discussing policy
proposals.
1.3.6 Court Quality
Background
Much of the hype for the corporate law hot spots, and for Delaware in particular, concerns
the relative quality of their court systems. Delaware boast a unique five member chancery
court which has exclusive jurisdiction over, and hence specialization in, corporate law
disputes. Furthermore, some claim that the Delaware court contributes to Delaware's
supremacy by administering law that is predictable but not easily replicable.
Data
Ideally, to capture the benefits of the better systems, we would like measures for the
overall quality of the decisions (i.e. for whether it was the "correct" decision), for the
time it took to administer them, and relatedly, for the expenses that were required to get
these "correct" decisions. Obviously, these measures are not available. There have been
a number of studies assessing and comparing the quality of the state courts (see Choi et
al 2008 for a review). These studies employ different methodologies and do not reach
similar conclusions. I approximate for the quality or nature of the legal systems using two
databases with proxies that seem most relevant for the questions at hand (given the data
limitations): The first includes the Chamber of Commerce ranking and score, which are
based on surveys of senior lawyers (in house counsel) at large corporations (with annual
revenues of over 100M). These measures are commonly used (see for example Dammann
and Schundeln 2007, and Kahan 2006) to rate the states, however, they suffer from several
limitations. The first, which is more technical, is that they only go back to 2001 (and
hence my panel is just for 2001 - 2007), and there are some differences in the survey
methodology and scoring even over this time period. The second is that they do not relate
specifically to corporate law, but rather to more general categories of laws (such as torts
and contracts, criminal law, and so on). The third - and what invites much criticism in the
literature - is that given that they originate exclusively from the in house legal counsel at
large firms, they are likely biased towards the preferences of management in these firms (to
which the legal counsel often report). The second database comes from the State Court
Statistics Project, which is conducted by the National Council for State Courts (NCSC)
and disseminated by the ICPSR (I collected the most recent data from the NCSC website
and thus have the years 1993 - 2005). I look at both the appellate and trial level statistics:
I include the following measures (for both the appellate and trial levels, compare Dakolias,
1999): The first is the ratio of civil cases disposed (whether by throwing out the case or
deciding it for or against the appellant) to civil cases filed (a "clearance ration" and an
"appeals clearance ratio", respectively). For states with more than one appellate court, I
average the measures. The second is the clearance ratio for all cases (not just civil). I
experimented with this measure since many courts have jurisdiction over many areas of
law, and hence their workload and efficiency may be influenced by the caseload in all of
these areas of law. The third is the ratio of the total number of judges in the courts to
the total resident population. Finally, I include the ratio of appeals that were successful
(where the decision was reversed or modified) to those that were not (where the appeal
was dismissed or the trial level decision was affirmed). All measures at time t are used to
analyze the (consequential) behavior at time t + 1.
These measures proxy for how efficient the systems are at getting rid of cases (how back-
loaded they are), where, for many of these disputes, the time the case is in trial is a very
significant cost determinant (and, consequently, likely to significantly influence litigation
behavior). These measures are by no means constant (even though in equilibrium the
workload must be balanced). Courts tend to have "better" and "worse" years in handling
their workloads. This can obviously also be influenced by the number of judges that are
in office (which motivates the inclusion of the number of judges per resident population
measure separately). Finally, the appeal success rate is an (imperfect) measure for a variety
of litigation climate indicators, including how much the trial level courts are respected (by
the higher court levels) as well as how likely appeals are to be filed (although this is a
more complicated equilibrium result influenced by the success of settlements out of courts,
beliefs, etc.).
1.3.7 Firm Characteristics - Decomposition of the Heterogeneity
Having described the main characteristics of the incorporation product, I now move to
discuss the data sources used and the motivation for the construction of the observed firm
heterogeneity. In addition to the data on firms and IPOs discussed above, these relate to
the structure of firm ownership, the industry concentration, and the characteristics of its
management and directors:
Ownership
The dramatic changes in the percentage of institutional holdings alters the balance of power
between shareholders and management. Institutional owners are generally seen as more
sophisticated owners, especially when they hold significant shares, and thus are more likely
to have a stronger say in the firm. Institutional investors are at least partially responsible
for the "greater involvement of boards of directors and shareholders" (Holmstrom and
Kaplan 2003). As mentioned, their presence has also been found to be related to the
abnormal returns earned by firms with better internal governance 23 . Accordingly, I model
the heterogeneity across several ownership dimensions:
2 3Interestingly, the growing strength of sophisticated investors dampens the concern for agency problems
between the shareholders and management and increases concerns of agency problems between larger and
smaller shareholders.
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Institutional Holdings: Data
Thompson's Reuters CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings, has data for the stock
holdings of all institutions managing 100M dollars or more24 . Using this data, Cremers
and Nair (2006, CN) look at two measures of internal governance - the percent held by
the firm's largest institutional block-holder (which are shareholders with more than 5%),
and the percent held by the 18 largest public pension funds. CN see public pension
funds to be more "free from conflicts of interest and corporate pressure" and as "aggressive
shareholder activists" (compare Guercio and Hawkings (1999)). They also see institutions
holding larger shares to have incentives "to monitor the management and pay for part
of the gains that occur through takeovers" ...potentially being "crucial to facilitate" and
thus working "in tandem with the market for corporate control". Following their work,
I construct four measures of ownership, including their two measures 25 , as well as the
fractional ownership by all institutional investors, and the total fractional ownership of
blockholders with more than 1%. The reporting periods differs by institution (it ranges
from quarterly to yearly), and thus when there is more than one reporting quarter they
are averaged.
Indeed, the existence of such institutional investors implies a selection by them, which
is an endogeneity concern in the sense that while it is interesting to see which stocks are
picked by institutions, we would also like to randomly assign them to different firms and
trace these firms' differential choices and performance. This endogeneity has recently been
discussed and dealt with by using the inclusion in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 as
an instrument (see Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales, 2008 and Sapra, Subramanian and
Subramanian 2008), an approach I follow below.
24 There may be some omissions for small holdings under 200,000 dollars.
251 was able to identify 15 of their funds in my data.
Director Holdings and Characteristics
The IRRC Director's database contains director level data yearly from 1996 - 2006 from
which I aggregated (to the year level), the following variables: the average director age; the
percent of reported Asians, African Americans, Whites, Hispanics, and Native Americans;
the proportion of women, the average number of other major boards the directors are on;
the average number of years served (I control for the firm age); the average number of years
left (if there is a fixed term); total shares held; total voting power held; the proportion
of the directors that are linked to the firm; the proportion of independent directors; the
proportion up for election; the proportion that attended less than 75% of the meetings;
the proportion that own less than 1%; and the proportion that are grandfathered upon
retirement/tenure.
This data is supplemented with data from the "Corporate Library" (which goes from
2001 - 2007) on the CEO compensation and characteristics, total number of directors, and
the overall compliance levels with SOX and with the loan requirements in SOX.
1.3.8 Internal Governance
Complete data on governance provisions in firm charters is taken from the IRRC database
for the years 1990 - 2006. This is the data used by Gompers (2003) expanded to 2006
(they used the data up to 1998) and is generally published on a biannual basis. This data
does not cover all of the publicly traded firms (it generally covers several thousand a year).
It is "derived from a variety of public sources including corporate bylaws and charters,
proxy statements, annual reports, as well as 10-K and 10-Q documents filed with the SEC.
The IRRC universe is drawn from the S&P 500 as well as the annual lists of the largest
corporations in the publications of Fortune, Forbes, and BusinessWeek. The IRRC sample
was expanded by several hundred firms in 1998 [and has been expanding consistently since
then through additions of some smaller firms and firms with high institutional-ownership
levels...even in 1990 the IRRC tracked more than 93 percent of the total capitalization
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of the combined New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX),
and NASDAQ markets." (Gompers 2003). As mentioned there is a GIM index which is
publicly available. See appendix A2 for a description of the variables. The most recent
sample is taken from the SharkRepellent website which tracks more firms (although does
not go back historically).
1.3.9 Firm Industry Concentration
Previous studies have not found industry controls to produce any clear or meaningful con-
clusions. However, the recent work by Giroud and Mueller (2008) suggests that governance
may matter (more) in noncompetitive industries. Thus a final characteristic of the firm
is the concentration of the industry in which it operates, the Herfindahl index of the SIC
code, as provided by compustat or the U.S. Bureau of Census (which accounts for private
firms as well). I experimented with the 2, 3 and 4 digit codes, but generally use the 3 digit
code, following the existing literature. 26
1.4 Modeling The Demand
1.4.1 Formulation and Specification
Firms have the following utility function from each potential state of incorporation:
Uijt(xjt, jt, Pjt, it, jt) x= jt 3 i + yjt7i - oipijt + Ogijt + r7mjt + j + Afj t + Eijt. (1.1)
xj is a vector of state laws, which includes the two indices ATS and MAND as well as the
payout and ultra vires laws and the state corporate income taxes; yj is the vector of court
qualities; pij are the franchise taxes, and the incorporation taxes (note that these taxes are
26
"We do however see a potential caveat in merely analyzing the concentration of the industry. If indeed the
threat to management is the driving force, then a measure for how competitive the market for (comparable)
managers should be sought. Some (especially high ranking) positions across different industries, compete
in the same market for managers.
firm specific). gij is the geographical distance - the physical distance from the incorporated
state to the home state; mj is a dummy variable indicating whether this product is the
"home state" for the firm. Naturally, all characteristics have a time subscript as well,
reflecting their changes over time. eijt is the commonly used logit error. Firms receive
independent draws from a type-two extreme value distribution in each period.
As is common in these specifications, the individual specific coefficients capture the
heterogeneity in firms and the (plausible) variation in tastes, for the laws and process.
Note that the price and geography characteristics, by construction, differ for different
firms. (j are the unobserved benefits from being incorporated in the system (commonly
assumed to be enjoyed by all firms)2 7 . In essence, this is a state of incorporation (product)
fixed effect. It captures the average (firm specific or aggregate) preference for the system.
The Alj t is then the time-specific deviation from the average (j. In this respect this
application nicely matches the characteristic based demand approach. Products (in my
model and as observed by firms) are a bundle of characteristics, and these characteristics
vary over time.
I began with a specification with 51 product choices (all US jurisdictions) and an outside
option of incorporating abroad. However, this model was very difficult to estimate, given
that in my database of public firms there are very few states that attract a significant
number of out of state firms. Thus, in order to achieve convergence of my estimators I
limit the choice set. I assume that firms choose to incorporate at home, in one of 10 out
of state options, or in the outside option, which is anything else. Including the home state
as one of the options allows me to keep most of the variation in the product characteristics
of all jurisdictions (and the absence of these characteristics abroad). This difference in
the choice sets adds to the variation that comes from firms switching their incorporation
choices, since structurally similar firms face different choices given their exogenous physical
27 Note that the lack of a firm specific subscript i, on (ji, or a model for the distribution of preferences
for the unobservable is restrictive only as we depart from a completely flexible preference structure for the
observed characteristics. Compare Nevo, 2000.
location. The 10 out of state options include any state that has more than 1% of the firms
(at any point in my sample period) - which includes Delaware, Nevada, Maryland, Florida,
Colorado, and Massachusetts - as well as California - home to many firms, and known for
having very little takeover legislation, and New York, also home to many firms. I also
include Pennsylvania, which historically had more firms, and Wyoming, which has made
efforts recently to promote itself. As can be seen in Figures 6 and 7 in the appendix most
of these states have seen significant shifts in the shares of firms they attract over my sample
years, from the general public firm pool, and from IPO firms.
Firms are assumed to observed all product characteristics and weigh them in their
location choice. We assume the utility from the outside option is:
uiot = ot + 7roDit + uOViot + womot + Eiot. (1.2)
Following the standard assumptions we normalize (0 to zero, thus the benefits from
incorporation in one of the 11 choice options are relative to the normalized outside option
of going elsewhere. uio = 0 so the utilities represent the difference between the particular
chosen good and the outside good. This assumption implies that when choosing one of
the states not accustomed to hosting out of state firms or to incorporate abroad, firms are
doing something different than what my model captures, which I normalize to a utility of
zero 28
Note, that much of the firm heterogeneity is observed. Thus, we can model the random
coefficients as:
0Li  i + -rDi + Evi with vi - N(0, Ik+1).
"I experimented with several other measures of the outside good, including dropping firms making
choices outside these 11 options, and using incorporation abroad, or incorporation in one of these states as
an outside option, and found my results to be similar.
The Di captures the firm structure heterogeneity in financial profile, ownership, and indus-
try, as discussed above. The vi capture unobservable firm heterogeneity (where E captures
the scale), i.e. other components not captured in the Di vectors. This of course is much
more flexible and general than a nested logit model, where the home vs. one of the other
products "nest" is captured with the inclusion of the "home" dummy variable for the home
product.
To simplify notation, we define xj = (xj, yj), the variables for which there are random
coefficients, yj = (gj, mj), and pij = (pij,gij) the variables for which there are no random
coefficients, and:
e1 = (,Y)
2  
= (7)
op = (c, ¢)
0 = (r)
0u = (C)
So:
Uj (jj,j)= Y xjkOk1 + ZYih 0h + j + a j +0 j k + Zj DiO ± XVi u, + Sit
k h kr kl
Thus, each characteristic with a random coefficient has (1+ R + L) coefficients: the average
coefficient, R coefficients on the observable firm structure demographics and L coefficients
on the unobservables. For simplicity L = 1 so we have one unobservable per product
characteristic.
Given the variation in the product characteristics over time, I include 11 dummies for
each of the choice options. These dummies subsume the j , thus restricting the endogeneity
concerns to the time specific - product specific unobservable, Afjt, not captured by and
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related to the variables in my model. Thus, the specification becomes:
Uijt(xj,yy, Di, j, Ajt) = Sj+- jkol Yjh + t+ Pijt+E XjkDirO9k+E XjkVil1O+Eijt
k h kr kl
where Sj are the state dummies.
Firms that choose state j are those for which state j provides them with the highest
utility, i.e. those belonging to the set:
Ajt(x.t,P.t, 6 .t; ) = {(Di,pij, Vi, Eit)luijt > Uilt Vl E J}. (1.3)
Thus, the individual choice probabilities are:
Pr(jDi, exp[Sj+k XjkO8 h Yjh2h + jt Pjt+ Ekr XjkDirOrk+C kl XjkVil kl]fv +E exp[Sq +Ek XqkOk +h YqhO+ OPiqt+ Lqt+Ekr XqkDir0 k +Ekl qkvil kl
1.4.2 Endogeneity: Discussion
Identification comes from many firms selecting from a wide menu of characteristic bundles,
where there are changes over time in the product characteristics, and also much variation in
the product choice sets faced by the different firms. Indeed, firms come from all jurisdictions
(and abroad). Identification of the standard deviation of the random coefficients comes
both from individuals switching in response to changes in the characteristics, as well as
from structurally similar individuals facing different choices sets. This is the result of
the changes over time in the options afforded to structurally similar firms, as well as a
result of my model design whereby the comparisons made are with a varying home option
and a fixed set of 10 out of home alternatives. The proportion that switch (or behave
differently) characterize the shape of the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity in
the preferences.
The ability to include state of incorporation dummies controls for the (j which is the
chief source of endogeneity in these models, reduces most of the endogeneity concerns:
The prices, the variation in tax rates 29 , likely reflect the advantages different states
offer to the firms located therein, however, as mentioned, most of the price variation is in
the differential choice sets and base of the different firms. The infrequency of tax changes
reduces the need (and in fact ability) to instrument for taxes.
There are standard "default" IO instruments that come from the structure of the setup
(see BLP, 1995, Hausman et al 1994, and Hausman 1996). These include (in context of our
application) the observed characteristics of the states that are assumed to be exogenous,
and the sum of the values of the same characteristics of the products offered by other
states3 0. These instruments present particular challenges here in that they rely heavily on
the structure of the game played by the states, a structure very difficult to specify, given
the stagnation in state action. Accordingly, I was unable to use them to explain the broad
variation in the taxes paid (given the state base and rate as well as the individual firm's
tax liability). I experimented with using the variation in overall state tax revenue, since
these influence the tendency to change the price, but are (likely) not directly related to
changes in the unobserved product characteristics captured in the Ajt, as they are chiefly
motivated by the many other budgetary factors. However, here too, unsurprisingly, I was
unable to fit a significant first stage. Taxes are thus treated as exogenous, as are the state
laws and court structure (compare the discussion in Nagar et al 2005).
The demographics are, in the context of this model, a decomposition of the heterogene-
ity of the firm. However, econometrically, they are no different from product characteristics
in that their interaction with the characteristics need not be correlated with the Aj. As
mentioned above, ownership by institutional shareholders is likely to be endogenous, in the
sense that while sophisticated shareholders help police management and shape firm pref-
2 9As mentioned only the incorporation tax and the franchise tax are treated as prices. SCIT is a
characteristic.
3 0 Note that the third set of instruments in BLP, the sum of the characteristics of the products offered by
other states, as well as the instruments offered in Hausman et al (1994) and in Hausman (1996), the price of
the same product in other markets, are not relevant here, since each state offers one unique product. The
difference in price here is a form of (third degree) price discrimination in that firms cannot choose different
products at different prices within a given state.
erence, they may also tend to choose firms that are expected to perform better given their
being in a jurisdiction which receives a particularly favorable time-specific shock. Here, as
mentioned above, I use the instrument proposed by Aghion et al (2007), inclusion in the
S&P 500. Inclusion in this index has a large random component (there can only be 500),
unrelated to the fundamental performance of the firm, but the assumption is that nonethe-
less it is the inclusion in the S&P 500 itself that generates a kick in institutional ownership.
Firms included in this index attract institutional funds for a variety of reasons"3 . Thus I
use a regression discontinuity approach whereby I include a flexible function of market value
32 and a dummy for inclusion in this index. The assumption is that (flexibly) controlling
for market value, being in or out of the index is largely random and thus this variation can
be used to look at the effects of randomly increasing the share of institutional shareholders.
Indeed, I will assume that this is the key endogeneity correction needed. However, the
methodology outlined here can easily accommodate the treatment of endogeneity in any of
the other product characteristics or firm attributes3 3 .
1.4.3 Estimation
I outline and follow the control function approach proposed by Imbens and Newey (2008),
and implemented by Blundell and Powell (2004), and Petrin (2006) 34 . According to this
approach, we write the endogeneity treatment as follows:
31 Openly indexed funds are more likely track it, managers (in open and closed funds) are benchmarked
against this index, and fiduciary duty laws influence such portfolio selection. See Aghion et al 2007.
32I chose levels to control for the linear relationship with market value that discretely breaks with the
discontinuity at the index. Controls are added for a power series of market value.
"
33 Endogeneity of the director and manager characteristics was not dealt with in detail given my finding
below of their not being instrumental in the incorporation decision.
I note that another potential instrument for institutional ownership is whether firms payout dividends
(given the rigidity in such decisions). I plan to explore this instrument further in future versions of this
work.
3 4 See Appendix E for two alternative treatment structures.
Assume that for the endogenous institutional ownership Deit
Deit = E[Dei zijt] + i (FS)
where zijt are the all exogenous variables (and instruments). Note that this includes all
characteristics of all choices.
Form
i = Dei - Dei
by taking functionals of the residuals from the estimation of the first stage. Table 2 shows
that all ownership measures are significant and that the first stage works well35 . The R
squared are relatively high3 6
We include and estimate an Sj f( ) for each product. The significance of these prod-
uct specific residuals is evidence of endogeneity, assuming the exclusion restrictions on the
instruments are valid. In addition, assuming one scalar error per product, a well defined
inverse for Dei, the general single equilibria across markets assumptions, and that condi-
tional on the Sj f(i) we are left with a similar specification and logit error, the inclusion of
this control variable essentially "controls" for the parts of the endogenous regressors that
are correlated with the Ajt, allowing for consistent estimation of the coefficients, and the
direct use of maximum simulated likelihood.
First, we construct the following likelihood:
L(D; 6, 0) = /N 1  T 1
log exp[Sj+E3 k XjkOk h YjhO h jt- Pijt-kr xjkDio kl klxki Sf(i)], u ^ )1(jit) f(v)d(,).og 1+E exp[Sq+E k XqkOk -h Yqh h- +Piqt+aqt+I r xqkDir orok-kl XqkVilOkl+Sqf(Ci)]
Then we directly maximize the sample analog:
3 5There is of course a different first stage for each specification of the model. Table 2 includes controls
for the litigation variables.
3 6 Over 15% for the 1% block and 24% for the total institutional share meaure, 15% for the pension block
and 17% for the 5% block measure.
log - I Z:Rj 1 Z I ( exp[Sj-k XkOt-h Yjh2I+OPijt+Sjf(i)+ Flr XjtDirOr+ko Xjtk'VitoOk0 ] )l(jit) f(U)d(v)
1+Eq exp[Sq+,- qkOk h YqhOh +OPpiqt+Sq f((i)+1r, Xqtl Di,0 t1+Zko XqtkUitoOo]
This is the probability of observing (all of) the choices in the data, given the structure
above. The right-hand-side does not have an analytical solution (given the assumed normal
distribution for v) and has to be simulated. Generally we average over R draws from the
assumed (normal) distribution, using different methods (Halton draws, Halton draws with
some extra noise, and just plain random draws with noise) to ensure proper coverage of
the domain of integration. We then obtain estimates of Sj, and the Os, controlling for
clustering and a host of starting points, and directly test and control for endogeneity.
(OLS regression clustere
Table 2
d at the state level, controlling for all characteristics of all products)
1% Block 5% Block Total Inst. Share Pension Block
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SP500 .098*** .013** .240*** .018***
(.017) (.005) (.037) (.001)
Market Value(billions) -.003*** -.002*** -.0004 -.00008***
(.0005) (.0001) (.002) (.00003)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 128002 128002 128002 128002
1.5 Results and Discussion
In this section I begin by looking specifically at the full model and then look specifically
at two tax changes in 2003 to confirm the tax results and to "zone in" on the populations
for which taxes are likely to most matter.
1.5.1 Demand Estimation
As mentioned above, the huge dimensionality of the data precludes the possibility of dis-
cussing all combinations of specification. Thus, in what follows, I will try to give a
representative sample of the results. Note that the estimates are identified up to scale,
given the normalization above. Thus, the focus should be on their relative magnitudes
(ratios) rather than on their absolute size. Table 5 below details the summary statistics
for the relevant variables in the specifications discussed below.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
3.094 1.597
0.623 0.781
rictions 0.925 0.316
0.560 0.496
i Ownership 0.151 0.207
ncentration 0.2 0.209
ing) 24.501 24.788
6.233 5.571
0.065 0.035
)n Taxes (Thousands) 34.065 229.691
:ked 0.155 0.362
er IPO 36.606 21.626
,atio (Appeals) 1.079 0.261
,atio (Trial) 0.843 0.185
housands) 1.344 1.063
Tables 1A and 3A present the several specifications. Note that with the inclusion of
additional firm structure measures, the sample size decreases and thus, while the qualitative
results are similar, the coefficients are not identical.
Preferences for States of Incorporation and Incorporation Characteristics
First, while most of the product fixed effects are insignificant, the fixed effects for the
Home state and Delaware products are large, positive and significant. This reflects the
N
1921327
1921327
1921327
1921327
1938536
1938536
428787
798019
1823545
1938536
849924
318099
1249885
1361846
1752226
preferences for being incorporated at home and in Delaware being the most common, but
also suggest that despite the many variables in the specifications I present, there are still
many residual unexplained characteristics that influence firm choice. These can include
for example networks effects, the "prestige" of the Delaware jurisdiction and its unique
court, or a general reluctance to explore outside options in the case of firms preferring to
stay at home.
Secondly, regarding the laws, on average, firms strongly prefer to have takeover statutes
(the ATS index laws), and have a negative preference for the MAND index. This implies
that, on average, firms prefer to not be constrained in the election of directors (through
cumulative voting), or in the ability of managers to receive loans3 7 . Similarly they prefer
to have the option to excuse directors of personal liability and to not be constrained in the
merger vote majority requirements. These combined suggest that, on average, managers
have a strong say in the "firm" choice and the ability to insulate themselves.
As to the preferences for the court process, I find that the only variables which matters
significantly to be the clearance ratios at the appellate and trial levels38 . As mentioned,
these are proxies for the overall expected delay in the courts system when cases are back-
loaded from previous years. Firms seem to prefer busier, more backloaded courts. This
could be explained by the insulation and deterrence an inefficient court system may offer,
since it implies that cases will take longer (something large deep pocketed firms can af-
ford), and thus justice, if and when served, will be costly. Interestingly, I do not find the
Chamber of Commerce ranking or score, as well as the other variables discussed above to
significantly influence the choice of jurisdiction39 . These results (my findings regarding
the clearance rates and the lack of significance of the other measures) contrast with claims
37 Although, as mentioned above, this ability is now uniformly banned by the SOX legislation.
"
3 The specifications presented below are for the trial court congestion measure. The appellate measure
is of a similar sign, but would require an argument based on the marginal deterrence of appeals. When
both variables (and their interactions) are included I lose some power and the significance levels are lower.
3 When adding the score and rank variables and thus reducing the sample size significantly we lose the
significance of this variable. However, it is unclear that this last result is not simply a sample size problem,
not reflecting the preference for this characteristic.
made in the literature regarding the importance of the legal system to firm choice. How-
ever, I note that these results, which are the results of the variation across all jurisdictions,
do not imply that the unique corporate tribunal in Delaware does not play a special role40 .
I was unable to identify the two incorporation taxes separately, likely due to their
multicollinearity, given their shared base, and thus I combined them. The incorporation
tax variable represents the total tax implications for choosing a given jurisdiction, given
the firm's location in the previous period. I computed the taxes using the rules in play
in year t - 1 with the tax base in year t. My reasoning is that given that I draw my
sample once a year I cannot expect firms to have moved (in the data) in the year in which
taxes change. Thus, in the context of the model above, my timing assumption is that at
the beginning of each period firms observe the tax rates in each jurisdiction and form an
expectation of what their tax base will be41 . I also experimented with a tax measure based
on last year's base and rate and found the results to be similar
As expected the demand is downward sloping. Note that given the large variance
in tax schedules, the tax measure is not a rate, but rather a total (firm specific price)
in thousands of dollars. Any significant tax increase (or initial imposition of tax) could
conceivably raise the tax liabilities by much more than several thousands and thus see a
significantly large firm response. Indeed, it seems that this choice of jurisdiction greatly
hampers the ability to collect high taxes, thus potentially explaining some of the state
lethargy in this area.
These results are consistent with my findings below regarding the 2003 tax increases.
However, the magnitude of the coefficients is much smaller. I suspect that, indeed, the
main response to taxes comes when there is a more salient change (as was the case regarding
40Furthermore, we may worry about this variable being endogenous in that a massive migration to an
attractive jurisdiction may bring with it an added burden to the courts that they have trouble accommo-
dating. However, given that, for the majority of states, corporate law disputes represent only a fraction of
the total burden on the courts, and that we generally do not observe any massive firm migration in a short
period of time, it is unlikely that the burden on the courts will be endogenously determined.
41Note that this tax base is generally based on measures controlled by the firm, such as the number of
authorized shares.
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the two most popular jurisdictions for "jurisdiction shoppers"), and less when the firm's
base increases due, for example, to the increase in its authorized shares. In addition, as
mentioned, there is often a penalty for moving in that firms will be required to pay the
incorporation tax on their entire tax base (as apposed to on an increase in base if they
stay in the same jurisdiction). When taxes are used to price the laws we get a rough
NPV (using a 5% yearly discount rate) for the ATS laws of 3.8M (for the average 3) and
negative 8.3M for the MAND laws. This suggests that while these laws matter, they do
not matter very much. These are potentially intriguing conclusions. However, given that
the taxes reflect the aggregate variation it is of course possible that taxes matter a lot for
a subset of firms. In any case, it is clear that the laws do not matter all that much for a
large segment of the firm population.
The SCIT are not significant when controls are added. As mentioned above, this is
not surprising, and suggests that the large amount of gaming of the differential rates does
not manifest in firm incorporation choices.
Finally, as expected the distance (measures in thousands of miles) negatively influences
the incorporation decision. Indeed, Nevada is aptly termed "Delaware of the west" reflect-
ing the general reluctance to have the incorporation state far away. A distant incorporation
state would undoubtedly raise the firm's costs in that administrative requirements as well
as any court proceedings would require a long and costly trip to the domicile state.
Firm Ownership
As mentioned, I experimented with 4 measures. The results on all the general institutional
holdings variables were similar and indeed stronger as the size of the institutional holdings
increased. Thus the results for the 5% block are generally of a larger magnitude than
those of the 1% block, which in turn are generally larger than those of the overall share.
The total institutional shares measure was generally not significant. The public pension
fund measure was generally not significant either (and at times not even of the same
sign), thus questioning the link between these incorporation decision results and the above
mentioned results on abnormal returns. I thus chose to present the results from the 1%
block specification, which seemed the most representative. As mentioned, this is the total
share of the firms' stock held by institutions that have shares of at least 1%. I discuss the
results here, assuming my endogeneity controls are valid, and that I accurately capture the
preferences of these "sophisticated" shareholders, and then return to discuss the different
endogeneity corrections in section 5.2 below.
Overall, institutional shareholders display a stronger reverse preference for the anti-
takeover laws (the sign is negative and the absolute magnitude of the interaction is larger
than the mean and so the combined effect, which is the sum of the two, is negative). This
suggests that these shareholders prefer managers to be policed by the potential takeover
threat and to not be insulated by law. Indeed, much research has shown that takeovers
often benefit target shareholders (and punish bad managers). Thus, this result can be
seen to reflect evidence of a key area in which there is a divergence of interests between
shareholders and managers, where it takes sophisticated shareholders, with a large enough
stake in the firm, to enforce the shareholder interests against those of managers. However,
this raises the question of why previous findings have found governance to especially matter
in firms with a larger fraction of institutional shareholders (see for example Cremers and
Nair 2005). If indeed these firms can have an impact on the governance choices of the
firms they hold, or on firm decisions more broadly, why would the existence of internal
governance mechanism be so important? 42
Interestingly, institutional investors express an additional, particularly large, negative
preference for the mandatory index. This can be explained in that when shareholders have
more power they do not need, nor desire, a rigid structure constraining their choice of mech-
anisms. This would imply that institutional shareholders still require a takeover friendly
4 2We may also wonder why it is chiefly in firms held by public pension funds, a measure not found to be
particularly important here.
legislative environment, but do not desire restrictive laws in other areas43 . However, this
result does suggest a potential caveat in including the merger voting supermajority in the
MAND grouping (one based on Kahan 2006). This requirement may indeed be more rele-
vant to the antitakeover group and may explain some of the size of this coefficient. Future
versions of this paper will include more results looking into these indices.
Taken as a whole, it seems that while institutional shareholders have a significant
influence on the firm, they do not simply echo a collective "shareholder wealth increasing"
interest, and are not a perfect substitute for governance mechanisms. There may be a
non-monotonicity in the effect of institutional shareholders on firm value, where when
institutional shareholders gain too much of the firm's share their objectives may change
and they may have a detrimental effect on firm decisions. We must thus also seriously
consider the potential for agency problems between the more concentrated and powerful
shareholders and the more dispersed less informed shareholders (see for example Nagar et
al 2005). Thus, for example the more powerful contingencies may not like the mandated
cumulative voting mechanisms which can grant dispersed shareholders more of a say in the
firm44 . More broadly, if indeed the current trend continues and institutional shareholders
become increasing powerful and dominant in the public exchanges, we must consider the
complex effects their presence has on firms and firm objectives, both at the firm level - in
the formulation of firm strategy - and in the design of regulatory policy.
Finally, these investors express seem to prefer well functioning courts, when measured
at the trial level. This suggests, that institutional shareholders prefer to be in better
policed environments, when measured at the trial level. In contrast, I find that, at the
appellate level, these investors exhibit an even a stronger (than mean) negative preference
for the key court characteristic. This result suggests a congruence in preferences there.
43 It is also possible that sophisticated shareholders may feel they have an advantage in jurisdictions
with MAND laws in that they can better police management (compared to competing firms with a more
dispersed ownership structure).
4 4Here too a disaggregate analysis of the laws in the MAND index may prove useful.
In future versions of the paper I plan to examine if indeed this can be reconciled with an
aim to deter value reducing external litigation and to facilitate the deterrence ensuing from
the potential to take management to court. This finding implies however that the choice
of incorporation jurisdiction is indeed sensitive to internalizing the differential effects of
judicial jurisdictions facing different burdens.
Industry Concentration
Here too, I experimented with several measures. I found the results using 3 and 4 digit
SIC codes to be similar4 5 . Following Giroud and Mueller (2008) I use the 3 digit measure
for the results presented below46 . I find that industry concentration particularly matters
regarding the MAND index. I do not find evidence of firms "surrendering" their takeover
protections when operating in concentrated industries. Firms with market power seem
to behave similarly to the "average" firm regarding antitakeover provisions. Firms in
more concentrated industries have a strong positive preference for these rules. However,
firms in concentrated industries are not influenced by the MAND laws when making their
incorporation choices. Their preference for the MAND laws is positive and strong when
compared to the "average" firm, and the overall effect washes out. This may reflect more of
an awareness of shareholders (and an incentive to act on it) of the need to curb managerial
behavior when the market disciplining forces are absent. However, when taken together
with the mean preferences, we may interpret this as managers being less constrained in
industries with less product market competition and thus having the freedom to choose
their incorporation jurisdiction irrespective of these laws (compare Cuiiat and Guadalupe,
2005). I believe this finding, as well as its interaction with the findings in the asset pricing
literature mentioned, does indeed merit further inquiry.
45However, there were differences when using the broad 2 digit measure.
461 also drop observations for which the industry concentration is above 97.5%, as they likely reflect
industries which are too narrowly defined.
Financial Profile
The main variables explored here are the age of the firm (since its foundation), and the time
since its original IPO. Table 3A shows that both the firms' age since its founding, as well as
the time since its original IPO both have a similar small but statistically significant influence
on firm preferences over laws. Older firms have an additional positive preference for the
ATS index, although the results are much stronger when measuring age since IPO. These
firms are also more comfortable with the MAND laws. This could reflect a congealment
around these internal practices. In other words, the older and more established firms,
may not require the same degree of flexibility in their governance. This, of course, could
reflect both a vintage effect - in that the newer firms are different and desire or require
more flexibility, and also a life cycle explanation, whereby as the firm matures, its needs
will change and it will move to another jurisdiction. My data on both the date of the
firm's founding as well as on the firms' original IPO comes from both compustat as well
as from the SDC data. When looking at the movements of firms in my data I find that
indeed a significant share are by firms that underwent an IPO since 1980. This is thus
suggestive evidence that there is some life cycle behavior in incorporation choices.
Indeed, when looking at the trends amongst IPO firms, it is clear that there is a strong
tendency towards Delaware incorporation, even as its shares are in decline. My anecdotal
evidence, from discussions with managers in the venture capital industry and in some of
the data collection agencies mentioned, suggests that indeed Delaware incorporation (a
jurisdiction with a MAND value of 0) has become a default for many firms when initially
incorporating47
When looking specifically at the younger firms which underwent an original IPO after
1980, I find that whether or not the firm was venture capital financed significantly influences
its preferences. Other variables explored, such as the IPO financing, and the share of
4 7This, however, is consistant with both a vintage and life cycle explanation, since all it requires is for
firms to initially prefer low MAND jurisdictions.
insiders before and after IPO did not seem to matter. The results regarding venture
backed firms echo those of institutional shareholders (although are of a smaller magnitude).
This is unsurprising in that venture capital investors often carry a significant stake in
the firm, and similarly possess the experience and sophistication surmised to influence
the preferences of institutional investors above. It can thus be seen as further evidence
supporting the potential of a formal and real authority divide in the firm decision making
process. However, it is clear that there is much diversity in the objectives of the various
venture capital investment policies, and thus the effect captured is likely an average effect
from amongst significantly varying venture capital effects 48 .
Other Firm Heterogeneity
Neither of the two main director measures considered - the total number of directors and
the percent of independent directors - are significant. The one exception is the interaction
of the total number of directors with the MAND legal index, which is marginally signifi-
cant. However, the paucity of data, once including these measures, changes the estimates
significantly, and significance is lost even for the mean 0 on the MAND index itself. Thus,
these results should be not be taken as conclusive evidence of director composition not
mattering. I used these two measures following the previous literature (see for exam-
ple Masulis et al (2007)). However, similarly, I did not find any of the other measures
mentioned above to be significant in the incorporation decision4 9
In addition, I experimented with two measures of compliance with the Sarbanes Oxley
legislation (compare Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007). The first, is a compliance score,
tracking compliance with the CEO and CFO certification of published financials, loans
compliance, designation of a financial expert on the audit committee, compliance with the
standards for overall director independence, and compliance with the standards of commit-
4 8 The significance level of the venture capital measure is lower as well, likely a cause of the dispersion in
funds.
49Given these findings I did not proceed to treat concerns of endogeneity in these measures.
tee independence. The second refers specifically to the compliance with the requirement
to eliminate loans to directors and executives. While this data is available for the year
2003 I tracked the firms for which it was available in the years before and the years after,
experimenting with different time windows. Once again, these were not significant in the
incorporation choice, but significantly restrict the sample size.
Unobserved heterogeneity
As can be seen, the standard deviation is significant only for the MAND index (and not for
ATS or the legal index)50 . As mentioned above, identification comes from firms switching
and from the difference in the choice sets of structurally identical firms. The magnitude
of the MAND c is particularly large thus suggesting that 100 *(1- =(- )) - 30%
of the firms have a positive valuation for the index. The ATS unobserved heterogeneity
suggests that a tiny fraction of firms have a negative preference for the ATS laws. This
suggests that controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity is important, but primarily for
the MAND measure, given the large amount of observed firm structure heterogeneity.
Furthermore, note the importance of the unobserved heterogeneity particularly con-
cerning the MAND index. In Table 2A we see that when the os are dropped the mean 0
changes dramatically in magnitude and in fact is no longer significant. The interactions
with the observed heterogeneity change significantly as well. These results strengthen
the need to estimate a distribution around the random coefficients, even in the presence
of much observed heterogeneity, not only to get realistic substitution patterns (as pointed
out by the original BLP, 1995, models), but to get the point estimates right as well.
5 0 Compare previous literature, such as Nevo 2001, where the results on the standard deviations are
generally insignificant.
1.5.2 Endogeneity Corrections
Control Function
Table 2A gives the base specification with and without endogeneity corrections. Column 1
repeats the base specification from table 1A, column 2 has unobserved heterogeneity, while
column 3 does not. Both columns 2 and 3 do not have endogeneity corrections. This
table shows that despite the ability to capture much of the product specific unobservable
with the product fixed effects, the controls are needed. Indeed, when added, the product
specific residual functionals enter significantly for most products and their joint significance
is easily established. This, in the context of the control function approach can be seen
as a test confirming the importance of an endogeneity correction. The magnitude of the
legal coefficients is influenced as well. The mean ATS P is about 60% its value without the
corrections. The interaction with ownership (for which we instrumented) is also about half
the absolute magnitude for the ATS index and about 66% the magnitude for the MAND
index, reflecting the standard bias towards zero. Interestingly, the interaction with the
industry characteristics is influenced by these controls as well. Finally, there are some
changes in the size of the product specific fixed effects, especially regarding those of DE
and HOME which are both decreased. Note that these patterns do not apply to the other
coefficients and thus this is not merely an issue of scale.
1.5.3 Robustness: Incorporation and Franchise Taxes: The Effects of the
2003 Tax Increases on Firm Incorporation Choice
This wide price variation is incorporated in my model above, where I find that indeed
firm demand is downward sloping. However, it is interesting to "zone in" on recent tax
increases in Delaware (where the tax was raised by 10%) and Nevada (where a franchise tax
was introduced) and apply a standard difference in difference approach. This is useful for
confirming the results regarding the high sensitivity to taxes, as well as for understanding
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Figure 1-3: Flows Out of States.
the populations most affected by such changes.
Figure 3 displays the flows of public firms out of Delaware and Nevada since 1991 (my
data start in 1990), plotted on their own and against the flows out of all other jurisdictions.
These are firms that remain in the data (so they remain (active) public firms). As can be
seen, there is a spike in 2004, which, given the tax increases in mid 2003, is the expected
time frame for the response. It is interesting to note that the "movers" in both jurisdictions
are generally smaller firms with a lower market value and net income, and in Delaware they
were still paying close to the maximum tax rate51 (in Nevada there was no tax prior to
2003).
"Of course they may have been paying the maximum rate, since the tax based used (shares issued) is
downward biased.
___ I
Table 1.2: Summary statistics (Non-Movers - Delaware)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Marketvalue 2382.289 12099.217 2671
Employees 7.104 37.753 3191
Net Income 72.832 652.752 3247
Franchise Tax Last Period 130066.355 49936.876 3342
Table 1.3: Summary statistics (Movers - Delaware)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Marketvalue 528.866 1471.514 111
Employees 1.622 3.992 167
Net Income -13.418 266.814 171
Franchise Tax Last Period 110629.984 56584.013 172
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Figure 1-4: Flows Out of States.
Table 1.4: Summary statistics (Non Movers - Nevada)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Marketvalue 638.002 1833.133 132
Employees 1.343 8.031 385
Net Income 2.766 89.335 478
uN~eteannu Mwmtcu
Table 1.5: Summary statistics (Movers - Nevada)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Marketvalue 93.469 175.769 10
Employees 0.085 0.251 30
Net Income -0.22 6.991 35
Table 1
P(move) P(move) P(move) P(move)
Nevada-2004
Delaware-2004
NV-After
DE-After
.040***
(.010)
.056***
(.012)
.010**
(.004)
.019***
(.006)
.007
(.004)
.018***
(.006)
Firms All All "Foreign" "Foreign"
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 201,790 201,790 120,240 120,240
This is naturally confirmed in the difference in difference estimation in Table 1, where
I look at the average marginal effects on the logit probability of moving out of the Nevada
and Delaware jurisdictions respectively. Controls include all state fixed effects and year
fixed effects, and I cluster by state. The difference in difference coefficients are the inter-
actions. Columns 1 and 2 include all firms, while columns 3 and 4 look specifically at firms
incorporated outside of their home state. Columns 1 and 3 difference the entire before and
.024***
(.007)
.039***
(.009)
Delaware: Trends in Share of Corporate License Revenues
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Figure 1-5: Trends in Share of Delaware's Corporate License Revenues.
after periods, whereas columns 2 and 4 focus on the effect in 2004, the year immediately
following the tax increase. All difference in difference coefficients are significant. However,
it seems that most of the treatment effect (the effect of the taxes) is concentrated in 2004.
In most cases these firms go back home. Of the 239 firms that moved out of Delaware in
2004, 236 moved their incorporation back to their home state (2 moved to Maryland, and
one to Nevada). Similarly, of the 37 firms that moved out of Nevada in 2004, 31 moved
back to their home state as well, thus reinforcing the notion of home incorporation being a
default for firms. Note that the other changes in Delaware's corporate law in 200352 were
not, to the best of my knowledge, fraught with controversy. Finally, looking, in figure 5, at
the aggregate share of Delaware's corporate license revenues in fiscal years ending in June
of 1993 - 2007 shows the declining revenues that increased only temporarily in 2003 (or
the fiscal year ending in June of 2004), only to decline with the massive exodus of firms.
5 2These were the limited expansion of the court of chancery's matter of jurisdiction and jurisdiction over
executive officers, and the resolution of the ambiguity regarding shareholder and director rights to inspect
the corporate books and records. See http://corp.delaware.gov/2003amends.shtml, visited 7/25/2008.
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1.6 Counterfactual Policies
As mentioned, the advantage of specifying and estimating firm preferences in the manner
proposed is that these preferences can be used to make out of sample prediction regarding
different counterfactual policies. The advantage of having individual level data is that
we can easily examine not only the impact on the aggregate shares, but also on the many
degrees of firm structure. This can be seen as a partial equilibrium simulation in that
we assume the distribution of firm structure remains constant and simulate the predicted
choices firms (with this structure) will make under different policies. We can examine
the differential behavior of firms with different firm structure heterogeneity. However, a
"general equilibrium" variant would also require a model for how the specific policy change
impacts firm structure. Thus, for example, if indeed sophisticated shareholders are select-
ing firms partially due to the firms' choice of laws, a simulation of the effect of centralizing
some of the governance legislation will then change the distribution of ownership across
firms. This will change the structure of the counterfactual market even if we assume that
the preferences remain as we estimated them. Similarly, a radical change in the market
may change the preferences captured (but not decomposed) by the fixed effects.
In what follows I simulate the effect of a simple counterfactual policy: the effect of
eliminating the ATS statutes (setting ATS to zero for all firms) and imposing all of the
MAND laws (setting MAND to 4) for all firms. I look at the year 2006 and compare the
predicted probabilities produced, given the 2006 data, with those under the uniform legal
policy described. I measure the "average policy effect", the difference in the expected
probability of choosing a particular alternative before and after the policy change, thus
explaining the change in the average choice, accounting for endogeneity.
As expected, there are significant changes in firm shares. Most notably, the share of
firms predicted to be incorporating at home decreases by 8%, as does the share of firms in
Nevada (down 58%), and Maryland (down 57%), while the share of firms incorporating in
California increases by 120%. This suggests that California is losing many firms due to
its lack of takeover legislation and that part of the reason firms stay at home is the more
convenient laws. Maryland and Nevada are capturing market share due to their "manager
friendly" laws. Delaware, on the other hand, increases its share by 8%. To a degree,
this dispels the notion, quoted above, that Delaware is attracting firms due to its "loose
laws". In fact Delaware has few takeover laws and when the divergence in laws is made
to disappear it does better. Once again, this is but one simple counterfactual exercise. I
plan to.examine more policies in later versions of this paper5 .
1.7 Incorporation Choice and Firm Performance
As mentioned, we can price firm preference over laws, in terms of the differential taxes.
However, the full price would include the implied reduction in firm value from being in a
suboptimal legislative environment. This would require a model and estimation strategy to
isolate and compare the firm's choice with the counterfactual of the optimal choice for that
given firm. Thus, for example, an analysis of the returns earned by movers would require
a decomposition of the reasons for a move (or carefully chosen trading portfolios), and the
complicated apportionment of any, firm specific, differential returns to any difference in
laws. Indeed, this is clearly a challenging exercise, one which is beyond the scope of this
paper. In the section below, I relate my findings to the analyses of performance common in
the asset pricing corporate governance literature (regarding firm bylaws), which are done,
largely, by tracking (abnormal) stock returns. Furthermore, I suggest how new trading
strategies can easily be formed using the additional variables introduced in the analysis
above.
Clearly, as discussed throughout, and as I have found in my data, the variables in my
model are related to the internal governance of a firm. The laws are often mechanically
related to the bylaws, and many of the firm structure variables in my analysis were explicitly
53Updated versions will be posted online.
chosen based on prior research. However, my findings enrich the analysis and interpretation
of the findings regarding the link between these variables and firm performance. Thus, for
example, it seems that institutional shareholders have a say in the firm and thus can shape
the internal governance. If indeed this is the case, it is interesting that it is chiefly amongst
these firms that governance is found to matter (in the asset pricing literature). Similarly,
it is interesting that industry concentration was particularly important regarding the laws
in the MAND index, and not those in the ATS index. Furthermore, the finding regarding
venture backed firms is but one example of a new way to sort firms before comparing the
differential performance of firms with different governance regimes.
In what follows I conduct one of the most simple abnormal returns exercises. As
mentioned, the GIM (and now commonplace) methodology is to construct an index of
governance, and update it when new data is available. Market value weighted portfolios
are formed for each group and normalized, so the trading strategy replicated is buying
democratic firms (with few pro managerial provisions) and selling (short) dictatorial firms
(every month). I follow the same methodology with both of my legal indices, while updat-
ing them in the year after any laws are passed for the firms in that respective jurisdiction.
Data on prices is taken from CRSP. The differential monthly performance (i.e. differential
monthly stock market returns) of firms in jurisdictions with high values of the indices and
firms in jurisdictions with low values for the indices are then regressed against 4 commonly
used factors, as proposed by Fama and French 1993, and augmented by Jagadeesh and
Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997)). These include the returns to the market portfolio,
and to three portfolios that capture the size, book-to-market ratio and momentum effects.
Data on the value of these factors is taken from Kenneth French's website. The abnormal
return is then the constant in these regressions, representing the return above and beyond
what are seen as the key factors moving stock market returns54 .
" My estimates are not identical to theirs, likely due to the information on some firms being hand-collected
and matched to CRSP by them. I use their index and the advantages of my panel in finding firms over
time (even when they changes one of their identifiers, such as their ticker).
Following the previous literature it is useful to separate my time period into the period
of the 1990s, and the later period. Indeed, the GIM index no longer "works" in the later
period and as suggested by various data suite teams5 5 , and in various public proxy voting
recommendation pieces (see for example the ISS US Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary,
2000 - 2007), much of these findings have been internalized. Thus, for example there is
a growing trend for firms to relinquish their poison pill protections and classified boards.
If indeed this is the case, the core legal defaults may matter once again (and may matter
more), especially for newer firms or firms with provisions open to periodic votes, which
may "suffer" the interventions of newly informed shareholders. The trends in institutional
ownership as well would induce similar results, in that they are likely influential not only in
the choice of jurisdiction, but also (perhaps even more importantly) in the bylaw structure
as well. Indeed, the post 1990s period in general and post Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley era
in particular are seen by many to be different, due to the more suspicious attitude towards
management. Takeovers have rebounded to their 1980's levels, but they are now less hostile
and less leveraged, and thus may be faced with different (or less) internal protections in
firms.
As displayed in table 6, I present the trading strategy for both of the indices, since 2000
and since 2001. In unreported regressions, I find that the constant in these specifications
is significant only in the period since 2000 (or 2001) but not for the full period and not in
the 1990s5 6 . Interestingly, I find that firms in jurisdictions with more takeover protection
perform better (the coefficient implies that 36 basis points could be earned per month by
using this strategy), suggesting the legislative protection was shareholder wealth increasing.
However, those in jurisdictions with a higher value of MAND perform better as well. And
so the results are mixed.
These results are no more than interesting facts and should be interpreted with care.
"
5Compare Sharkrepellent "Research Insight" reports consistently documenting a large trend amongst
existing public firms and IPOs to reduce their takeover protections.
56When excluding all financial services firms the abnormal returns are slightly higher.
/~ 
____ ~i_ __~l ~; ~);__ _~(____;_jll~_I ili.-ii -i.-i,.i-*~: lilii~...l-l^ 1I1-..i.- .. _l_-i-~i_.i.iiiii:ii
My speculations regarding the reason for the post 2000 years is no more than a speculation
and must be carefully analyzed. However, this - as well as the analysis of other (new)
trading strategies suggested by my findings - is an obvious extension for future research.
ATS (high-low)
.363**
(.168)
-.293***
(.050)
-.238***
(.052)
.122*
(.067)
.057
(.041)
72
Table 6
Legal Index Trading Strategies
ATS (high-low) MAND (high-low)
.361*
(.196)
-.295***
(.051)
-.341***
(.052)
.203***
(.062)
.040
(.045)
84
.461**
(.216)
-.075
(.065)
.055
(.066)
-,.197**
(.086)
-.192***
(.052)
72
MAND (high-low)
.450*
(.240)
.079
(.062)
-.059
(.064)
-.092
(.076)
-. 112**
(.055)
84
1.8 Summary, Discussion, and Future Work
This paper exploited the choice that the American legal structure offers states and firms
to recover the differing firm preferences for the characteristics of the incorporation bundle.
We found that there is significant lethargy in state activity. However, given the "home
bias" or the preference firms have for remaining incorporated in their home state, there
is still wide variation in the incorporation choice. We then addressed the issue of what
matters to firms in their choice of governance regime, in the choice of incorporation. As
discussed above, the choice offered by the US regulatory structure allows for the recovery
Const.
MKT
SMB
HML
UMD
Obs.
of much information embedded in the preferences revealed by firms:
Beginning with the taxes, I showed that, unsurprisingly, there is no evidence that state
corporate income taxes, which generally are not directly related to incorporation, play
a role in incorporation choices. This alleviates concerns that the large suspected abuse
and manipulation of the differing state tax rules extend to the incorporation freedoms.
Moving to incorporation taxes I found, using both reduced form evidence from specific tax
changes and in the aggregate model, that at least a subset of firms are very responsive
to taxes. This may serve as an explanation for the fact that incorporation taxes are so
low. However, when viewing taxes as a substitute for governance laws, a simple calculation
has firms valuing governance laws at several million dollars, a miniscule amount given the
size of the public firms analyzed. This suggests that for some firms the laws do not
matter all that much. Note that this may be important in the overall state calculus
given the large number of (smaller) private firms, which may be responsive in a manner
similar to the smaller public firms. However, clearly, for larger firms, this elasticity of
willingness to pay taxes-to governance, is much higher. Furthermore, the large response
to tax changes may reflect some gaming behavior between firms and states as a deterrent
for future tax initiatives. Finally, it is clear that while taxes are a direct (measurable)
price in that the incorporation (or reincorporation) choice has direct tax implications, the
multitude of effects the components of the incorporation package have on the various firm
constituencies are likely to be significantly larger. In other words, the coefficient which is
an average across firms comprising of various types of variation in the data cannot explain
the full importance and interaction of the taxes with the specific firm characteristics. Laws
may (differentially) impact the market value of different firms (particularly those that do
not move) and this may serve as a more powerful incentive in the choice of incorporation.
However, a different model is needed in order to isolate and relate the impact of the various
laws and incorporation bundle characteristics on the heterogenous firm values, and I leave
this for future research.
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I then moved on to the core of the paper - governance legislation. I showed that the
preference structure for governance laws is complex, and, unsurprisingly, very much related
to the internal and external characterization of the firm. The average preferences of the
firm can often be seen to reflect the (narrow) interests of management: On average, firms
dislike antitakeover laws and mandatory laws restricting the flexibility to grant managers
more power and to limit their liability. Similarly, there is a marginally significant distaste
for restrictions on payouts to shareholders. Thus, there are indeed clear patterns in the
collective preferences of firms. However, these preferences are not uniform. When institu-
tional shareholders as well as venture capital - both of which can be seen as sophisticated
shareholders - have significant stakes in the firm, they express a clear distaste for anti-
takeover laws. This may reflect the findings that takeovers often benefit shareholders and
punish inefficient management. It may also reflect the prevailing view that these laws are
shareholder wealth reducing57 . Firms with more market power are similar to the average
firm in their preferences for antitakeover litigation, however, they have a different inten-
sity of preferences for mandatory laws restricting managerial power. This suggests some
specificity in the trade-off between product market competition and corporate governance
regulation in law. I did not find any of the director characteristics with which I experi-
mented to have power in explaining the choice of the incorporation package. The age of
the firm, both since its founding and since its IPO, affects the intensity of preferences as
well. This can be seen as evidence of a "life cycle" development of firm preferences, or of
a recent shift in the preferences of younger firms.
In addition to the analysis of the observed heterogeneity, this paper shows that ac-
counting for unobserved heterogeneity is important as well. I find, particularly concerning
the mandatory laws analyzed, that there is still much residual variance in firm preferences,
5 7This view is the result of many event studies, many of which were conducted in the 80's (see for example
Bhagat and Romano, 2002). From a theoretical point of view, even if antitakeover laws make takeovers
more difficult, they may increase the premiums to shareholders when takeovers are successful and have a
positive effect overall.
the omission of which would obscure the findings. This further confirms the importance
of the methodological approach. Furthermore, this paper shows and compares several
endogeneity corrections for the selection of firms by institutional shareholders and finds
that the omission of these controls significantly biases the findings towards zero. Indeed,
the analysis of observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity makes a more general point
regarding the need to view firms as a sum of their inner components, both as a technical
manner - to disentangle the conflicting effects - as well as a necessary step to obtain a more
complete view of "firm" choice.
I then moved on to the other pieces of the incorporation package. I find that firms
generally, and institutional shareholders increasingly, dislike efficient courts, in that they
prefer to be under the jurisdiction of court systems which have accumulated a large number
of cases from previous years, which, consequently, can be expected to perform more slowly.
Institutional shareholders seem to prefer well functioning courts, at least at the trial level,
once again highlighting the divide in preferences 58
To complete the analysis of the incorporation bundle, I find, as expected, a significant
distaste for the geographical distance. This suggests the potential for regional incorpora-
tion "hot spots" and may explain some of the reason for Nevada emerging as a "Delaware
of the West".
Taking a step back, the more general point made is that, as shown in the counterfactual
simulations and as suggested by my findings, policy towards firms does not and will not
have a uniform impact. Despite the lethargy in state legislation, there is considerable vari-
ance in the incorporation implications across states. However, sorting does and will occur
when firms are given the freedom to choose. This sorting is likely to be largely related to
the effective authority within the firm, and not solely to the differential manner in which
heterogeneous firms can increase their value. In other words, the optimistic view, which
58As mentioned the preferences of institutional shareholders for delay at the appellate level are reversed,
albeit with marginal significance levels. I plan to explore the source of this difference in looking at trial
and appellate courts. The average preference is for "slower" courts at both levels.
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would hope for firms to spatially match their needs to different niches provided by different
states, presupposes a firm collective that maximizes a shared objective, a view severely
challenged by the findings in this paper. Reform of firm choice can be made in one of
two ways. The first is to increase the freedom afforded to firms by not restricting them
to any bundled incorporation package, but rather allowing them to piece their corporate
governance regime together on their own. This can be done by separating the choice of
judicial forum from the incorporation decision, thus allowing firms, for example, to adju-
dicate in Delaware, using California law, or even by slicing the choice of law more finely to
allow firms to choose to be subject to different jurisdictions for different areas of corporate
governance law. The second is of course to reduce the freedom given to firms either by
linking incorporation to the physical location, or, more easily, by imposing uniform fed-
eral regulation. The findings in this paper suggest that more choice would not necessarily
seep down to firms with weaker shareholders and thus would miss many of the desired
beneficiaries. Furthermore, this would require an accounting for the resulting incentives
states have to develop their regimes, including a potentially complicated allocation and ap-
portionment of the incorporation taxes. However, centralizing corporate governance law
would eliminate choice from all firms, a result that may indeed be too dramatic and require
too much foresight from the policy maker, which would be required to effectively consider
the differing needs of the different firms. Furthermore, it is clear that the current makeup
of firm heterogeneity is merely a snapshot of an ongoing process. Firms, both public and
private, are in a state of flux as the composition of ownership and management and the
structure of industries are rapidly changing. The current economic crisis is contributing
to this restructuring as well, as crises often do. Thus, policy must also be sensitive to
the expected future changes, both those resulting directly from the impeding regulations
as well as those naturally arising from the changing economic conditions. Firms with a
high concentration of sophisticated shareholders should be closely monitored as they shift
the location of the agency issues to the potential majority-minority shareholder divide.
Furthermore, as mentioned, the counterfactual analysis may be more a summary of the
current dynamics than a reliable predictor of what will happen with policy reform. The
measures of laws may be, to some degree, capturing the sentiment in the various jurisdic-
tions and not the laws per se. Sentiment and forward looking expectations undoubtedly
play a large role and are difficult to account for when extrapolating the results to inform
future proposed policies.
It seems obvious that the taxation of incorporation should be revisited. First, facilitat-
ing the recovery of more tax revenue may serve as an incentive for states to more actively
consider the design of their systems. Second, the use of taxes as a price may even be
a potential means to screen firms based on their differential needs. A restructuring of
the current base (likely an antiquated historical artifact) to make it more salient, to relate
it to the agency issues within the firm, and to prevent an easy escape from taxes with a
reincorporation move, would then be required.
Finally, there is indeed a conceptual link between what is seen to matter for the "upper
level" of governance - the choice of litigation regime - and the overall preferences of firms
as reflected in their charters. Thus, the effects of being in jurisdictions with different
corporate governance laws can be taken directly to stock market trading strategies, either
generally, as shown in the paper, or more narrowly, by zeroing in on particular firm cohorts.
However, the findings in the incorporation analysis should be seen as complementary to
the findings on the general count of governance provisions in firm charters and to impact
the interpretation of these latter results. Thus, for example, we may question the finding
that governance matters more to firms with a high level of institutional shareholders, if
indeed these are firms where shareholders have more of a say and can directly monitor
management, as suggested here. Similarly, we may question the intensity of any trade-
off between market competition and governance, given the lack of a significant shift in
preferences for the ATS laws, and a modest shift for the MAND laws. More broadly, any
claim regarding the effects of the passing of governance laws on firms (see for example
Giroud and Mueller 2008) must include an accounting for the collective firm choice to
remain under the jurisdiction of such laws and not to reincorporate. A natural development
in the corporate governance literature will be to more carefully analyze the components
of the broad indices used (the GIM index being an obvious example), their relationship
to the legal environment, and their differential impact on different firms. This extension
of the study of the link between governance and performance should also be made, of
course, regarding other real measures of performance and firm choice, such as the choice
of investments and capital structure and firm profitability.
This paper can be seen as a preliminary step towards the consideration of the manner
in which federal regulation should be made. In this vein, the extensions to this paper
are straightforward. First, more work is needed in modeling the political economy of the
supply side. Much progress can be made in understanding the current distribution of
incorporation bundle characteristics, as well as in designing policy that can motivate state
innovation, if indeed the states' objective function can be modeled. Second, as noted
throughout the paper, the large dimensionality of the data I collect in terms of the many
attributes of firm structure allows for a very large number of specifications testing a broad
range of issues regarding the behavior of firms differentiated across these dimensions. An
exhaustive examination of all the degrees of observed heterogeneity in my data is too broad
for the scope of this single paper. Indeed, as mentioned, my results suggest that there are
more dimensions of firm heterogeneity that have significant explanatory power. Thus, more
aspects of the data can be examined and the data can be augmented to specifically analyze
other dimensions of heterogeneity. Similarly, while I focus on a broad range of legislation,
there are still rules that I have not considered. Thus, for example, while I find that financial
firms behave similarly to the overall pool of firms, I plan to explore the specific rules relating
to them and the manner in which they (differentially) impact firms 59 . Indeed, as the new
' For example, Maryland has become increasingly popular amongst REITs and so it would be interesting
to see whether there may be judicial and legislative developments to impact this.
policy proposals of the incoming administration crystallize, the methodology presented
here and the counterfactual simulations can be tailored in furtherance of their analysis.
Furthermore, as noted throughout, while the results of this paper are largely based on
an aggregate analysis, more "micro" studies (similar to the one done above regarding the
legislative changes in 2003 can be done).
As a next step, private firms should be analyzed. These firms vary to a considerable
degree both during their "private" life and in their decision to go public. The collection
of a more representative panel of private firms allows for a closer look at the timing of the
IPO decision and its response to regulation of trading exchanges (a complementary form
of regulation to that studied in this paper). The structure of such an analysis parallels the
structure used here. However, private firms face different governance and control issues
and have different agency problems. Thus, we should expect to see different preferences
exhibited between public and private firms and in private firms amongst themselves and
this may serve as a test for the model presented here for incorporation motives. Finally,
while my focus has been primarily on the US, this market structure of competition over
firms and firm choice is becoming increasingly relevant in Europe as well. The research
outlined above can be nicely paralleled in the study of the evolving European markets and
ultimately in the global market as well.
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Table 1A
Means Standard Deviations Interactions with Firm Stnlcture
Variable (f's) (a's) Ownership Industry Concentration
Laws
ATS .314'** .001 -.478*** .049
(.096) (002) (.164) (.042)
MAND -.687*** 1.31"* -1.19" .493**
(.208) (11 ) (.406) (.102)
Payout Restrictions .037
(.277)
Ultra Vires -.353
(.292)
Courts
Clearance Ratio -. 75" .066 1.43"* .711
(364) (.045) (.712) (.422)
Taxes
Incorp. Taxes -.002***
(.o114)
SCIT -3.28
(4.35)
Distance -.272***
(.083)
Product Fixed Effects
HOME 4.37*** FL -1.21
(.232) (.201)
DE 5.9"** CO -. 16
(.340) (.313)
NV .11 MA -.625***
(.458) (.209)
MD -.017 NY -.035
(.287) (.435)
CA -.413* PA .071
(.358) (.442)
WY -1.75"**
(.595)
ATS is an index of Antitakeover laws, MAND is an index of mandatory laws, Payout Restriction
indicates the minimum asset to liability ratio required to make a shareholder payout. Ultra Vires indicates
whether ultra vires actions are recognized in the state. Clearance Ratio is the ratio of cases accumulated
to cases disposed of in trial courts in the previous year. Incorp. Taxes are the total tax liability for the
firm (incorporation and franchise taxes) as resulting from the choice of jurisdiction. SCIT is the state
corporate income tax rate in the previous year. Distance is (in thousands of miles) from the home state to
the incorporation state. Ownership is measure as the percent of shares held by institutions with at least
a 1% block in the firm. Industry concentration is calculated based on the herfindahl index using the 3
digit sic code. This specification uses 780,824 observations. Endogeneity is controlled for using the control
function approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the home state level. *,** , *
indicate significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 2A
Variable (Endogeneity Correction) (2) (3)
HOME 4.37*** 3.68*** 3.49***
(.233) (.248) ( 25)
DE 5.49*** 4.54*" 4.32***
(34) (.305) (.293)
NV .11 .48 .496
(.458) (.438) (.467)
MD -.016 .920** .699*
(287) (.379) (.409)
ATS
Mean .31** .191" .181**
(.97) ( 078) ( 075)
Ownership -. 178"* -.242*** -.21**
(.712) (.078) (.074)
Industry Concentration .05 .210'** .202***
(.042) (.068) (.061)
a .002 0.0007
(.002) (.001)
MAND
Mean -.688*** -.639*** -.19
(.208) (.214) (. 27)
Ownership -1.19"** -.8*"* -.67"**
(.406o ) (.2i66i) (.174)
Industry. Concentration .93"* .305*** .210**
(103) (. 111) (071)
( 1.31"* 1.1t*
(.115) (0.17,1)
Taxes
Incorp. Tax -.002*** -.002*** -.002***
(.0004) (.0003) (.0003)
SCIT -3.28 -2.07 -1.80
(4.350) (4.36) (4.38)
Distance -.272*** -.250** -.224***
(.084) (.070) (074)
Payout Restrictions .037 .015 -.058
(.277) (.223) (.200)
Ultra Vires -.353 -.268 -.173
(.292) (.257) (.275)
Variable descriptions are the same as under table 1A, and the same variables are used. Not all variables
are reported for ease of exposition. Here, the first column has the control function endogeneity correction,
while the second and third do not. In addition, column three does not account for unobserved heterogeneity
in the random coefficient design.
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Table 3A
Variable (1) (2)
ATS
Mean .446"* .368**
(.157) (.159)
Ownership -.752** -.679"*
(.218) (.225)
Industry Concent. 098 .039*
(.041) (1063)
Venture Backed -. 035 -. 052"
(.026) (026)
Age (since IPO) 011"
(004)
Age (since founded) .004*'
(.001)
1 .009 .003
(.007) (.003)
MAND
Mean -.861" -.718*
(.419) (.410)
Ownership -1.58*" -1.58"*
(.450) ( 492)
Industry Concent. .710"* .637"'
(.140) ( 242)
Vent ure Backed - 157"* -. 123*
( 0,5) (o17)
Age (since [PO) 041"*
(001)
Age (since founded) .011"'
(.0oo3)
7 1.49"' 1.37**
(.21fi) (.173)
Clearance Ratio
Mean -135"** -1.29**
(.53) (.525)
7 0.012 0.048
(07) (.059)
Taxes
Incorporation - 002* -.002"
(0008) (.0009)
SCIT -6.32 -3.87
(6.73) (6.15)
Observations 298,473 220,930
Variable descriptions are the same as under table 1A. In addition, Venture Backed is a dummy variable
indicating whether the firm had an initial IPO backed by venture capital, and two alternative age variables
are added. These additional variables are cumulative to all variables in the model. Endogeneity corrections
are using the control function approach as explained in the text.
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1.9 Appendix E
As mentioned, once the instrument is identified, it can be incorporated in my highly non-
linear model in two additional (related) ways:
1.9.1 GMM
The first is analogous to the BLP (1995, 2004) literature. Define 6jt to be the time specific
state specific fixed effect which captures this Afj t as well. In other words we now have a
state time specific effect. Thus yielding the specification of:
uijt(xj, yj, Di, j, ADjt) = jt + OPpijt + jtlDir O j xjtkLitoo + ijt.
Ir ko
And, separating out the endogeneity of the ownership demographic, we have:
uijt(xj, yj, Dij,4j, A jt) = ijt + OPpijt + E XJkD ir O rk +  jlDieOO + XjtkjvitOO0 +6ijt.
Ir I ko
or:
uijt(xjt, Yjt, j, Ajt) = jt() + pijt(xjt, ij, vi, Di; ct, 80, 0u ) + eij t
where,
6jt = Xjt 1 + Yjt 0 2 Ajt ,
Yijt = [xt] * (O°Di + O"vi) + OPpijt.
Now, note that with aggregate data, by construction, the only observed choice variable
is the shares, and thus it is these shares that have to be inverted, using a contraction map-
ping, to match the predicted shares with the observed shares (or minimize their distance).
In this application this is avoided due to the richness in my data, containing individual
choice. We proceed as follows:
First, we construct the following likelihood:
L(D; 6, 0) = EN_1 E log f ( e x p [ j t+ Ez, XjkDirO%+OPit+Z XI1 DieO~ i+Zlk O~ ] )1(jit) f(v)d(U).
S j= +Eq exp[(q+ l, XjkDirOO k OPPiqt _- xjlDieO L+Eko XjkVioO o]
This is the probability of observing (all of) the choices in the data, given the structure
above, similar to the construction mentioned in the paper. The difference is that here all
variables that are not firm specific are soaked up in the state-time fixed effect. Similarly,
we maximize the analogous simulated likelihood:
SL N l r=l ( exp[jt+-Tr xjkDirBOIk+OPPijt+ l  _jOlDi +Ek Xj o xjkvioko] l(jit)( ).i= t= R r= j= 1+Eexp[6q+ IrjIkDirO k PPiqt+ j 1x DieO ±L+Eko Xjkio )f()d(
This yields estimates of the 6 jt, 0o, 0u, OP . Now the = {01, 02} are recovered by
forming GMM moments:
Define
w it + Z7rXjkOk + I:Yjh h
k h
and construct the residuals:
wjt(o) = 5jt - wjtO.
Next, we define H(Zjt) to be a function of instruments (following Newey, 1990). Here,
since the errors are linear, we use a simple series with interactions between the z1 , z2, ... , zk.
Finally, we construct the moments as
gjt(O) = H(Zjt)wjt(O),
where the number of moments grows with the number of terms we construct in the series
in H(.).
;; .i i__i______l/__/ll_________11111_^ _I_ __(_II___)___~___ ~l/;li~_liij/;i__;
Now, by assumption, at the true 00:
E[git(eo)] = 0.
Thus, define:
g(0)= ;-- gt (0)jt
the GMM estimate is:
= argb min (0) 2-1 (0)',
where f is consistent estimate of E[gjt(Oo)gjst(Oo)']. This estimate is obtained by first
using the initial estimate of f = I and then, computing and using 0 to form the sample
analog of E[gjst(Oo)gjst(Oo)'] as
j=l s=1 t=1
where J is the number of products, S = T = the number of periods. Essentially, to
control for serial correlation of the errors, we interact each period's g(.) with all time
periods (including its own period).
For simplicity, we bootstrap the standard errors of the estimates (while drawing from
the state clusters), constructing an outer-loop on the entire estimation procedure.
The MPEC Approach
Implementation of the maximization is done using in Matlab and AMPL. The advantage
of using AMPL - which is mathematical software designed for optimization with a large
number of constraints - is the use of automatic differentiation, the richness of optimizers
and the ability to reduce the simulation error arising from the multiple estimation steps.
Indeed, this procedure skirts some of the criticisms in Dub6, 2008, and Knittel, 2008.
An alternative formulation of this problem is to combine all the steps into the following
estimation problem:
Define:
1 RJ exp[6jt + O pijt + Ekr XjkDirt' k kl jkviltOki 11
r=lj=l 1 + , exp[qt + oPPiqt + kr XjkDirtO k -kI l X klilt ll ()
and then minimize the GMM moments, subject to the first order conditions from the MSL
problem holding at the solution. Formally:
mmn () -1 (0)'0
s.t.
d __ N T (it) 1 1 )1-(jit)
dt = E= ET= -ijtr) r=1 R 1+q exp[6qt+OPPiqt +krx jkDirtOk+kl jkVilt kl i
d NVT 1 (U1it)_ R Pijt )1-1(jit)
P L i= lt= j Pijtrl-sijtr r=1 R +29 exp[bqt+OPPiqt+kkD kil
dO - =1 1 (XjkD irt - m=l XmkDirtSimtr)l(j i t) Vrkk l(XykEit Jjlik
dO 1  T 1  jkVilt - m=l Xmk ViltSimtr)] 1(jit) Vkl.
A comparison of the estimates from all three approaches will be detailed in an updated
version of this appendix.
1.10 Additional Figures
1.10.1 Figure 6: Trends in shares of Incorporations
1.10.2 Figure 7: Trends in share of IPOs
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1.11 Appendix Al - Description of State Laws
When possible I quote the definition in GIM. In these cases, the definition will be followed
by "(GIM)". Otherwise, these definitions will be culled from a variety of sources including
SharkRepellent (which is current and thus from which I also can track any changes in state
laws since GIM), the ISS Proxy Voting Manual, and the State Takeover Law Handbook. I
separate the laws into those used in the specifications above and other explored, but found
not to be significant or to not have sufficient cross section variation.
1.11.1 ATS LAWS
Control Share Acquisition Provisions
These are provisions that "require a majority of disinterested shareholders to vote on
whether a newly qualifying large shareholder has voting rights. They were in place in 25
states by September 1990", where 4 states added their provision in 1990 and one more
added its provision 1991." (GIM). In Arizona, Florida, Idaho, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee and Washington they apply to out of sate corporations as well. It
essentially requires that a bidder obtain shareholder votes or risk not being able to use the
acquired stock to obtain control. This is one of the five provisions Bebchuk and Cohen
(2003) see to be the central ones to incorporation choice. It is seen to be beneficial even
by some apposed to ATS since it protects shareholders against coercive offers, without
granting managers the ability to resist bids.
Director Duties
These provisions also termed Expanded Constituency Provisions, "allow directors to
consider constituencies other than shareholders when considering a merger. These con-
stituencies may include, for example, employees, host communities, or suppliers. This
provision provides boards of directors with a legal basis for rejecting a takeover that would
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have been beneficial to shareholders. Thirty-one states have Directors' Duties laws allowing
similar expansions of constituencies, but in only two of these states (Indiana and Pennsyl-
vania) are the laws explicit that the claims of shareholders should not be held above those
of other stakeholders [Pinnell 2000]."
Fair Price Provisions
"Fair-Price provisions limit the range of prices a bidder can pay in two-tier offers. They
typically require a bidder to pay all shareholders the highest price paid to any shareholder
during a specified period of time before the commencement of a tender offer, and do not
apply if the deal is approved by the board of directors or a supermajority of the target's
shareholders. The goal of this provision is to prevent pressure on the target's shareholders
to tender their shares in the front end of a two-tiered tender offer, and they have the result
of making such an acquisition more expensive. Also, 25 states had Fair-Price laws in place
in 1990 (with 3 of them passing their laws in 1990, MAC), and two more states passed
such laws in 1991." (GIM). They limit the bargaining power of bidders in that the risk for
shareholders not tendering in the first round, of obtaining a low price in the second round,
is mitigated.
Freeze Out Provisions
Also termed Business Combination Statutes. These provisions impose "a moratorium
on certain kinds of transactions (e.g., asset sales, mergers) between a large shareholder
and the firm, unless the transaction is approved by the Board of Directors. Depending on
the state, this moratorium ranges between two and five years after the shareholder's stake
passes a pre-specified (minority) threshold." (GIM) In effect the laws limit the benefits of
takeovers in that the synergies in the case of mergers or other restructuring cannot take
place immediately.
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Poison Pill Endorsements
This is a seal of approval given by the state for the use of poison pills (see their definition
below). This in effect provides a layer of protection should the pills be challenged. The
endorsement does vary by state in its degree. Thus, for example New York and North
Carolina are clear that such plans are still subject to judicial review to ensure shareholder
interests are considered and that the freedom to use these pills is not unlimited.
1.11.2 MAND LAWS
Cumulative Voting
Six states have mandatory provisions requiring election by cumulative voting (see entry in
appendix A2 below). Other states allow the firms to choose.
Limits on Loans to Directors and Officers
Most states permit loans to directors and officers, subject to self dealing constraints. Four
states have special rules holding directors personally liable for the loans or have procedural
requirements (such as shareholder approval). As mentioned, this is a particularly interest-
ing provision, given that now, post Sarbanes-Oxley, there is a general prohibition on such
loans.
Restrictions on Limits to the Personal Liability of Directors
Some systems permit firms to eliminate personal liability of directors for a breach of duty
(see entry below). Six states do not permit this, or do so on grounds narrower than
Delaware.
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Merger Vote Majority Requirements
Seven states require that mergers be approved by two-thirds of the shareholders, and do
not permit the company to adopt a lower threshold. Other states require a regular or two-
third majority but allow firms to vary the percentage in their certificate of incorporation.
And indeed (Kahan 2006) finds most firms with the choice to, opt out.
1.11.3 Payout Restrictions
We use Wald and Long's (2007) coding of the minimum asset to liability ratio required
to make payout to shareholders (which clearly affects leverage decisions). These laws are
very stable over our time period, but they document them having significant effects on
manufacturing firms' location (and reincorporation) choices.
1.11.4 Ultra Vires Recognition
These laws recognize actions taken by the firm (through its agents) as firm action, even
when the actor overstepped the boundaries of their position in the firm charter. This
imposes more responsibility on the firm over its actors. Most states have generally chosen
to recognize such acts. Jurisdictions that do not, offer firms a limitation on the breadth
of their liability.
1.11.5 Other Laws Tested but Not Used
Anti-Greenmail Restrictions/Profit Recapture
These restrictions refer to "a transaction between a large shareholder and a company in
which the shareholder agrees to sell his stock back to the company, usually at a premium,
in exchange for the promise not to seek control of the company for a specified period of
time. Antigreenmail provisions prevent such arrangements unless the same repurchase offer
is made to all shareholders or approved by a shareholder vote. Such provisions are thought
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to discourage accumulation of large blocks of stock because one source of exit for the stake is
closed, but the net effect on shareholder wealth is unclear [Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Eckbo
1990]. Five states have specific Antigreenmail laws, and two other states have "recapture
of profits" laws, which enable firms to recapture raiders' profits earned in the secondary
market. We consider recapture of profits laws to be a version of Antigreenmail laws (albeit a
stronger one)... states with Antigreenmail laws tend to pass them in conjunction with laws
more clearly designed to prevent takeovers [Pinnell 2000]. Since it seems likely that most
firms and states perceive Antigreenmail as a takeover "defense," we treat Antigreenmail
like the other defenses and code it as a decrease in shareholder rights." (GIM)
Compensation Restrictions
These laws prohibit the establishment of irregular, compensation increases, during takeover
contests, such as new golden parachutes (see below) provisions. However they are of limited
efficacy since they generally do not apply to the period before the takeover contest (see
Mallette and Spagnola, 1994).
Control Share Cash Out Provisions
These provisions enable "shareholders to sell their stakes to a "controlling" shareholder at
a price based on the highest price of recently acquired shares. This works something like
fair-price provisions (see above) extended to non-takeover situations. These laws were in
place in three states by 1990 with no additions during the decade" (GIM), (or thereafter).
Naturally, they discourage takeovers in that they are potentially made more expensive with
this option extended to shareholders.
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA)
This is a complete codex written by the American Bar Association. A number of states
have adopted the MBCA and so there clearly are network benefits from sharing its laws.
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However, four of the five largest states and Delaware have not adopted it. There is also
considerable variation in the time the MBCA was adopted (although largely before the
90s). It is therefore more a proxy for a form of legal network effects and less an indicator
for having particular laws. Naturally, there are many alternatives to adopting the MBCA.
Non-adopting states deviate from its provisions in a variety of ways. It is thus a difficult
"law" to analyze.
Severance Pay and Labor Contract Provisions
These provisions are used to by states to protect employees in the event of a takeover.
Severance pay ensures severance to the employees, while the labor contract provisions
requires that, post-takeover, no collective bargaining or employment contract be terminated
without the explicit consent of all parties to the contract. Massachusetts and Rhode Island
had both provisions, although the former has been invalidated by federal courts in that it is
preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Pennsylvania still
has both, while Delaware and Illinois only have the latter. (See Simas v. Quaker Fabric
Corp. of Fall River, 6 F.3d 849 (1st Cir. 1993) and United Paperworks International Union
Local 1468, et al, v. Imperial Home Decor Group, 1999 WL 1115761 (D.R.I. 1999). I thus
counted all state with at least one of the two as having this type of protection.
1.12 Appendix A2 - Description of Bylaw Characteristics
1.12.1 Blank Check Preferred Stock
"Stock over which the board of directors has broad authority to determine voting, dividend,
conversion, and other rights. While it can be used to enable a company to meet changing
financial needs, its most important use is to implement poison pills or to prevent takeover
by placing this stock with friendly investors. Because of this role, blank check preferred
stock is a crucial part of a "delay" strategy. Companies that have this type of preferred
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stock but require shareholder approval before it can be used as a takeover defense are not
coded as having this provision in our [the IRRC] data. This stock, when issued, gives
directors the broad authority to establish voting, dividend, conversion and other rights.
This flexibility is good for facilitating the adjustment to changing financial conditions.
However it also grants the authority to issue stock necessary for the implementation of
defenses, including anti-takeover defenses."(GIM)
1.12.2 Bylaw and Charter Amendment Limitations
These limit "shareholders' ability to amend the governing documents of the corporation.
This might take the form of a supermajority vote requirement for charter or bylaw amend-
ments, total elimination of the ability of shareholders to amend the bylaws, or the ability
of directors (beyond the provisions of state law) to amend the bylaws without shareholder
approval." (GIM)
1.12.3 Classified Board
"A Classified Board (or "staggered" board) is one in which the directors are placed into
different classes and serve overlapping terms. Since only part of the board can be replaced
each year, an outsider who gains control of a corporation may have to wait a few years
before being able to gain control of the board. This slow replacement makes a classified
board a crucial component of the Delay group of provisions, and one of the few provisions
that clearly retains some deterrent value in modern takeover battles [Daines and Klaus-
ner 2001]."(GIM) This provision is mandatory in Massachusetts (unless opted out by the
directors), as of 1990, and enabling in other states.
1.12.4 Common Stock Redemption Rights
They are similar to poison pills in that they allow for the sale of stock back to the firm at
a premium price, if another shareholder acquires a significant share of the stock through a
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tender offer not approved by the board of directors. This in effect threatens the dilution
of the firm value by distributing the company's assets directly to the shareholders before
control of the company is surrendered, and thus is another anti-takeover provision.
1.12.5 Compensation Plans With Changes in Control Provisions
These provisions allow "participants in incentive bonus plans to cash out options or accel-
erate the payout of bonuses if there should be a change in control. The details may be a
written part of the compensation agreement, or discretion may be given to the compensa-
tion committee." (GIM)
1.12.6 Cumulative Voting
These provisions allow "a shareholder to allocate his total votes in any manner desired,
where the total number of votes is the product of the number of shares owned and the num-
ber of directors to be elected. By allowing them to concentrate their votes, this practice
helps minority shareholders to elect directors." (GIM) These are seen to increase share-
holder rights. They grant the minority more power to be represented, in that they can focus
on electing at least some of the directors. These provisions can also be made contingent
on there being a substantial shareholder.
1.12.7 Director Indemnification Contracts
These are contracts between the company and particular officers and directors, using the
bylaws, charter, or both, indemnifying them from certain legal expenses and judgments re-
sulting from lawsuits pertaining to their conduct. Some firms have both "Indemnification"
in their bylaws or charter and these additional indemnification "Contracts"... "The cost
of such protection can be used as a market measure of the quality of corporate governance
[Core 1997, 2000]." " (GIM)
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1.12.8 Dual Class Common Stock
Dual Class Common Stock attaches more or less voting power to different shares. Thus
allowing for a disproportionate amount of control to be put in the hands of those holding
these preferred shares.
1.12.9 Golden Parachutes
"Golden Parachutes are severance agreements that provide cash and non-cash compen-
sation to senior executives upon an event such as termination, demotion, or resignation
following a change in control. They do not require shareholder approval. While such
payments would appear to deter takeovers by increasing their costs, one could argue that
these parachutes also ease the passage of mergers through contractual compensation to
the managers of the target company [Lambert and Larcker 1985]. While the net impact
on managerial entrenchment and shareholder wealth is ambiguous, the more important
effect is the clear decrease in shareholder rights. In this case, the "right" is the ability of a
controlling shareholder to fire management without incurring an additional cost. Golden
Parachutes are highly correlated with all the other takeover defenses."(GIM) GIM treat
these as restrictions of shareholder rights.
1.12.10 Limitations on Director Liability
"Limitations on director Liability are charter amendments that limit directors' personal
liability to the extent allowed by state law. They often eliminate personal liability for
breaches of the duty of care, but not for breaches of the duty of loyalty or for acts of
intentional misconduct or knowing violation of the law."(GIM)
1.12.11 Pension Parachutes
"Pension Parachutes prevent an acquirer from using surplus cash in the pension fund of
the target to finance an acquisition. Surplus funds are required to remain the property of
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the pension fund and to be used for plan participants' benefits." (GIM)
1.12.12 Poison Pills
"Poison Pills provide their holders with special rights in the case of a triggering event such
as a hostile takeover bid. If a deal is approved by the board of directors, the poison pill can
be revoked, but if the deal is not approved and the bidder proceeds, the pill is triggered.
Typical poison pills give the holders of the target's stock, other than the bidder, the right to
purchase stock in the target or the bidder's company at a steep discount, making the target
unattractive or diluting the acquirer's voting power. Poison pills are a crucial component
of the "delay" strategy at the core of modern defensive tactics." (GIM)
1.12.13 Secret Ballot
"Under a Secret Ballot (also called confidential voting), either an independent third party
or employees sworn to secrecy are used to count proxy votes, and the management usually
agrees not to look at individual proxy cards. This can help eliminate potential conflicts of
interest for fiduciaries voting shares on behalf of others, and can reduce pressure by man-
agement on shareholder-employees or shareholder-partners."(GIM) GIM see the inclusion
of this provision in by-laws as increasing shareholder rights.
1.12.14 Severance Agreements
"Executive Severance agreements assure high-level executives of their positions or some
compensation and are not contingent upon a change in control (unlike Golden or Silver
Parachutes)." (GIM)
1.12.15 Silver Parachutes
"Silver Parachutes are similar to Golden Parachutes in that they provide severance pay-
ments upon a change in corporate control, but differ in that a large number of a firm's
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employees are eligible for these benefits." (GIM). These do not protect key decision makers
in a merger, and are thus potentially just an expression of the power of management. They
are classified by GIM in the "Other" group rather than in the "Protection" group.
1.12.16 Special Meeting Limitations
"Special Meeting limitations either increase the level of shareholder support required to
call a special meeting beyond that specified by state law or eliminate the ability to call
one entirely. Such provisions add extra time to proxy fights, since bidders must wait until
the regularly scheduled annual meeting to replace board members or dismantle takeover
defenses. This delay is especially potent when combined with limitations on actions by
written consent." (GIM)
1.12.17 Supermajority Requirements for Merger Approvals
"Supermajority requirements for approval of mergers are charter provisions that establish
voting requirements for mergers or other business combinations that are higher than the
threshold requirements of state law. They are typically 66.7, 75, or 85 percent, and often
exceed attendance at the annual meeting."(GIM) Note that the state laws (see above) are
not uniform on this issue. These provisions are similar to Control-Share Acquisition Laws
defined above.
1.12.18 Unequal Voting Rights
"Unequal Voting rights limit the voting rights of some shareholders and expand those of
others. Under time-phased voting, shareholders who have held the stock for a given period
of time are given more votes per share than recent purchasers. Another variety is the
substantial-shareholder provision, which limits the voting power of shareholders who
have exceeded a certain threshold of ownership." (GIM)
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1.12.19 Written Consent Limitations
"Limitations on action by Written Consent can take the form of the establishment of
majority thresholds beyond the level of state law, the requirement of unanimous consent,
or the elimination of the right to take action by written consent. Such requirements add
extra time to many proxy fights, since bidders must wait until the regularly scheduled
annual meeting to replace board members or dismantle takeover defenses. This delay is
especially potent when combined with limitations for calling special meetings (see above)."
(GIM)
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Chapter 2
Estimation of A Dynamic
Oligopoly Entry Game in the US
Airline Industry: Hubs, and LCC
2.1 Introduction
The recovery and analysis of airline profits and their determinants have long been elusive.
Airlines, by and large, have lost money since the invention of the first planes by the
Wright brothers in 1903. As shown in figure 1(a), several of the large legacy carriers
have been in and out of Chapter 11 in recent years (compare Borenstein and Rose 2007).
However, the number of passengers has increased steadily over this time period', and
as shown in figure 1(b) the operating revenues in the industry have risen significantly as
well (following the post September lth decline). In this paper I develop and estimate
a dynamic model of airline competition, with entry and exit, and recover the supply and
demand sides of the domestic US airline market. The model exploits the information
'The number of domestic passengers has gone from 551M in 2002, to 679M in 2007. There is some
decline in 2008 to under 650M.
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(a) Recent Bankruptcies (b) Operating Revenues
Figure 2-1: Recent Trends
embedded in the decisions of consumers in choosing between the many airline product
offerings in each quarter, regarding consumer preferences, demand, and marginal costs, as
well as the information embedded in the quarterly decisions of entry and exit, which are
assumed to reveal each airline's belief of the (expected present discounted) profitability of
the markets it chooses to serve.
As is common in the dynamic game literature, this paper makes the simplifying as-
sumptions of airlines maximizing the profits from each market separately and not taking
into account the added benefits to the entire network; of the transitions between states
following a first order Markov process where the payoff relevant variables are only the
market specific variables; of the individual airline transition probabilities being indepen-
dent conditional on the state space; and while the model can have multiple equilibria, this
paper assumes that the data is generated by one (and only one) of them. It also specifies
a relatively simple nested logit demand model over the quarterly tickets sales, which is
used as an input to the dynamic game. However, this paper extends previous applied
work on dynamic games by allowing for firm identities to matter, while accounting for the
impact this has on the size of the state space by structuring the model in a manner which
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facilitates the use of state-of-the-art mathematical solvers. This allows for the exploration
and exploitation of the highest level of richness in airline costs and profits possible under
the current computational optimization technology.
The recovery of the costs of serving the heterogenous US markets - and consequently
a better understanding of the profit structure - allows for an analysis of many of the key
questions that have been at the focus of the vast airline literature both within and outside
of economics. This paper addresses two of them: The desirability of hub networks, and
the impact of the increased presence of low cost carriers (LCC) on the costs and profits of
incumbent airlines, which I detail below:
2.1.1 The Case for Hubs
Following the deregulation of airlines in the late 1970s, many of the "legacy carriers" chose
to concentrate a large portion of their operations in certain airports (the "hubs") and to
connect the other cities served (the "spokes") to these hubs by non stop flights. Figure
2 shows the distribution of hubs across the US. The rationale for hubs is that there are
significant benefits or returns to scale from having a large presence in the hub airport that
outweigh, in certain situations, the additional costs (and inconvenience to passengers) of
having the many additional connecting flights, and travelling larger distances when serving
two spoke end points (compare Hendricks, Piccione and Tan, 1995) . Hubs facilitate the use
of larger planes which reduce the cost per passenger and allow for a reduction in the number
of direct connections. They also allow for economies of scope in having a concentration
of manpower in the hub, and may also allow for more bargaining power with the airports.
They have been claimed to also be attractive to consumers since they offer more variety
and frequency of flights (at the hub), and more expertise 2 . There are thus potentially both
supply (cost savings) and demand (revenue increases) advantages to hubs. Finally, there
2 Separating variety and frequency is difficult since both measures, but frequency in particular, are largely
demand driven.
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Figure 2-2: Hubs in 2008
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are claims that hubs serve as an entry deterrent, given the complementarities in profits
between different routes (any city added connects the entire network to that city).
Given the many puzzles surrounding the airline industry, these claims require empirical
support, by examining the determinants of profits in general and fixed costs in particular.
I find that hub carriers have higher variable profits that their competitors in their own
hub markets but lower than average profits in non-hub markets. Consumers prefer to
travel with the hub carrier in hub markets and have a significant distaste for flying with
other carriers in these markets. They also prefer to travel with airlines that have more
destinations from the origin, or more flexibility. However, the static game estimates
further reveal a distaste for connecting flights, or a preference for nonstop flights, which
can offset the preference for using the hub airlines. Furthermore, the profits garnered
by carriers in their hub markets are significantly reduced when including fixed costs and
they do not increase the costs of entry for other carriers. These estimates further question
the desirability and overall profitability of the hub structure, even in the hub markets
themselves.
2.1.2 The Impact of Low Cost Carriers (LCC) on Rival Costs and Profits
The second question analyzed is the heterogenous effects of the different carriers on their
rivals. There is a natural interaction between the six legacy carriers. However, a key
feature has been the growing market share of low cost carriers, leader amongst which is
Southwest Airlines, followed, more recently, by JetBlue. The differing products offered by
these carriers induce a response by the actual or potential other players in the market.
There seems to be a convergence in operating procedures (such as less food on flights), and
as figure 2 shows, a convergence in fares and labor costs as well. Previous work, including
Berry, 1992, and, more recently, Ciliberto and Tamer 2009 examined the effects of firm
heterogeneity on entry into airline markets in a static framework. This paper extends
this work to a dynamic framework, allowing for firm identities, and thus for heterogeneous
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Figure 2-3: Convergence in Operating Procedures: Legacy and LCC
effects of the legacy carriers and low cost carriers on the profits of their rivals, accounting
for the heterogeneity in markets. The interactions between players are decomposed into
their differing effects on rival variable profits and marginal costs (both part of a static pric-
ing game), as well as on the costs of entry and the fixed operating costs. I find variable
profits to generally be higher for the LCC. Consumers have a significant preference for
these airlines in general (accounting for observable features of the products offered), but
especially for Southwest and JetBlue, upon which I therefore focus. This likely reflects
some unobservable features of the services provided (or the characteristics of their prod-
ucts). Marginal costs are also significantly lower for these airlines, suggesting that they
are doing something better on the cost side. Furthermore, there are large strategic effects
between airlines, but the (negative) impact of the presence of LCC on the profits of legacy
competitors is most pronounced. The preliminary results for the entry costs and fixed
costs suggest that there too there are significant strategic effects, where the presence of all
major airlines increases the costs associated with entry and the fixed costs, but the LCC
play a special role.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 I briefly survey the relevant literature.
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Section 3 discusses the datasets used and the construction of the sample. Section 4 sets up
the general framework and the model. Section 5 then discusses the estimation, separating
the variable profits and marginal costs recovered from a static pricing game, and the entry
and fixed cost parameters recovered from the dynamic game. Section 6 collects and
discusses the results. Finally, section 7 concludes and suggests some of the many extensions
and future work that can be done using the framework in the paper.
2.2 Related Literature
As to the methodology, there are a number of dynamic game applications using one of two
methods. The first is a simulation of moment inequalities approach, where the value func-
tions are simulated forward using policy functions and transition probabilities estimated
from the data, and the estimates are those under which value functions of the policies
chosen are greater than the value functions from any alternative policies (as developed by
BBL 2007). The second is a maximum likelihood with best response equality constraints
approach (as developed by AM 2007), which will be discussed at greater length below.
Given the complexity of these methods, previous applied work, including Ryan 2009 (ce-
ment, BBL), Collard-Wexler 2005 (ready-mix concrete, AM), Sweeting 2007 (radio, BBL),
Beresteanu and Ellickson 2006 (supermarket products, BBL) and Macieira 2006 (super-
computers, BBL), generally assumes symmetric equilibria. This is a difficult assumption
to justify in most settings. This paper is closer to the AM approach, but allows for in-
dividual airline heterogeneity and a state space visible to all players which transitions
consistent with the equilibrium probabilities thus allowing for the treatment of the effect
of the airlines' own and rival market features (such as hubs), by exploiting state-of-the-art
optimization techniques.
The application, the study of airlines, has received much treatment in a voluminous
literature spread across many fields, for which there are now many useful surveys (see for
example Borenstein and Rose 2007 and 2008). I briefly sample that most relevant to the
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analysis here.
For entry into airlines markets, Berry (1992) which builds on Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991) analyses entry as a static game of discrete choice. The profit function is restricted
to ensure the uniqueness of the number of players, by assuming firm characteristics only
affect the fixed costs, and a symmetric post entry game. Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)
use a similar framework, but rather than requiring a unique number of entrants (and
restricting the profit function to ensure this), they consider multiple equilibria and allow
for a different number of entrants and different selection mechanisms in different markets.
Their estimation builds upon the set estimation procedures in Chernozhukov Hong and
Tamer (2007), and thus they allow for multiple equilibria within a set constrained by
the requirement of airlines earning positive profits in markets. The identified estimated
parameters are those for which there is a selection function such that the predicted choice
probabilities in the model match the empirical choice probabilities in the data. Both papers
find heterogeneity in the manner in which competitors' profits are affected by the presence
of their rivals and an important role played by airport presence. This paper is similar
in its identifying assumption of airlines operating in city pair markets when they produce
positive profits, however rather than looking at static single period profits I require the
difference between the value function of operating and of not operating in the period to be
positive. The dynamic framework relies on the assumption that the equilibrium estimated
is the one most likely given the data. This framework allows for an estimation of fixed and
entry costs from the moments of entry and exit, and for the study of both the strategic
effects airlines impose on one another and the effects of hubs. However, it requires a
full specification of the state space today and in all possible future periods and of the
transitions to and from all elements of the state space.
Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009) analyze hubs in a dynamic framework as well, and as such
are closer to this paper. Their markets are city pairs, but their incumbency in a market
is defined by operating non-stop flights in the market. The analysis is restricted to 2004.
The restrictions they impose on the state space require binning all states with four or more
incumbents together and discretizing the variable profits to a grid of 11 points. They also
do not include the characteristics 3 and identity of rival airlines in the state space observed
by each airline. Their paper thus focuses on the effect of hubs on airlines' own profits.
They find much lower fixed costs, entry costs and variable profits than those found here.
In contrast, this paper looks at a larger time period and specifically includes the identity
and characteristics of all incumbent airlines, which, in the dynamic model treats all 6
legacy carriers separately and bins the low cost carriers together. Equilibrium transition
probabilities are estimated to and from all elements of the state space. This allows for the
study of the effects of airline characteristics - most notably hubs - and identities - such as
being a low cost carrier - on own and rival profits and costs.
Finally, in preliminary work, motivated by the BBL approach, Benkard, Bodoh-Creed
and Lazarev (2008) estimate and project simple probit entry probability functions to sim-
ulate the effect of mergers. This paper estimates similar activity probabilities, but these
are used as initial values in the search for activity probabilities which represent a MPE of
the full dynamic model.
For the demand side, Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006), followed by Berry and Jia (2008)
use a characteristic based model of demand, which is a simplification of the now canonical
BLP (1995) framework to a bimodal distribution of tastes, to estimate (variable) costs
and markups, defining products as unique combinations of airline-fare-itineraries. This
paper specifies a pricing game at the quarterly level - consistent with the data driven time
periods in the dynamic model - and thus uses a simple nested logit to estimate demand,
which is then projected on the state space. The demand model used here is closer to that
used by Peters (2006), who looked at data from 1985 and found static demand models
to not predict post merger prices well. There are also a host of reduced form studies.
For example, Borenstein (1989, 1991) finds that flights on airlines with hubs at end points
3They have a measure of the "mean value of hub size for the incumbents".
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command higher prices. However, recently (Borenstein 2005) he finds these premiums to
have declined. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) finds preemptive price cuts in expectation of
Southwest entry (which is generally into markets in which there is a Southwest presence at
one of the endpoints). However, are but a few of the many studies focusing the importance
of hubs and the effects of LCC 4 .
2.3 Data Construction
The main datasets used are two of the three datasets (merged by ticket id) from the Origin
and Destination Survey (DB1B, hereinafter "the survey"), which is a 10% random sample
of all domestic US tickets aggregated up to the quarter and the aggregate information in
the T-100. These are public and commonly used (for example Ciliberto and Tamer (2009),
Berry, 1992, and Borenstein, 1989). I use the 20 quarters from 2002 - 20065. The Coupon
dataset has coupon specific information for each domestic itinerary in the survey, including
the operating carrier, number of coupons, origin and destination airports, trip break code,
number of passengers, fare class, and distance. Each coupon is a separate observation and
represents a city pair trip (these may be pieces of the same itinerary). An itinerary is the
entire trip and may contain many coupons (a round-trip contains at least 2). The Ticket
dataset has the number of coupons, the origin airport, round-trip indicator, reporting car-
rier, a credibility indicator, the itinerary fare, the number of passengers, and distance and
miles flown 6 . These are merged (by operating carrier) with the T-100 Domestic Segment
Dataset, which includes all (100% of the data rather than just a sample) of domestic market
data by air carriers, and origin and destination airports for passengers enplaned, including
4 See, for example, Borenstein and Rose (2007,2008) for more.
5 Future versions of the paper will examine the effect of dropping 2002 which following September 11th,
was an atypical year.
6 The third dataset, the Market dataset, has directional market characteristics of each domestic itinerary
in the survey, with a seperate observation for each market (defined as an airport pair), in the itinerary. It
is not used due to inconsistencies in the market definition.
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load factors, number of passengers and flights, etc.7 . Tickets not in the T-100, or that are
not provided on a regular basis (at least once a week) are dropped.
For the entry decisions, a market is a (nondirectional) city pair. Airlines decide which
cities to connect and in doing so are "in the market" for itineraries involving both cities
as both origins and destinations. On the demand side, the products are the tickets sold
based on the origin and destinations of consumers (compare Aguirregabiria and Ho 2009
that look at non-stop itineraries). The numbers of stops are a product characteristic. Time
periods are a quarter as dictated by the data. I think of the airlines as supplying these
products in different ways: some with more direct connections, and some with complex
hub structures. The effective seller is the ticketing carrier 8 .
This data has many dimensions and its reliability is not perfect. Accordingly, following
the previous airline literature using this data, the sample is reduced by dropping tickets with
more than two stops, multiple ticket carriers (per directional trip)9 , credibility questioned
by the Department of Transportation, segments of international trips or non-contiguous
domestic travel with Hawaii, Alaska and Territories; less than 120 passengers per quarter,
and particularly high (over 2000 dollars) prices 0 . I keep all classes of tickets, including one-
way tickets since the objective is to determine the total profitability of the route. Airports
in the same MSA are joined (to reflect the competition induced by the multiple airports in
a given city), and the size of the market is seen as the geometric mean of the population
of the endpoint cities1 .
Airports commonly seen as hubs are coded as such. I thus have the following cities as
7 There is also a T-100 Market database, which again has inconsistent definitions of a market and thus
is not used. For example, a carrier change is defined as serving a different market.
s The ticketing carrier sells the tickets. The operating carrier is determined by the airlines (not necessarily
the owner of the plane or in any other fixed definition). The reporting carrier is seen as pretty meaningless
by the DOT.
9This represents less that one percent of the data.
10 These tickets are dropped due to suspected reporting error. In further versions I plan to explore the
impact of this cut.
"Data were available at http://www.census.gov/popest/metro/CBSA-est2006-annual.html. Note that
I only looked at markets that had at least one ticket carrier at some point in the sample.
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Figure 2-4: Spending on Fuel
hubs: Atlanta (Delta), Chicago (American, United), Charlotte (US), Cincinnati (Delta),
Dallas (American), Denver (United), Detroit (Northwest), Houston (Continental), Mem-
phis (Northwest), Minneapolis (Northwest), Philadelphia (US), Pittsburgh (US), Salt Lake
City (Delta).
This data is also merged with a time series of jet fuel prices from the United States
Department of Energy's Energy information Administration (to be used as cost shifters),
aggregated to the quarterly level. As can be seen in figure 4 the spending on fuel has
increased dramatically. Airlines explicitly cite fuel costs as a reason for the increase in
prices and these prices do indeed work well at explaining ticket prices, as discussed below.
2.4 General Framework
I adapt the general structure proposed by AM 2007, which is amenable to the use of
the computational techniques I employ. To set notation, assume there are N airlines
i E I = {1, 2...N}, potentially operating in M markets, where markets are combinations of
the D different US cities12 . These markets are not directional in that we assume that for
12More precisely, these are metropolitan statistical area combinations, as I will explain below.
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the LA-Boston combination, for example, airlines in the market sell (one way and round-
trip) tickets originating and culminating in both cities. Thus for D origin and destination
cities there are M = D(D - 1)/2 markets. Airline choice sets have to be made to both
reflect the data limitations, as well as to provide a tractable framework for the dynamic
analysis. We assume the following timing for airlines decisions, where each quarter is a
time period:
2.4.1 Timing
1. Each airline observes the state space at the beginning of the period (which is deter-
mined by the actions of the previous period).
2. Airlines observe their private productivity shock.
3. Airlines choose an action aimt E {0, 1}, where a 1 corresponds to being active in the
market. This choice, of course, may require entry or exit, depending on the state
in the previous period. Airlines know whether they enter or exit in the period, but
form expectations over which of the other airlines will be in the market, given the
state space of the previous period. Based on these beliefs airlines choose capacity
for the market and the characteristics of the tickets that they offer, and play a price-
competition game with the other airlines that chose to be in the market for the
period. These latter choices will not be modeled but rather will be assumed to shape
the variable profits which we estimate as a function of the evolving state space, which
ensues from the entry and exit decisions.
4. Consumers choose the ticket with the characteristics that maximize their utility.
Airline payoffs (the sum of the prices they collected for the tickets sold) are realized.
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2.4.2 State Space
The state space is driven by both data limitation and the feasibility of the computation.
The structure of this problem - the study of hubs and the heterogeneous effects of com-
petition - requires treating markets and airlines heterogeneously. However, many of the
market level variables do not evolve and so the state space can be made relatively rich
by allowing for one market specific state. Markets include the following variables (which
remain fixed in the estimationl3): hub variables, the nonstop distance between cities, the
size of the market, the density of passengers in the market (taken from the first quarter of
2002 and held fixed throughout the sample) and whether the market is a tourist market.
The variables that evolve are the number (and identity) of the incumbents in the marketl4
Given that identities matter, there are 2 N states associated with N players in a given
market. There will also be N different value functions for each element of the state space
in each market. The analysis of hubs requires including all 6 legacy carriers: American
Airlines, United Airlines, Continental Airlines, US Airways, Delta and Northwest Airlines.
The analysis of the effects of LCC requires having at least one more player. I thus chose
the most parsimonious player state space with N = 7. Given the prominence of Southwest
Airlines and, more recently, JetBlue, the seventh player is either one of these two carriers.
Following previous work, and particularly CT (2009), I order markets by the geometric
mean of the city populations. I begin with all markets between the 50 largest cities (and
show below that these are not a bad approximation to all US markets). This gives me a
total of 1225 markets. I further eliminate 14 markets between cities that are very close
geographically, leaving me with a total of 1211 markets.
As discussed below, I am thus left with 1211. 27 = 155, 008 states. This represents the
'"This assumption simply implies that the airlines beliefs are such that they do not expect an evolution,
on average, in the future.
14In future verisons I plan to include the sum of the number of destinations flown by the carrier from the
two connecting cities which is a deterministic function of the airlines in the market (assuming we limit it
to the select number of markets).
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richness (and computational burden) of the model.
2.4.3 Profit function
Airlines' per period profit function from all markets is:
fit(ait, st, eit)= rim(st) - aimCim(st, imt)
m m
where 7im is the variable profits from each market, and Cim(.) are the fixed and entry costs
incurred by serving the market:
Cim(Smt, imt) = FCimt + Eimt + (1 - aimt-1)ECimt.
Note that given the timing assumption, the state space at time t, Smt, represents the
identity and number of firms that were in the market at time t - 1. aimt is the action
taken at time t. Simple put, airlines incur an operational fixed cost if they are active,
and an additional cost for entering the market (i.e. becoming active after a quarter in
which they were inactive) 15 . We can think of the payoff from not being in the market as
i + Eit(0) but since this payoff is not separately identified from the fixed cost we redefine
fixed costs as net of this opportunity cost. Exit costs can also not be separately identified,
since identification comes from the (two) moments of entry and exit. The structural fixed
and entry cost parameters are modeled as:
FCimt(y) = Y1 + 12i + 73 Xm + 'Y4 MyHUBSim + 'Y5 HUBSm + 76Legaciesi + y 7LCCi
ECimt(Cp) = 1 + 2i ± S3Xm + 4 MyHUBSjm + p 5HUBSm + p6 Legaciesi + 0 7 LCC.
15Natually, other definitions of inactivity could be used, exploring the possibility of seasonality in the
service of some markets, etc. For entry I require an airline to active for at least two consecutive periods,
following inactivity. Similarly, for exit, I require an airline to be inactive for at least two periods following
activity. This is expected to alleviate some of the possible errors in the data collection, which results from
an (imperfect) 10% survey.
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The costs are decomposed into a constant and carrier specific fixed effects, Xm - market
level variables (which I begin by having as just the distance between cities), MyHUBS,
the number of cities which are the airline's hub, HUBS, the number of hubs for other
carriers 16 , Legacies - the number of (other) legacy carriers in the market, and LCC -
whether a low cost carrier (here Southwest or JetBlue) is in the market (other than the
airline itself, and so this is zero for the LCCs).
Finally, eit = {Eimt : m = 1, 2...M} are the private information idiosyncratic shocks
incurred by each airline in each market m. We assume they are i.i.d. over airlines, markets
and time17 with an extreme value CDF G.
2.4.4 The Dynamic Entry Game
This game has the standard markov-structure: Airlines maximize the expected present
discounted value of profits, taking into account all payoff relevant variables. Denote the
strategy functions by a = {(u(st, Ei), i E I}. This gives a value function for each airline i
over the states:
V'(st, eit) = max {Ilit(ait, st, eit) + 3E[Via(st+l, Eit+1)lst, ait] }
ait
which takes as given the strategies of the other airlines (belonging to a) and chooses ait as
a best response - maximizing the expected discounted profits. The MPE (markov perfect
equilibrium) implies that: Vai E a we have:
ai(st, eit) = arg max {Ilt(ait, st, eit) + OE[Via(st+1, eit+l)|st, ait]}
ait
161I chose to count up all hubs for other carriers to allow for a difference between having one and more
than one carrier with a hub in a given city.
17 This assumption, which is common in the dynamic game literature, may be a strong one. It is possible
for certain markets or airline-market combinations to have serially correlated shocks. Such would be the
case if airlines were reluctant to exit certain markets even if they were unprofitable (for example due to
network benefits not captured in the model). I plan to explore this important extension in future work.
or that all airlines are best responding to each other. As in the AM framework, players'
strategies depend on one another only through the conditional choice probabilities, i.e. the
probabilities that airlines choose aimt given the state space. These integrate the strategy
functions over the private information shocks.
P(ai s) Pr(ai (s,i) ai) = JI{oi(s, i) = ai ii)dEi
This gives the equilibrium condition in terms of probabilities, which essentially will form
the constraints in the dynamic optimization problem. In order for the conditional choice
probabilities to represent an MPE they must satisfy:
P (aiIs) = I{ai(st, it) arg max{Hit(ait, st, eit) + OE[V(st+1 , eit+1)st, ait] } }dGe( it).
Equilibrium existence follows the proofs in AM and Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007)
for any absolutely continuous (with respect to the Lebesgue measure) density function.
Airlines can and should jointly optimize their entire network. However, for tractability
we make some simplifying assumptions:
First, for simplicity we treat each market separately. We assume that each regional
airline manager maximizes the expected present discounted profits from each market and
does not consider the private shocks or decisions that the airline makes regarding other
markets. In other words, although there is some commonality in the matter in which
consumers respond to airlines (for example through the fixed effect or brand effect and
through the total number of destination served), and entry into one market may now enable
consumers to fly between other cities that become connected in the airline's network, airline
managers do not take this into account.
Second, we simplify the structure of the transition probabilities. We assume a first
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order markov process, where:
Pr(smt+l Smt, aimt, st; P-im) Pr(smt+l Smt,aimt; P-im).
In other words, rather than considering the state space of all markets considered (including
the airline's own state in these other markets) the payoff relevant variables are the market
specific state variables. This assumption extends the previous one in that airlines do not
consider the entire state space for all markets even with regards to the profits in their own
market. Thus, airlines consider how the this being a hub market for themselves and for
their competitors affects profits in the market, but not how the profits from being in this
market are affected by the identity and characteristics of the airlines in related markets.
For example, serving both LA-Boston and LA-NY may be something valued by consumers
in adding to the flexibility the airline offers, and thus the profitability of entering LA-Boston
may depend on whether the airline is in LA-NY, but here we assume the airline does not
consider this. The conditional transition probability is thus assumed to be independent of
the state space in other markets (which is the assumption we relied on above in specifying
the size of the state space).
Third, following what is standard in this literature, we assume that the individual
probabilities are independent conditional on the state space and so:
N
Pr(smt+1 smt,) = I Pr(aimt Imt).
i=1
Fourth, while the model may have multiple equilibria, we assume the data are gener-
ated by one MPE, which players expect to be played into the future.
These assumptions allow for a redefinition of the equilibrium (note the addition of m
subscripts), where an airline chooses to be active depending on the value function from
each market iff:
Vimt(Smt, 1) - Vimt(Smt, ) 0
E[Himt(aimt, Smt, 6it)] + /[E[ViP,t+lIsmt, 1] - E[ViP,t+Smt, 0]] > Eimt.M ~ YMtl I. St, ~
The first expectation is the expected profits in the market given the state space at the
beginning of the period,
E[Iimt()] = -aimt(1-aimt-)ECim(mt) E [ m) imm)]FP(s m(sm = aimt imt)]
sMESm
where entry costs are incurred when an inactive firm becomes active, and the variable
period profits depend on which firms decide to be active in the period. Thus, there is an
expectation taken using the transition probability matrix, FP(.), which is a function of
the true equilibrium probabilities. The second is the expectation of the value functions
from next period onward (once again using the transition probability matrix).
This implies equilibrium probabilities of firm i being in market m at time t, of the form:
Pim(ait = l|smt) = G6 (E[Iit(ait, st, 6it)Sm,t-j1] + [E[Vim,t+smt, 1] - E[Vm,t+1 smt, 0]]).
Now, we can think of the per period profit function as:
Himt = (1 - aimt)[zimt(0)'O] + aimt[zimt(1)'0 + Eimt]
where: zimt(0, smt) is a vector of zeros, Zimt(1, Smt) - (E [fri(sm) I smt], E [FCi(sm) Ismt], aimt(1-
aimt-1)ECi(smt) and 0 _ {1,, <p}.
Denote the variance of e by oe. We then have a MPE being a vector of P = {Pim(s)}
such that for all (i, m, simt):
e
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where '(.) is the extreme value CDF (and 0 is all of the parameters in the model), and we
have the infinite sums of:
zmt = zimt(1, mt) - Zimt(0, smt)+
Ese {E{ (Pim(aim,t+j = 0sm,t+j))zim,t+j(0, s'm,t+j)+Pim(aim,t+j = 1 sm,t+j)Zim,t+j(1, s,t+j)(, aimt =
s'es{E{(Pim(aim,t+j = 0Is'm,t+j))zim,t+j(O, s't+j)+Pim(aim,t+j = smt+j)zim,t+j(1, s't)}|aimt
0, sim,t+j-1lt
rt nt= j
emt = s sE{Pim(aim,t+j = 1 Smt+j)(Euler-lnPim(aim,t+j = 1s'm,t+j))} aimt
1, mt+jj-1 
-
Ess({ { {Pim(aim,t+j = lISm,t+j)(Euler - In Pim(aim,t+j = 11Sm,t+j)) aimt = 0, sm,t+jl }]
Thus airlines compare the value of being active with that of not being active in terms
of the payoff today and in all future period paths beginning at being active or not being
active today respectively. Thus includes the effect of the activity status today on future
entry and exit through the equilibrium probabilities. Once again, expectations are taken
using the transition probability matrix which provides a probability for every possible
transition from a given state. The derivation of eimt E(eimt(aimt)lsmt, uo*(st, Ei) = ai),
the expectation of the error conditional on it rendering ai the optimal action, using the
Euler-Mascheroni constant was shown by Hotz-Miller (1987?). As is standard, the infinite
sums are solved by solving a system of linear equations.
Equation (EQ) represents the conditions required for their to be an equilibrium in the
model, namely that each firm is best responding to the actions of all other firms. Given the
assumptions above, an equilibrium exists (see AM 2007). There are as many best response
constraints as the dimension of the state space, multiplied by the number of carriers.
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2.4.5 The Transition Probability Matrix
Note above that the transitions are the product of the individual choice probabilities.
This still however leads to a prohibitively large number of transition, since we have for
each market (7 - 27)2 possible transitions. After looking at the data, I find that in 99%
of the data, there are no more than 2 movements (changes of status - entry or exit) per
period. I thus constrain all transitions involving more than two transitions to be zero (and
scale the permissible transitions accordingly). To give a sense of the data, table 2 lists the
transitions (by number of players, not identities).
Table 2
Transitions
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 74 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 84
1 10 608 91 12 1 0 0 0 722
2 2 63 896 194 40 6 4 0 1205
3 0 12 128 1275 363 57 14 12 1851
4 0 0 6 242 1830 545 97 10 2730
5 0 0 0 21 345 2848 735 62 4011
6 0 0 0 1 25 425 5158 613 6222
7 0 0 0 0 1 24 336 5823 6184
Total 86 693 1211 1745 2605 3905 6344 6510 23009
2.5 Estimation
2.5.1 General Strategy
The estimation strategy is a result of both the complexity inherent in the airlines' op-
timization problem, as well as the feasibility constraints imposed by the state-of-the-art
solvers available today. Over time, as solvers improve and computational power increases
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larger problems (and richer state spaces) will become feasible.
As mentioned, airlines are interested in maximizing profits, which are the difference
between the revenues they can garner from ticket purchasing consumers and their costs.
Airlines make many choices, including the choice and allocation of their fleet, the structure
of their networks, and so on. For simplicity, I think of the airlines as solving this complex
profit optimization problem using backwards induction. This implies that when playing
the pricing game at the ticket level, airlines take capacity (as well as product characteristics
and their fleet and network) as given. Consequently, at this level, the marginal costs of
serving an additional customer are just the costs of filling a seat, conditional on capacity, as
well as some probability of incurring a cost for adjusting capacity. These latter costs likely
involve compensating consumers for overbooked flights (adding more capacity at the "last
minute" is much less common) and are not likely to be very large in the overall calculus of
firm costs. The difference between the revenues from an optimally chosen pricing structure
and these marginal costs represent the variable profits from the route. These actual (or
potential) variable profits then go into the calculus of the decision regarding the airline's
activity status in each route, in forming the expected present discounted profits.
The model allows for an estimation of variable profits from the dynamic game as well.
However, this would add many more parameters to be fit, and ignore the abundance of ticket
level data which is available. Consequently, my approach is to estimate all parameters
that can be estimated from the static game and then construct projections of these variable
profits, for each market, on the state space and use them as inputs into the value function
and the dynamic model. Specifically, I specify a static pricing game to obtain variable
profits, and estimate them with all of the cross sectional data described above. Note
that, when estimating the static game markets are directional: consumer choose from all
available tickets beginning at their desired origin. I thus combine the profits from each
direction in computing the total market profits. I then move to estimate the structural
parameters of the entry and fixed costs specified above.
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2.5.2 Variable Profits
Approach
In modeling the demand, choices have to be made to both reflect the data limitations,
as well as to provide a tractable framework for the dynamic analysis. On the data side,
the time of purchase (and, consequently, the choice set available to each consumer) is not
observed; many of the ticket restrictions, which are key determinants of the price, are
unobservable as well. Indeed, a disaggregate analysis, like a BLP 1995 approach (treating
each ticket separately), requires identifying products as any tickets with a different price (or
any other characteristic); and thus, products are rarely repeated. Each quarter will have
tens of thousands of products, yielding a huge amount of product shares. In my model,
entry is into a market in a particular quarter, and so, in the model, airlines consider
the quarterly profits. Thus, instead of estimating the per product variable profit and
aggregating to the quarterly level, I simplify the analysis by thinking of a (reduced form)
game over the entire quarterly traffic. This eliminates the ability to have consumer specific
coefficients (or even the simple two-type bimodal distribution in BCS and Berry and Jia
2009). It does, however, simplify the instrumental variable methodology. I define the
price of a product as the average price paid by each passenger to the carrier in the market.
If Pkm is the price of each ticket sold by airline k in market m, redefine pj as:
EkEKm Pkm
sjMS
where MS is the size of the market, the geometric mean of the MSAs of the endpoint cities.
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Static Pricing Game and Demand
I use the common discrete choice framework (for example Berry 1994), where consumers
have the following utility function:
uijt = xjtP - aPjt + jt + Cigt(u) + (1 - a)eijt.
xj is a vector of characteristics of the product and market characteristics. pj is the product
price, 3 and a are the vector of tastes for the product characteristics and price respectively;
(j are the unobserved ticket features; eijt is an i.i.d. (across all products and consumers)
logit error, ( is common (for consumer i) to all products in group g and has a distribution
function that depends on a, a E [0, 1],where (ig(a) + (1 - a)eijt is still distributed logit.
As a goes to 1 there is no i.i.d error (within group correlation of utility levels goes to one).
With a E (0, 1) product shares have the common nested logit form:
i exp[(xjtP - apj + jt)/(l - a)] (1)
sj/ = (1)
where
Dg = exp[(xjt/ - apjt + jt)/(1 - a)].
Define
jt = XjtO - oPjt + 'jt
as the mean utility of product j. Assume the outside good has a zero mean utility, and
so the share of consumers who decide to fly (and purchase a ticket) follows the same logit
form (substituting in for the outside good) :
D(- (2)
1 + D9
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The (unconditional) share of product j is the product of (1) and (2):
i i i exp[(xjtP - apj + (jt)/(1 - a)]
8j = 8j/g" Sj J -(3) DO(1 + D (i - u) )
Specifically, the share of the outside good is:
1
s 1 + D - )
This framework is convenient. Taking logs (and suppressing the index for each individual),
we have
1
ln(sj) - In(so) = j - a ln(D,)
and taking logs of (2) we have ln(§)-ln(so) = ln(Dg) and so:
1 In(3) - In(so)In(sj) - In(so) = S ) - i
and rearranging we have:
sj = ( - ) ln(sj) - In(so) + aln(g)
= (1 - o) In(sj) - In(so) + a[ln(sj) - In(g)]
= ln(sj) - In(so) - a In(g)
where the second equality comes from substituting in (3). This yields the following:
ln(s} - In(s') = xjtP - apjt + u ln(g) + jt. (4)
Using this relationship, we can obtain the coefficients 3, a and a using a linear instrumental
variable approach, we where know that, at minimum, pj and 9 are endogenous with respect
to (j. Finally for the supply side of this last stage game, we can assume a standard Bertrand-
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Nash game and then have:
Si
pj = Cj + s
opj
and so differentiating (3) we have that:
(1-a)
pj -= C + [1 - s - (1 - a)sj
and so we can form
aj = P3 - 1 - p- - (1 - a)s,
and obtain measures of the variable profits in the market. Pjm - Cjm.
We can project the marginal cost on product characteristics and estimate:
Cj = Wj 3 + j
where wj are the product characteristics affecting the marginal cost, which, once again
simplifies to this linear form.
Instrumental Variables are needed, as mentioned above to account for the simultaneity
of the determinations of prices and quantities. A good cost shifter for the average prices
are the fuel costs and so I use a 2SLS strategy of instrumenting for the price and internal
share with fuel costs and, what are commonly known as the BLP instruments, the sum of
the characteristics of the other products - which are the sum of the average characteristics
of the other airlines in the market 18. The latter group of instruments stem from the
assumption that firms play a pricing game where the characteristics of all other products
affect the prices they can charge and the overall share of consumers choosing to fly, but
that airlines are not adjusting the product characteristics (and specifically the jt) jointly
'"These instruments provide reasonably large first stage R-squares, and highly significant parameters.
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with the other players19
For comparison 20 I also replace these BLP instruments with the set of instruments used
by Hausman (1996). The identifying assumption behind these instruments - which exploit
the panel structure of the data - is that, given the controls, market-specific valuations are
independent across markets (but potentially correlated within a market). This allows
for the use of ticket prices in other markets as valid IVs. These prices are thus assumed
to be correlated across markets due to common marginal costs but, given the mentioned
assumption, not due to market specific valuations. All prices in all markets and all quarters
could potentially be used as instruments. Following Nevo 2001, I use the average price in
all markets (excluding the market being instrumented for) in a given quarter2 1
2.5.3 Estimation of the Dynamic Game
The Optimization Problem
Given the estimation of the bottom node of the game, we estimate the parameters of entry
and fixed costs from the entry and exit decisions/moments. We therefore track the activity
status of each airline and construct the following constrained maximum 22 pseudo likelihood
estimator23 . We maximize (0 E 9):
L(E, P) = 1(aimt = 1) ln(T(aimtlsmt;P, O)+(1-1(ait = 1)) Iln(1-qJ(aimtIsmt; P, O))
i=1 m=l t=l1
"
9 This assumption, which is questionable in many industries, is questionable here as well. It may be
unreasonable to assume that airlines are not adjusting their ticket features, although this is difficult within
a time period given the complexity in coordinating the entire network.
20In this version of the paper, I use the first version of estimates for as inputs in the dynamic game.
21 There is no claim being made here regarding the optimality of this choice of instruments. I also include
the hub characterization of the other produces here, since these are, by construction, not adjustable.
2 2 More precisely, it is the supremum of the maximization of the pseudo likelihood.
2 3 The term "pseudo" comes from these probabilities not necessary representing the equilibrium proba-
bilities, but rather best responses to an arbitrary vector P. See below and in AM for more on this.
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subject to the equilibrium condition (EQ) above of:
ae
Simply put, we are maximizing the likelihood of observing the activity patterns in the data,
given the model, subject to all actions representing best responses to P, or being consistent
with the most likely equilibrium given the data, in the game specified above. We will call
the solution to this problem the "Full Maximum Likelihood Estimator"
Feasibility and Computational Methodology
This problem is computationally challenging. Thus, while the objective function is smooth,
there is a (non-linear) equilibrium constraint for each element of the state space, for each
player. There are thus 7 - 1211 - 27 = 1,085, 056 probabilities, for each of which there are
all the transitions described above. The value function has to be solved for each player and
each element of the state space as well, by inverting a system of linear equations, where:
Vim(s) = Pim(a)E(fI(s) - S Vim(')TP(s, s').
aEA s'ES
This estimator is consistent, and efficient (see AM). To ease this computation burden,
previous work has simplified the state space by assuming that players are symmetric and by
discretizing the state space. AM note that "this estimator can be impractical if the dimen-
sion of P is relatively large....this is the case in models with heterogeneous players...even
when the number of players is not too large". It is not possible to assume symmetry here,
since the purpose of this study is to understand the differential effects that the differing
network features have on the players themselves, and the heterogenous effects they have
on their actual and potential competition.
When the population probabilities PO are known, the equilibrium constraints are not
needed and the estimator is root-M consistent. When a l non-parametric estimator
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of PO,I P is available (as is the case for example with a frequency estimator or a kernel
method, when there are no unobservable market characteristics), estimates of 0, resulting
from the maximization of the likelihood: L(O, 0) , or from what we will call the "Two
Step Estimator", are consistent as well (see full details in AM 2007). It is difficult to
determine and establish consistency of the estimators of the probability methods in most
applications. The use of market fixed effects when feasible, is helpful, but there still could
of course be market-time specific unobservables corrupting the estimates. AM propose
a Nested Pseudo Likelihood method: The prescription set forth by this methodology is
that (potentially non-consistent) estimates of PO0 are formed, Oks are obtained from the
maximization of L(O, PO), °kO+1 (k) are formed, using the equilibrium constraints with 9 k,
new ^k+1 are formed from the maximization of L(O, PkO+ 1 ) and so on until:
S+t - P lk+t-1) -
where r represents the stopping rule. This sequence is well defined when there is a unique
value of 0 that maximizes the pseudo-likelihood function for each value of P, which is
assumed in all applications using this method. When this sequence of {i, Ok} converges
(if it converges), its limit represents the maximum of the constrained problem. This is what
they call the "Nested Fixed Point" estimator. In the Monte-Carlo examples presented
in the AM paper convergence is achieved. Interestingly, the "two-step" estimates provided
very similar results, suggesting that in any case, the estimated probabilities should be used
in initializing the solution algorithm for this problem.
To ease the computational burden, I follow the MPEC (Mathematical Programming
with Equilibrium Constraints) approach, advocated by Judd and Su (2008) and Dub6, Fox
and Su (2009). The MPEC structure of the problem essentially relies on the "augmented
likelihood function", £ (0; a, X), presented above, which explicitly expresses the dependence
of the likelihood on o. 0 and a do not need to be consistent with the conditions of the
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equilibrium of the model 24 ; however, when adding the equilibrium conditions as constraints,
the solution to the problem will be a 0 which represents the most likely equilibrium. Given
this formulation, I can use solvers which rely on quadratically convergent constrained
optimization methods, based on Newton's method (see Schmedders 2008 for a review of
optimization methods) 25 . The solvers do not solve a fixed point, or require the specification
of an algorithm for solving the equilibrium conditions, and the augmented likelihood uses
single valued functions. Furthermore, the constraints need only to be solved at the point
of the optimal solution; an LU decomposition is computed, and backsolving is used (rather
than inverting matrices); derivatives are computed using automatic differentiation 26 , which
"eliminate[s] this as a serious problem" 27 ; and the sparsity in the Jacobians and Hessians
is exploited.
I begin by estimating smooth functions for the activity probabilities. For each player,
I estimate the logit probability:
Pi(a, sm) = G(XP)
where G(-) is the standard logistic CDF. X includes the activity status of each of the
players in the previous period, a quadratic function of the distance, the geometric mean
of the population, the passenger density, whether it is a tourist market, the number of
hubs for the airline itself in the market, and the number of hubs for the other legacies. I
cluster by market to flexibly allow for serial correlation 28 . The results are presented in
table 5 below. As can be seen, the strongest predictor of being active in a market is last
period's activity status, reflecting the stability of decisions over time and potentially the
24 Compare to the discussion of the "pseudo" maximum likelihood above.
2 5This as opposed to Guass-Siedel methods, commonly used in past work, which have at best linear
convergence, and (even local) convergence for which is difficult to prove with nonlinear equations.
26 This refers to methods that computed analytic gradients and Hessians efficiently and use the chain rule
of differentiation to build a sequence of simple operations. Languages such as AMPL and GAMS aid in
computing these gradients and Hessians using insights incorporated in symbolic software.
27 See Judd and Su 2008.2 8In future versions I plan to explore more flexible specifications of these activity probabilities.
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large role for entry and fixed costs. The other coefficients are consistent with the variable
profit results presented below. Note that these are merely activity probabilities and not
structural parameters. However, these results can be compared to Benkard et al (2008)
who use similar probit probabilities to simulate the effects of Delta-Northwest merger and
find them to have much predictive power 29.
I use the predicted probabilities generated by these regression to form the initial prob-
abilities for all elements of the state space in every market. In other words, this initializes
the values of all of the equilibrium constraint probabilities discussed above. In addition, as
is standard, / is treated as a parameter. Given that these are quarters, I chose 3 = 0.98.
Finally, I chose the knitro solver, which is one of the most powerful solvers today, de-
signed to handle linear and nonlinear problems with dimensions running into the hundreds
of thousands. It has the versatility of three different algorithms which it can choose be-
tween, including direct and conjugate gradient interior point methods, as well an active
set algorithm to rapidly solve binding constraints using linear programming. The main
advantage of the AMPL language is that, once the problem is transformed into the form
above, the code is straightforward and the communication with a multitude of available
solvers is made easy. AMPL prepares the problem for the solver, and, when the presolve
option is used, it transforms the problem into an equivalent smaller problem which is easier
to solve. It removes unnecessary constraints and applies useful transformations. However,
AMPL, can require a large amount of memory and even the most advanced solvers are not
without limitations. In this application, the richness of the model is largely dependent on
the size of the state space that can be estimated, where each element of the state space
essentially adds an equilibrium constraint for each player. For the full model specified here,
there are over a million constraints. This is generally above the limit of what can be done
with the best solvers and so the problem has to be estimated in parts (or, equivalently, the
29I note that one of the key predictors, especially for Southwest entry was the amount of passenger traffic
that could be added to the network. This variable could be tracked in further versions of the paper, along
with the total number of destinations from the cities discussed above.
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number of markets that can be used in the estimation has to be reduced). Furthermore,
both AMPL and the solver demand a lot of RAM memory. A 64 bit operating system
(and AMPL version) is required to process a problem using over 4 GB of RAM, which in
my experience is the case for most non-trivial applications. The largest server I was able
to use has 65 GB of (shared RAM), and approximately another 30 GB of (slower) swap
memory. These represent the computational constraints with which I was faced3 0
The difference between the full maximum likelihood and the two step estimator, given
this formulation, hinges on whether the initial estimates are treated as starting values, or
are held fixed in the estimation3 1 . Note that even for the two step estimator, each player's
value functions have to be solved for, using the transition probabilities (as functions of
the initial values). I have found that 50 market can solved for in a matter of minutes,
while 300 markets requires about a day. For the full model, even 50 markets can take a
matter of days. To get initial estimates I estimated the markets in groups of 50 and in
groups of 300 (while averaging the scaled coefficients). The results vary between groups
and between the averages of the groups.
2.6 Results
This section collects the results of all stages of estimation. We begin by discussing the
results from the static demand: the demand parameters and the marginal costs. We then
discuss the projection of these parameters on the state space, which feed into the value
function. Finally we move to discuss the parameters of the entry costs and fixed costs
from the estimation of the full dynamic game.
3
oThese were the limits when writing the first draft in June of 2009. I hope and expect these limit to
soon be seen as laughable.
31 In the code, the difference between the two-step and the full maximum likelihoos estimates is two
comment characters.
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2.6.1 Demand Parameters
In order to track the impact of the necessary simplifications of the state space, I present
several specifications, using all relevant (and available) variables. My approach is to
specify as rich a demand model as possible and then project the resulting profits onto as
rich a state space as possible. Summary statistics for all filters considered (all markets,
all markets between the 100 largest MSAs, and all markets between the 50 largest MSAs)
are presented in table 1. The results are presented in tables 3(a) and 3(b). Once again I
present the results for the three filters considered, which suggest that the limits made on
the subset of markets are reasonable.
I cluster by market to allow for serial correlation, but, as can be seen, all coefficients
are highly significant and of the expected sign. I include fixed effects for all major carriers
(the six legacy carriers, and six of the biggest LCC including Southwest, Jetblue, Frontier,
AirTran, Spirit Airlines and ATA Airlines), and for each time period.
The demand is downward sloping in price. Distance (measured in miles) is positive
but non monotone, reflecting an inverted U-like relationship where air travel becomes more
attractive as it crowds out other modes of travel, but at further distances travel is needed
less and is consumed less. The number of destination cities may reflect more convenient
gate access and expertise as well as flexibility in rerouting passengers and thus is positive.
The tourist dummy captures travel to or from Las Vegas or Florida and fits the high
level of traffic to these cities not captured by the other variables in the model. Travellers
prefer less stops and more direct flights. They also prefer travel to and from the hub of
the ticket carrier they are using, and have a negative preference for airlines other than
the hub airline at hub airports. Within this model, the airline dummies are positive and
large for the main LCC: JetBlue and Southwest ("B6" and "WN" respectively), but not
for the legacies, capturing the features of the LCC service not captured by the relatively
parsimonious specifications possible with the data. Finally, as expected, travelers prefer
round-trip tickets. To get a sense of the monetary value of the characteristics it is useful
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to use the value of a marginal dollar of price as a scale. Doing this suggests for example
that on average, passengers would pay $143 dollars to travel an extra 1000 miles, and $241
less for a connecting flight. They are willing to pay $53 extra to travel with a carrier
that has a hub at their destination airport, and about $55 more for a tourist spot. In
comparison, when using the Hausman instruments in table 3(b), the magnitudes change:
on average, passengers would pay $500 to travel another 1000 miles, and $957 less for a
connecting flight. The hub premium increases as well to $93.5 dollars, as does that for
tourist destinations.
2.6.2 Marginal Costs
For the marginal costs recall that these are those in the pricing equation, where price is
defined as the average price for a given airline's product in a given market and a given
quarter. Here, we find the tourist variable coefficient to be extremely low. This likely
reflects much lower prices for these markets, which is likely due to the higher elasticity of
travel to these destinations. In other words this is a control for the parsimonious model
which assumes the same Bertrand-Nash pricing game in all markets. The other coefficients
are as expected. The more round-trip tickets, the higher the cost. Similarly, a larger
number of connections increases the cost (per ticket), because there is more travel. Note
that this is the final level costs. The choice of more connections is helpful in the aggregate
analysis of the airline, since it eases constraints on the rest of the network. The more
speciality in terms of destinations from the origin, the lower the cost. Costs follow an
inverted U shape with respect to distance where there are savings in costs at much higher
distances. The large coefficients on the hub variables are surprising and may, once again,
caution the simplicity of this analysis, but suggest that costs are higher at hub airports
to the hub carriers themselves. As expected, all LCC have much lower marginal costs.
In other specifications, the number of markets is reduced. This helps reduce the size of
the data, but also, potentially, allows for a more homogenous group of markets. This
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homogeneity has advantages in fitting the (parsimonious) model, but omits some of the
information embedded in markets in which at least one of the endpoints is in a small MSA.
Popular vacation spots would be an obvious example of this. However the second and
third specifications, corresponding to CT and excluding all markets not between cities in
the largest 100 MSA (55% of the markets) and 50 MSAs (15% of the markets, for a total of
1211) respectively, have roughly similar results. Similarly, the results using the alternative
set of instruments in table 3(b) are qualitatively similar3 2
The average number of connections and the percent of round-trips is likely to be endoge-
nously determined, and thus the assumption made in these specifications is that product
characteristics are fixed at the beginning of the period. However, specifications without
these variables yield similar results. These variables are not part of the state space for
the dynamic game and are used to get the best fit for the variable profits where are used
below. Taken as a whole, these results can be related to the two main questions of the
paper, hubs, and LCC. Regarding hubs, the results from the static estimation suggest
that while consumers prefer flying with hubs or with airlines offering more connections
from the origin, more generally, they have a very high distaste for flights with connections
(stops). Thus, the benefits from having a large hub presence comes at a high cost if indeed
this requires many more connecting flights. It is difficult to comment on the magnitude
without accounting for the benefits of the whole network, but these results do suggest the
potential for segregation by different airlines in offering different products that meet either
the flexibility features, or the nonstop features respectively. As to the LCC, it is clear
that consumers have a high preference for the LCC brand and especially for Jetblue and
Southwest. This suggest that there are some unobservable characteristics of their products
which consumers like. Marginal costs are also lower for these airlines and overall variable
profits are thus higher. The increased number of nonstop flights offered by these carriers
32As mentioned, there are some differences in magnitudes which I plan to explore. There is also a
difference in sign in the effect of the HubDest parameter on the marginal cost, but these estimates were not
of the same sign in table 3(a) either.
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increases consumers' willingness to pay as well.
2.6.3 Structural Profit Parameters
Now, for the purposes of the dynamic model we need a simple projection of the variable
profits (revenues minus marginal costs), estimated above, on the state space. The results
are presented in table 4 below. As can be seen the results from this parsimonious re-
gression reflect those from the full (static) variable profit estimation. The fixed effects
are negative for all airlines, relative to the omitted category of Southwest and JetBlue.
The distance follows a U shape, the population, passenger densities and additional profits
earned from tourist markets are all positive. Variable profits are higher in the airlines'
own hub markets, but lower in markets in which their competitors have hubs. The LCC,
Delta and Northwest all have significant negative effects on their rivals, when they are
in the market. Interestingly, the strategic effects of the players on rival profits suggest
that Southwest and Jetblue significantly and to a large degree, reduce the profits of their
competitors33
The constant is 6.7 million dollars of quarterly variable profits. This reflects the
baseline profit of the omitted category (the LCC). Baseline profits (fixed effects) are
lower for all other carriers (relative to the omitted category) and are generally three to
four million dollars. The variables distance, passenger density and population are scaled
down (and so coefficients are per 1000 miles, passengers or residents respectively).
As mentioned above, these are seen to be the structural parameters of variable profits.
Thus, in the estimation of the dynamic game we project these parameters on the state
space of every market in each time period and input these projected profits into the value
function. This both exploits the DB1B and T-100 data available, and reduces the burden
on the estimation of the dynamic game below34
3
"This projection, although clearly much more parsimonious than the estimation of variable profits above,
has a relatively high R-square of 40%.
3 4In future versions I plan to explore more flexible specifications of these projections, given the large
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2.6.4 Entry Costs and Fixed Costs
I present the results (from the estimation of 300 market blocks) in table 6 below. Column
1 represents the average from all groups, while columns 2 and 3 represent the averages
from the first two and second two blocks of 600 markets respectively. As can be seen, the
estimates are of the expected magnitude, but vary between blocks of markets. Markets
are ordered by the geometric mean of the city populations (not by the passenger traffic or
profitability), but this likely still introduces some systematic differences (and so perhaps
choosing the subset of markets randomly may be better). The preliminary results here
suggest that entry costs are the equivalent (for the LCC omitted category) of slightly less
than 3 years of variable profits, and so can be quite high, but not surprising. Fixed costs
are about 60% of the variable profits, and so are considerable as well. Both costs vary
by player, where American, Northwest and United seem to have lower costs, while the
costs for Continental, Delta and US Airways are higher. Distance (measured here and
in the profit projections in thousands of miles) is negative for some of the blocks, which
is unlikely. This result seems to be sensitive (it was not the case when I averaged over
market blocks of fifty markets). Thus, this issue may be alleviated by added a quadratic in
distance, as in the static results, as well as increasing the size of the blocks (both of which
I plan to explore). Entry costs are much lower in markets in which the carrier has hubs,
and interestingly (although to a smaller degree) for hub markets more generally. Entry
costs are higher the more legacy carriers incumbent in the market, and, to a smaller degree
when there are LCC incumbents. Fixed costs, are higher in hub markets. This echoes the
results of the marginal costs being higher in airlines' own hub markets as well. If this is
indeed the case this results suggest that the added benefits of hubs are smaller than what
is commonly perceived. In the specification presented here legacy carriers and especially
sample size.
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LCC, being in the market, raises fixed costs3 5 . These results were also not stable across
blocks and are puzzling. I will revisit these as well, as the scale of the estimation increases.
Returning the our motivation, we find evidence that while hubs increase consumers
willingness to pay, as do an increased number of destinations from the origin airport, they
come with considerable added marginal and fixed costs which may outweigh the benefits
even in the hub markets themselves. The increase in fixed costs is higher for the hub
airline in its own hub airports than for competitors. The additional connections required
are both more costly to the airlines and also can garner less from consumers, especially
when competitors offer nonstop flights. Similarly, I do not find that hub airports are
more expensive for competitors to enter. Taken as a whole, these results do not paint an
optimistic picture for the use of major hub airports.
As mentioned, low cost carriers are found to be more profitable in the static demand
and to significantly reduce the variable profits of the legacy airlines. In the estimates in
table 436 we find that on average the presence of a LCC in the market is associated with
a reduction of over $660, 000. These effects are much smaller than the effects of legacy
carriers on themselves and on the LCC. These airlines are more appealing to consumers
and to have lower marginal costs. However, surprisingly, LCC impose less of a deterrent
to the entry of legacy carriers in the airports they serve, as compared to that which the
legacy carriers impose on other legacy carriers and on the LCC. In addition, the results
presented here do not show an impact of LCC presence in a given market on the fixed costs
of the other incumbents. Thus, while there are huge benefits to LCC in both desirability
and costs, future work is needed to understand the source of the convergence in operating
procedures and fares shown above, and the to explore the potential for the LCC benefits
to be emulated by other carriers.
There are many caveats to these preliminary estimates. Firstly, the structure of the
3 5This may represent, for example, higher advertising and spending in these markets to combat the LCC
presence.
3 6There results are from the projections of the variable profits on the state space as discussed above.
model is such that, conditional on the parameters of the model, all randomness comes from
the extreme value errors. This is a serious limitation with which these types of dynamic
models are faced. From a computational point of view the solver has to fit the o and
the entry and fixed costs. Entry and exit can come from either the draws of the error or
these costs. This is likely a reason for the high sensitivity of the results. It may (and
does for some of the blocks) even produce negative costs. Furthermore, as mentioned,
we cannot identify exit costs separately and thus the fixed costs are essentially net of exit
costs (which are not estimated), as well. Secondly, larger blocks need to be estimated. I
am currently estimating the markets in two blocks, but ideally they should be estimated
together. Thirdly, the full maximum likelihood estimates (for the full number of markets)
should be used. Unfortunately, these take time, and will likely only be feasible for smaller
blocks of markets. In their absence, the accuracy of the results hinges on the consistency
of the initial probability estimates and their small sample bias, and so richer specifications
of these initial probabilities should be explored. Fourthly, correct standard errors need to
be obtained. Given the complexity in deriving analytical standard error for this multi-step
process, a bootstrap methodology is more feasible. This methodology requires drawing
from the data (with replacement), accounting for market clusters, and completing all stages
of the estimation for each draw3 7 . This is time intensive and somewhat difficult (and thus
often not done in the applied dynamic game papers), given that solvers can, in some
instances fail, and may need to be run several times to find an optimum. These caveats
will hopefully be addressed in future versions of the paper.
2.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper I applied a dynamic entry game model to the complex airline industry, in an
effort to recover market specific profitability and its determinants. Specifically, I focused
3 7There are many distributions to think about. For example, when projecting the profit parameters we
take the point estimates, even though these can lie in large regions and are sometimes insignificant.
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on the desirability of hubs and the strategic effects of the heterogeneous players. The
model used allowed for the exploitation of the benefits of state-of-the-art mathematical
solvers and optimization software, which have recently been strongly promoted.
The results in this paper have important implications: I found that while hubs offer
benefits that consumers desire and higher profits to hub airlines in their own hub markets,
this network may also come at a cost in only offering many more flights with connections
which are much less desirable to consumers. In addition, the preliminary estimates of
fixed costs suggest that costs may be higher in the hubs as well further dampening their
desirability and that they do not deter entry. As expected, Southwest and JetBlue are more
profitable than legacy carriers, and their brands offer benefits not captured by the limited
product characteristics in the data. Their presence in the market imposes particularly
large strategic effects for the other carriers, in lowering variable profits and in raising fixed
costs. More work is needed to understand the nature of the impact of LCC on their rivals
and the potential for their advantages to be emulated.
As mentioned throughout, while this paper takes a further step in employing and en-
riching what can be done with dynamic models, there are important limitations both to
the overall use of dynamic entry games in this application and in the preliminary results
presented above. The estimation can be improved by increasing the number of markets in
each block and in the full estimation, but memory limits and the computational capacity of
solvers will inevitably constrain the size of the state space - and, consequently, the richness
of the model that can be estimated, and thus final judgement will have to be made in
the interpretation of the results. First and foremost, the simplifications which essentially
abstract out of the joint network optimization made by airlines may indeed be deemed
unreasonable.
The bridge between applied econometric work and state-of-the-art computational soft-
ware is an important one. Economic models in general and dynamic models in particular,
test the boundary of these tools and greatly benefit from increases in computational power.
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Any flexibility granted by using better methods, offers more room to develop better repre-
sentative economic models.
The extensions to this paper are immediate. More has to be done to ensure that we
indeed at the limit in capturing the richest profit function possible. As more of the ticket
transactions move online, better data is also becoming available. Then, with this profit
function at hand, many counterfactual experiments may be estimated. For example, the
preliminary work by Benkard et al, regarding the simulation of mergers can be extended to
exploit the full structural model. Given that identity specific value functions are estimated,
specific mergers can be explored, once choices are made regarding how we view the new
merged entity. I plan to explore some of these extensions in future work.
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2.8 Tables:
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. N Mean Std. N Mean Std. N
Price 362.442 108.73 814066 352.05 105.176 612319 331.017 95.827 282724
Fuel 126.411 43.375 814066 125.89 43.38 612319 124.98 43.419 282724
Roundtrips 0.891 0.112 814066 0.885 0.115 612319 0.872 0.121 282724
Connections 0.911 0.315 814066 0.888 0.334 612319 0.806 0.391 282724
Destinations 63.077 26.504 814066 64.107 26.129 612319 65.579 26.485 282724
Frommyhub 0.055 0.228 814066 0.058 0.233 612319 0.076 0.265 282724
Tomyhub 0.053 0.224 814066 0.057 0.233 612319 0.076 0.265 282724
Distance 1148.841 621.705 813925 1181.412 630.388 612302 1271.623 666.848 282724
These are the main variables used in the demand estimation. The first three columns are for all
markets, the second three is for the first filter which keeps the 100 largest MSAs and the third are for the
main sample used which keeps the markets between the 50 largest MSAs. As can be seen, most of the
variables have roughly the same summary statistics.
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Table 3(a)
Utility Function and Marginal Cost Parameters (BLP Instruments)
allmkts filter-1 filter-2 mc-1 mc-2 mc-3
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Price -.007***
(.0002)
Lwshare .279***
(.011)
Tourist .390***
(.023)
HubOrigin -. 190***
(.015)
HubDest -.066***
(.014)
Roundtrips 1.300***
(.045)
Connections -1.687***
(.024)
Destinations .012***
(.0002)
Frommyhub .368***
(.019)
Tomyhub .719***
(.019)
Distance .001***
(.00004)
Distancesq -3.35e-07***
(1.30e-08)
-.007***
(.0002)
.274***
(.013)
.397***
(.025)
-. 195***
(.018)
-.059***
(.016)
1.436***
(.055)
-1.783***
(.029)
.013***
(.0003)
.382***
(.022)
.754***
(.021)
.001***
(.00004)
-3.45e-07***
(1.49e-08)
-. 006***
(.0003)
.249***
(.022)
.406***
(.032)
-. 148***
(.026)
-.093***
(.024)
1.799***
(.103)
-1.958***
(.049)
.016***
(.0005)
.356***
(.031)
.792***
(.031)
.001***
(.00007)
-3.32e-07***
(2.19e-08)
-53.043*** -53.712*** -55.712***
(2.369)
5.511***
(1.305)
-2.997**
(1.259)
21.871***
(2.965)
35.050***
(1.611)
-.382***
(.023)
57.569***
(1.593)
50.874***
(1.553)
.073***
(.004)
-6.59e-06***
(1.49e-06)
(2.587)
3.784***
(1.425)
-1.223
(1.386)
25.323***
(3.374)
33.224***
(1.745)
-.395***
(.029)
58.998***
(1.780)
52.347***
(1.700)
.066***
(.005)
-3.49e-06**
(1.70e-06)
161
(3.263)
9.523***
(1.894)
8.373***
(1.880)
-.681
(5.805)
23.240***
(2.166)
-. 226***
(.049)
53.962***
(2.331)
52.465***
(2.174)
.078***
(.007)
-8.74e-06***
(2.39e-06)
Table 3(a) Cont'd
Utility Function and Marginal Cost Parameters (BLP Instruments)
allmkts filter-1 filter-2 mc-1 mc-2 mc-3
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
AA -.273*** -.306*** -.342*** 70.115*** 62.321*** 44.618***
(.030) (.033) (.051) (2.108) (2.412) (3.970)
CO -.430*** -.516*** -.604*** 67.590*** 59.979*** 45.512***
(.030) (.033) (.049) (2.041) (2.312) (3.735)
DL -.281*** -.344*** -.534*** 92.407*** 85.830*** 52.335***
(.031) (.035) (.054) (2.386) (2.875) (4.922)
NW -.524*** -.610*** -.803*** 63.022*** 55.912*** 39.528***
(.029) (.033) (.050) (2.105) (2.459) (4.130)
US -.184*** -.221*** -.241*** 50.863*** 46.671*** 31.646***
(.029) (.032) (.049) (2.059) (2.359) (3.884)
UA -.298*** -.359*** -.464*** 74.510*** 72.253*** 56.097***
(.030) (.034) (.050) (2.069) (2.414) (3.979)
B6 .475*** .516*** .656*** -37.678*** -38.238*** -36.205***
(.066) (.067) (.085) (3.453) (3.574) (4.881)
F9 -.134*** -.106*** .129** -18.519*** -16.865*** -18.183***
(.034) (.036) (.050) (1.994) (2.144) (3.061)
FL .180*** .308*** .603*** -48.095*** -46.653*** -51.839***
(.037) (.041) (.067) (1.961) (2.188) (3.365)
NK .699*** .533*** .622*** -74.194*** -69.661*** -79.750***
(.102) (.098) (.109) (3.667) (3.689) (4.604)
TZ -.052 .024 .387*** -27.351*** -27.376*** -26.417***
(.037) (.040) (.058) (1.950) (2.163) (3.287)
WN .323*** .292*** .398*** -14.173*** -13.392*** -17.443***
(.030) (.033) (.052) (1.895) (2.110) (3.249)
Obs. 644516 485915 224977 644516 485915 224977
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Table 3(b)
Utility Function and Marginal Cost Parameters (Hausman Instruments)
all-h
price -. 002'**
(.0002)
Lwshare .176***
(.012)
Tourist .615***
(.026)
HubOrigin -. 287'**
(.016)
HubgDest -. 130"**
(.0)16)
Roundtrips 1.361***
(.0)46)
Connections -1.914***
(.024)
Destinations .013***
(.0oo002)
Frommyhub .187***
(.025)
Tomyhub .564***
(.023)
Distance .001**
(.00004)
Distancesq -3.11e - 07***
(1.34e-08)
f-1-h
-. 002***"
(.0002)
.210"**
(.016)
.611"*
(.030)
-. 253***
(.021)
-. 095***"
(.020)
1.418***
(.06 1)
-1.963**
(.029)
.014**
(.0002)
.173***
(.031)
.573***
(.029)
.001***
(.00005)
-3.38e - 07***
(1.56e-08)
f-2-h
-. 003"*
(.(00 3)
.295***
(.034)
.593***
(.041)
-. 130***
(.032)
-. 074"**
(.031)
1.639"**
(.124)
-1.912**
(.064)
.016***
(.ooo004)
.128**
(.050)
.559***
(.053)
.001*"**
(.00008)
-3.05e - 07***
(2.39e-08)
mec-a all
-53.840***
(2.308)
10.545***
(1.270)
2.566**
(1.235)
11.933***
(2.894)
43.043***
(1.585)
-. 344**
(.022)
50.633***
(1.543)
45.080***
(1.506)
.080***
(.004)
-8.30e - 06*
(1.44e-06)
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(1) (2) (3) (1)
me-1
(2)
-54.015***
(2.499)
9.976***
(1.385)
4.880***
(1.354)
13.520***
(3.298)
45.085***
(1.706)
-. 397**
(.027)
51.221***
(1.714)
44.653***
(1.639)
.073***
(.004)
-5.59e - 06***
(1.63e-06)
mc-2
(3)
-54.923***
(3.059)
14.486***
(1.839)
13.047**
(1.830)
-13.102**
(5.703)
42.256***
(2.132)
-. 281**
(.047)
44.369***
(2.230)
41.707***
(2.078)
.083***
(.007)
-1.00e - 05***
(2.31c-06)
Table 3(b) Cont'd
Utility Function and Marginal Cost Parameters (Hausman Instruments)
all-h f-1-h f-2-h mc-a all me-1 mc-2
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
AA -. 520***
(.039)
CO -. 712**
(.038)
DL -. 608***
(.043)
NW -. 758***
(.038)
US -. 355***
(.036)
UA -. 585***
(.039)
B6 .713**
(.075)
F9 -. 067*
(.035)
FL .478***
(.034)
NK 1.106***
(.098)
TZ .112***
(.036)
WN .470***
(.031)
-. 539**
(.042)
-. 765**"
(.040)
-. 671"**
(.048)
-. 829"**
(.040)
-. 391"**
(.039)
-. 642***
(.042)
.718***
(.074)
-. 041
(.035)
.551**"
(.037)
.880***
(.093)
.162***
,(.038)
.391***
(.034)
-. 511***
(.057)
-. 748"**
(.050)
-. 733***
(.062)
-. 934**
(.051)
-. 372**
(.054)
-. 646***
(.053)
.688***
(.092)
.153***
(.044)
.676***
(.063)
.815***
(.105)
.423***
(.051)
.360***
(.061)
Obs. 644476 485875 224937
II
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65.537***
(2.100)
65.945***
(2.044)
82.527***
(2.355)
58.774***
(2.096)
47.578***
(2.057)
72.230***
(2.065)
-39.982***
(3.535)
-17.870***
(1.988)
-50.835***
(1.987)
-79.987***
(4.447)
-28.098***
(1.969)
-19.491***
(1.943)
644516
60.223***
(2.394)
61.072***
(2.311)
77.059***
(2.813)
53.782***
(2.435)
44.840"**
(2.347)
72.443***
(2.394)
-41.295***
(3.674)
-16.637***
(2.149)
-49.898***
(2.220)
-69.467***
(3.567)
-28.795***
(2.189)
-18.594***
(2.170)
485915
45.528***
(3.934)
48.187***
(3.735)
51.221***
(4.814)
40.776***
(4.081)
31.465***
(3.835)
60.410***
(3.938)
-39.302***
(4.974)
-19.340***
(3.098)
-55.232***
(3.386)
-74.902***
(4.511)
-28.003***
(3.301)
-25.226***
(3.348)
224977
Table 4
Projection of the Variable Profits on the State Space
Variable Profit Projection
Constant 6694214.000***
(855010.000)
AA -3630095.000***
(508058.800)
CO -4367321.000***
(446053.300)
DL -3546622.000***
(471656.600)
NW -4471127.000***
(467761.500)
US -4486935.000***
(549021.800)
UA -4848132.000***
(519141.500)
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Table 4 Cont'd
Projection of the Variable Profits on the State Space
Variable Profit Projection
Distance
Distancesq
Population
Passenger Density
Tourist
OwnHubs
OtherHubs
AA in Market
CO in Market
DL in Market
NW in Market
US in Market
UA in Market
SWJB in Market
-2409303.000***
(443088.200)
743346.000***
(139236.800)
454.471***
(160.204)
53355.020***
(6386.904)
1128930.000**
(527532.800)
6107603.000***
(385589.100)
-1627747.000***
(212550.800)
163744.400
(265317.300)
-156505.000
(207198.200)
-1336960.000***
(293430.900)
-798468.300***
(188964.000)
212201.300*
(125126.900)
206435.800
(173316.800)
-662852.400***
(136145.000)
127800Obs.
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Table 5
Estimates of Predicted Activity Probabilities
AA
(1)
Constant -5.192***
(.228)
LastAA 4.271***
(.153)
LastCO .659***
(.100)
LastDL .140
(.113)
LastNW .325***
(.109)
LastUS -1.101***
(.109)
LastUA .414***
(.097)
LastSWJB -. 075
(.100)
Distance 4.691***
(.372)
Distancesq -1.213***
(.150)
Population .0004***
(.00005)
Pdensity .002
(.001)
Tourist 1.347***
(.338)
-4
3.
.4
.2
2.
-.
.0(
(.
-.
CO DL
(2) (3)
.017*** -3.747***
(.192) (.157)
09*** .086
(.092) (.095)
351*** -. 009
(.103) (.087)
-. 088 4.184***
(.106) (.110)
(71*** .590***
(.095) (.084)
45*** .208**
(.082) (.091)
231*** -. 421**
(.082) (.089)
61*** .133
(.071) (.084)
970*** 3.674***
(.307) (.285)
834*** -1.057***
(.110) (.100)
02*** .00009*
00008) (.00005)
003*** -. 0006
(.001) (.0006)
406* -. 120
(.220) (.219)
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-3
.4
4.
.
(
NW US
(4) (5)
.410"** -3.769***
(.160) (.162)
409*** -1.166**
(.094) (.107)
136*** .069
(.086) (.089)
75*** .072
(.093) (.105)
074*** .142
(.107) (.092)
232*** 5.466***
(.086) (.125)
.052 .632***
(.082) (.087)
.161** .017
(.070) (.067)
492*** 1.543***
(.291) (.285)
.384*** -. 413"**
(.104) (.098)
.00003 .0004***
00004) (.00005)
.0001 .004***
.0006) (.001)
.402* .500*
(.223) (.301)
UA
(6)
-3.798***
(.167)
.398***
(.105)
-. 241**"
(.081)
-. 460***
(.100)
.226***
(.085)
.940***
(.090)
4.244***
(.104)
-. 251"**
(.081)
3.124***
(.315)
-. 770***
(.114)
.0001**
(.00005)
.0007
(.001)
.297
(.273)
SWJB
(7)
-4.085***
(.170)
.197*
(.120)
.059
(.097)
.169
(.114)
-. 449"**
(.111)
.282***
(.094)
.263**
(.102)
7.489***
(.168)
.430
(.268)
-. 008
(.089)
.0001***
(.00004)
.004***
(.001)
.484**
(.208)
Table 5
Estimates of Predicted
Cont'd
Activity Probabilities
AA CO DL NW US UA SWJB
(1)
1.540***
(.258)
2.545***
(.334)
1.416***
(.180)
2.776***
(.409)
.927***
(.158)
1.095***
(.129)
Totalhubs-oAA
Totalhubs-oCO
Totalhubs-oDL
Totalhubs-oNW
Totalhubs-oUS
Totalhubs-oUA
Total Hubs
e(N)
-. 215***
(.083)
-. 497***
(.074)
.075
(.077)
.039
(.074)
-. 187***
(.067)
.116*
(.069)
-. 434***
(.058)
23009 23009 23009 23009 23009 23009 23009
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Hubs-AA
Hubs-CO
Hubs-DL
Hubs-NW
Hubs-US
Hubs-UA
Table 6
Estimates of Fixed and Entry Costs
This table represents the parameters of the fixed and entry costs. Column 1 is an average over all four
groups of markets. Column 2 is an average over the first two groups and column 3 is an average over the
last two groups. Estimates are in the millions of dollars.
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Type of Costs: Entry Entry Entry Fixed Fixed Fixed
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Constant 81.5 140 22.7 4.17 8.13 .222
AA -30.8 -32.8 -28.9 -9.48 -20.3 1.29
CO 3.87 28.4 -20.6 -10.2 -21.1 .636
DL .441 17.2 -16.3 -9.43 -19.5 .668
NW -87.2 -164 -10 -7.08 -14.6 .398
US 41.3 116 -33.3 -11.3 -23.9 1.35
UA -37.0 -54 -19.9 -10.4 -21.4 .624
Distance -22.5 -46.8 1.8 -. 05 -1.05 .047
My Hubs -33.7 -70.1 2.78 8.75 17.9 -. 37
Other Hubs -15.1 -2.27 -7.51 .095 .415 -. 225
Legacies 4.15 8.09 .219 .445 .942 -. 052
LCC 2.12 2.62 1.61 4.46 9.88 -. 952
Chapter 3
Federal Appeals: Selection,
Outcome and Predictability
3.1 Introduction and Motivation
As appeals are an integral part of most judicial systems, their existence is often taken for
granted. However, legal systems have experienced many difficulties with their appellate
structure. There is much criticism and concern regarding the undue burdens on the courts
and their increasing caseloads, which many see to be related to the process. Judges
do not have a sufficient amount of time to devote to each case, and many public dollars
are spent considering cases that should have never been filed. There are also concerns
regarding access to the courts and the availability of legal redress, given the high attorney
fees and the length of the process. Naturally, this reality can be exploited by powerful
bodies with much legal counsel at their disposal, who may target individuals for whom the
legal remedies and process are too costly to employ. From the other end, there are those
voicing concerns regarding the quality of the decisions. Some see the American system,
particularly the federal judges who are appointed directly by the president, to be biased in
a variety of ways.
170
In this paper, I empirically explore whether certain types of cases are more likely to
be appealed, and whether there are certain types of cases that are more likely to prevail
on appeal. Using data on all federal civil law cases (trial and appeal) I find that there are
clear situations in which cases have a higher probability of success on appeal. Notably,
appellate courts are more likely to rule in favor of the US as a litigant, and to overturn
decisions for the plaintiffs, especially when the trial was by jury. There are also (sometimes
different) systemic tendencies in the propensity to appeal.
These findings are interesting in evaluating the role for the appellate level in the judicial
system. The appellate procedure chosen in the US is not the only one. There are alternate
appellate schemes employed in other countries and more novel ones considered in the
literature (see for example Shavell, 1995). Once systematic biases are identified, there are
many potential deterrents to frivolous or patently unworthy appeals, which could prevent
such appeals from ever being filed. The existence of such appeals are one of the chief
sources for the heavy caseloads imposed on judges, which, quite naturally, could lead to a
variety of negative consequences'. There are also ways to reduce the resources spent on
such appeals, and to allow for the judges' time to be spent on the cases requiring their
expertise.
However, litigation in general, and litigation at the appellate level in particular, is the
result of a violation of one or more of the assumptions underlying the Coase Theorem.
Consequently, while my focus is not on testing a particular model, any systematic tenden-
cies leading to appeal or to success on appeal (of the selected cases that are appealed) are
likely to be related to these violations and any proposed reform will affect the out-of-court
settlement process as well. The form of selection impacts the interpretation of my findings
and my findings serve as stylistic facts models of settlement breakdown should aim to ex-
plain. The breakdown of settlement has been explained in three main ways (discussed at
1Of course there are positive consequences as well, such as having many repeat observations for similar
cases to let the common law system function with more plurality of opinions, etc. These seem less likely,
however, when the cases have obvious outcomes.
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greater length below): First, there is a large bargaining literature (focusing on the pre-trial
rather than appeal stage) with a variety of predictions regarding the probability of going
to trial and efficiency. These, generally, either employ an inconsistent priors approach
or one of many asymmetric information models. Second, there are models of the client
and attorney relationship, focusing on the potential agency problems arising out of the
various compensations schemes. Third, there are models which deviate from rationality
assumptions, where even under symmetric information there can be optimism which causes
settlement breakdown. Empirical work has largely focused on the pre-trial stage and has
related various data to some of the theoretical models (with the inconsistent priors ap-
proach receiving special treatment). In this paper, I focus on appeals where the legal and
factual realities are different; and rather than focusing on one particular model, I infor-
mally discuss the implications of my findings for a range of possible models of settlement
breakdowns and the incentives to appeal and briefly address the implications for potential
reform.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I lay out the legal foundation and
background on the functions of the federal appellate level and the underlying framework
for the breakdown of settlement, and explain the various suspected biases in appellate
decisions. In section 3, I survey the relevant literature. In section 4, I present the data.
In section 5, I discuss the methodology and present the results, and finally, in section 6, I
conclude and discuss future work.
3.2 Legal Foundation and Background
The choice of the federal data is largely one of convenience: federal data is meticulously
collected and is available. For the analysis of predictability, I chose appeals since the
operative factual reality at the trial level is much less clear. Parties are not always sure
what has really happened, or what they can prove or verify that happened, and it is up
to the court, after hearing much testimony and evidence, to establish the relevant facts
172
~ -_ __( li___)_Ll__/ij;*~l__iil-:-i_-~i~~;~-~l- -ti __l___(^__i___-__~~L-X__i-.i il---ii~ii .i ~iliiil;: i;:i~-i:l-_- I l--l~_-llli---^--------~_~~i~l~--;irj- ij-li-1;=~-r:1::-1:j-Il_--:li;?-
of the case - the "legal reality". There is much more uncertainty at the trial level and
much more maneuverability for the lawyers, who can attempt to shape the determination
of the facts (by judge or jury), using the sometime huge body of evidence. This uncertainty
leads to much less predictability, and the breakdown of settlements is thus often related
to disagreements over this uncertainty. In contrast, at the civil appellate level, courts
are supposed to interfere with a trial court decision only if it involves a mistake of law
(as opposed to a mistake of fact). The factual reality determined by the trial court is to
serve as a foundation for the appellate court, unless there is a "clearly erroneous" decision.
This reality is particularly acute when the trial is by jury, as the decision, and the factual
reality upon which it was based, are not detailed in formal written opinions. Thus, the
uncertainties should mostly concern the legal ramifications of this factual reality. However,
statistically, there are very few cases in which "new law" is required; cases are generally
very similar to cases that have been heard before and thus the legal implications of a given
factual reality should be clear2 .
Civil proceedings are a better testing ground for appellate predictability than criminal
proceedings, since in the latter type of proceedings the facts established by the trial level are
more frequently reviewed. The perception is that the stigma imposed on a guilty defendant
by the criminal process is so severe, that it can be reexamined by the appellate levels. The
defendant is thus often given at least two shots at proving his innocence. In addition, these
stigmas may be valued very highly by defendants - leading to a frequent asymmetry in
stakes. In other words, while in a case regarding monetary compensation decisions can be
assumed to largely depend on their expected monetary value, the considerations are much
2There is an intermediate standard of appellate review between that of legal determinations (reviewed de
novo) and that of factual determinations (reviewed for clear error): decisions that fall within the discretion
of the trial judge. These include many cases applying settled legal standards to changing facts, which are
reviewed for "abuse of discretion". The standard is supposed to be more restrictive than "de novo" and
less restrictive than "clear error".
Another factor is that there are some appeals that are heard without an actual trial having been con-
ducted. These are appeals from decisions on summary judgment, motion to dismiss, etc. In all those cases
the appellate court faces the exact same record the trial court did when making the decision under appeal.
For some circuits (the second circuit for example), summary judgments are reviewed de novo.
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less clear in criminal cases. In addition, criminal proceedings, including criminal appeals,
are considerably cheaper than civil proceedings.
The cases that are appealed may not be random. Appealed cases are "survivors"; cases
that could not be resolved otherwise, for which it is privately optimal for parties to go to
trial. To set ideas, each one of the parties will litigate iff:
Vi(litigation) > max{Vi(settlement),0},
where i = {a, d}, the appellant and defendant. To simplify, assuming risk neutrality, and
that parties are motivated strictly by the case at hand (they do not, for example, have
reputational concerns), litigation should only occur if there is no settlement amount that
both the appellant and the defendant would prefer to going to trial and the expected value
of litigation is positive. The appellant would accept any offer greater than Va(trial)+ SCa,
where
Va(trial) = Ea[W] - Ea[LCa].
In other words, the appellant would accept any offer greater than the expected value (using
his beliefs regarding the probability distribution) of appeal awards (winnings, W, minus
his litigation costs LC), plus the costs to him of securing such a deal SC,.
The defendant would be willing to offer anything lower than -Vd(trial) - SCd where
Vd(trial) = -Ed[W] - Ed[LCd].
In other words, the defendant would be willing to pay her expected losses in trial plus her
expected litigation costs in trial, minus the costs of settling. Litigation will happen when
Va(trial) + E[SCa] > -Vd(trial) - E[SCd]. (Litigation)
Under public symmetric information regarding the expected award to the appellant,
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this implies:
Ed [LCd] + Ea[LCa] < Ed[SCd] + Ea[SCa],
or that litigation happens when the costs of litigation are smaller than the expected costs
of settlement. However, even assuming a simple bilateral one shot bargaining game,
absent the strong assumption of both parties observing the same information and forming
the same expectations, there are many other factors that could explain litigation (where
the litigation condition holds): Thus for example, asymmetric information, or asymmetric
beliefs, regarding the probability of winning or the stakes, affect the minimum offer that
would be accepted by the plaintiff and the maximum offer which would be made by the
defendant. This asymmetry is possible due to actual private informational advantages
one of the sides may enjoy (such as a superior knowledge of the law, a familiarity with
the judge, etc.), or for behavioral reasons - such as overconfidence. It also may result
from an agency problem where the lawyers may convince their clients that such is the case.
Furthermore, even with symmetric information, different priors could lead to appeals.
The particulars of the asymmetric information can lead to different outcomes. For
example, the one sided asymmetric information model in Bebchuk (1984) leads to a fairly
robust prediction (confirmed below) of the likelihood of settlement decreasing with the size
of the stakes, as the optimism is magnified with the increase in the expected award. How-
ever, the findings regarding the expected plaintiff win rates at trial (shared by Reinganum
and Wilde (1986)) depend heavily on the structure of the information asymmetry and as
shown in Shavell (1996), under general assumptions, any plaintiff win rate is possible.
Given the complexity and multiplicity of potential explanations for settlement break-
down, I will begin by examining the potential factors determining the predictability of
appeals, ignoring the option for out-of-court settlement. I will then move to informally
discuss the interpretation of my findings for a complete model of the incentives for appeal
and the causes of settlement breakdown. I chose the factors that may influence predictabil-
ity in two ways: The first is by examining the role and function of appellate courts, as
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set forth in the law (I will call these "legal biases"). The second is by examining the vari-
ous claims of systematic biases in the decision making of the courts (these will be termed
"systemic biases").
3.2.1 Legal Biases - General Deference to the Trial Court
As mentioned above, generally, in civil proceedings, appeals are not viewed as being a
"fresh new start" with a higher judicial level. The trial is seen as ending at the district
court level. It is the district court that hears all the witnesses and gains a "hands on"
impression based upon which it determines "what happened". An appeal is merely a
check on this legal decision, made based upon the factual reality determined by the district
level. The factual reality is not interfered with, even if it is seemingly mistaken, unless there
is something flagrantly wrong. The appellate court mostly examines whether the law was
generally determined and applied correctly. The main factors determining the outcome of
an appeal are thus whether the case even merits the review of the appellate court: whether
the district court decision involved a mistake (of the nature described above), and whether
the district court decision was largely based on fact, as opposed to on an elaborate legal
determination. If appealed cases do not meet these criteria, there is a high probability
that they will be rejected and less room for disagreement about the outcome. However,
unfortunately, variables capturing these factors are not (and can not) be made available,
as they require a subjective reading of each trial court decision.
There are two tests that can proxy for this legal reality. Given the anecdotal evidence
and the common perception of most cases being decided based on existing law applied to
the facts of the case, and not involving flagrant errors, we can examine first, whether there
is an overwhelming rejection of appeals. This would be the case if appealed cases are
representative of all cases tried (that do not merit a second review). A second related
test is what percentage of appeals has a concurring or dissenting opinion or is reheard en
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banc3 . This provides an indication of the uncertainty that the case generates. Judges have
incentives to write dissenting and concurring opinions, not only in order to try to establish
a majority, but also to signal their legal philosophy and affect the future development of
the law, which also gives them prestige, recognition, respect and promotion opportunities.
This measure is clearly imperfect. On the one hand, predictable cases are sometimes treated
seriously for political or public opinion reasons. On the other hand, even complex cases
may not engender a separate opinion being written, as judges balance a host of strategic
considerations, and face severe burdens on their time. Many cases have only a majority
opinion, despite disagreement amongst members of the panel.
Note that the findings here naturally impact the explanation for appeals: A finding of
appellate cases being complex cases which often are accepted and over which there is often
disagreement lends itself to one of the bargaining failure models for appeals. Parties may
find it hard to determine and agree upon the expected outcome of appeals. In contrast, a
finding of appeals being representative of the general universe of cases may require other
explanations for the violation of the Coase theorem and the breakdown of settlement.
3.2.2 Systemic Biases
Jury Trials
Either party in federal court has a constitutional right to unilaterally demand a trial by
jury. The right to a jury has been entrenched in the Seventh Amendment. Thus we
should expect the trial to be by jury whenever a jury brings with it an ex-ante advantage
to either of the parties (appellant-defendant). As mentioned above, what distinguishes
trials by jury is that the decision is not lengthy and detailed. Historically, such trials are
seen as reflecting the views of the litigants' peers, perhaps benefiting from a perspective
not always available to the judges. The jury is guided by a judge who is to ensure that
3 Most cases require a decision by the appellate panel to reach this stage.
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the jury is accurately weighing the proper questions and considerations and who has the
power to interfere with the decision if it is grossly mistaken (especially in matters of law).
Accordingly, conventional wisdom is indeed that appeals against jury trials rarely succeed
(see Clermont and Eisenberg, 2001, and references therein). However, there have also
been claims of juries exhibiting a strong plaintiff-bias; i.e. of them being more sympathetic
and empathetic towards the supposed victim-plaintiff than the "colder" judges especially
regarding the size of the awards (see for example Helland and Tabarrok 2000). This bias
may indeed lead to a need for corrections to be made at the appellate level. There have also
been further claims regarding a recent trend of appeal courts intervening even in matters
of fact, and looking at the wisdom of the decision as a whole (from my personal experience,
this claim is reasonable). Below, I look at the effect of the trial being by-jury on the appeal
rate and appeal success rate, both in general and also when the jury ruled for the plaintiff
(where the claimed jury bias towards plaintiffs may be more relevant).
US Appellants and US Respondents
Federal judges are appointed by the president. Their allegiance to the federal government
and the US as a whole is likely to be an important factor in their appointment 4 . Settlement
with the US as a party may also be more complex, given that the US is a repeated player
with reputational concerns. This raises the following questions: Are federal courts more
likely to defer to the discretion of the Federal Government? Is the US as a party, treated
differently in appeals? Can we distinguish between cases in which the US is the appellant
and cases in which the US won in the first round and is "targeted" on appeal? These
questions will be addressed below. I note however, that these questions are asked with
a high level of generality given the aggregate nature of the inquiry here. I expect that
looking more closely at individual judges (such as those with promotion ambitions), would
4This, of course, despite the fact that, once appointed, judges are - at least formally - insulated from
the political sphere.
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yield interesting results.
Who won? Plaintiffs vs. Defendants
As mentioned above, there have been claims as to a potential bias towards plaintiffs in
jury trials. This raises the following questions: Is there a systematic tendency in either or
both of the trial and appeal levels for either party that are not purged by the potential for
out-of-court settlement? These tendencies can be related to behavioral models, including
for example overconfidence or sunk cost effects, as discussed below.
Procedural Progress
Cases can end at the district level at different stages. I distinguish between cases dismissed
at various stages of the trial. I have explored specifications with all 13 levels of dismissal,
as well as with coarser categories. There are opposing considerations for the effects of
the procedural stage. On the one hand, cases dismissed early may be thought of as being
resolved, and thus as not requiring an appeal. On the other hand, litigants may feel that
when the case was dismissed "too early" they will not have had "their day in court" and
thus will attempt to seek another hearing at the appellate level.
Life of the Case
I distinguish between three time periods: The time that elapses from the date the case
was filed in the district court to the time there was a decision at the district court (the
first time category); the time that elapses from the filing of a notice of appeal until the
final decision on appeal is rendered (the second time category); and the time from the date
the case was filed in the district court to the time a final decision was reached on appeal
(the third time category). The length of the first and second time periods can result from
several factors such as each court's workload, the stage at which the decision is given, the
litigants dragging out the case, and the complexity of the case. The third time period is also
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influenced by the length of time until an appeal is filed (which may be due to settlement
attempts and also to tardiness). The length of these time periods can have several effects.
The more complex cases may be cases that courts are interested in accepting (ruling for
the plaintiff, or granting the appeal), and the courts may be reluctant to reject cases that
have dragged on for so long. However, the longer cases may also have been dragged out by
undeserving parties5
Self Representation
Conventional wisdom is that self representation is a very bad idea, especially in the "ad-
versarial" system, where it is up to the litigants to raise all the claims. The court generally
evaluates the legal claims posed by the litigants and does not help them, especially in civil
cases. Thus it is particularly interesting to see how appellate courts view decisions made
when the plaintiff represented himself at the district level, and also when the appellant
represent himself. It is also interesting to see whether plaintiffs that represent themselves
are more likely to appeal. In different specifications, I have examined self-representation by
the plaintiff at the district level when the plaintiff won, self representation at the district
level when the plaintiff lost, self representation by the defendant when the defendant won,
self representation by the defendant when the defendant lost, and self representation by
both of the parties. For the appellate outcome I also examine the effect of self representa-
tion at the appeal, of the appellant, of the defendant, and of both the appellant and the
defendant. Note that appellants that represent themselves do not risk agency problems
with their lawyers. However, given their general lack of legal education this effect may be
of second order.
5If the length of time from the point of the district court decisions to a decision on appeal can be
reasonably expected by the parties, the effect may be to make litigation less likely since it reduces the
present value of the appellant award and the defendant's costs, thereby creating value (the value of time
until recovery) that the parties can use to make settlement more attractive. Delay will of course have a
stronger effect on the reservation value of the party with higher discount rates. It also depends on whether
the awards can be expected to account for the time that elapsed. However, unfortunately we do not observe
the expected length of the case at the point of the decision to appeal.
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3.3 Existing Literature
There is a sizeable Law and Economics literature on the selection of cases for the trial level.
There seems to be a consensus that tried cases are unrepresentative of the universe of filed
cases. However, there are many different models of bargaining failure and settlement. As
mentioned, these models generally follow one of two approaches. The first follows the
inconsistent priors approach of Priest and Klein (1984), according to which both parties
estimate case quality with error, and cases then proceed to trial when, randomly, the
plaintiff is sufficiently more optimistic than the defendant. This approach predicts that,
as the fraction of tried cases declines 6, the surviving cases will have a 50% likelihood of
winning, as disagreement is more likely when the cases are of a quality near the decision
standard for winning. As Waldfogel (1995, 1998, 1999) explains, this model implies that
plaintiff victories and trial rates are functions of the decision standard (the fraction of cases
that would yield plaintiff wins if tried), the uncertainty of the parties regarding the quality
of their case, and the degree of stake asymmetry. These measures are unobservable and
thus empirical papers testing this model have used proxies for them. Thus for example
Kessler, Meites and Miller (1996) look at cases where they expect defendants to have higher
stakes and Eisenberg and Farber (1997) look at cases where they expect more uncertainty.
The second approach is one of many asymmetric information models. One of the leading
models is Bebchuk's (1984) screening model which assumes that the defendant has private
information and thus implies that informed defendants reject settlement offers when they
have stronger cases, thus selecting cases where plaintiffs are less likely to win (as compared
to the general universe of cases). Of course this selection would be reversed if, in the model,
the plaintiff had the private information and the defendant made the offer. Reinganum
and Wilde (1986) show that in a signalling model where the informed party makes the
offer there is a fully separating equilibrium where the plaintiff mixes between accepting
6 For example as clients become better at predicting case quality.
the offer and proceeding to trial (and thus receives a settlement offer equal to the payoff
in trial). Shavell (1996) shows that any plaintiff win rate in trial is possible under more
general assumptions. These models have thus received less empirical treatment and it is
difficult to distinguish between the classes of models (compare Waldfogel 1998 that does
this using an uninformed plaintiff-informed defendant model and the criticism of this in
Daughety and Reinganum 2008). Finally, there are more stylized models of bargaining,
examining the role of multiple litigants and specific procedural rules (such as discovery,
most favored nations clauses, and joint and several liability, see Daughety and Reinganum
2005, 2008).
There are also several papers model modeling the agency problem between the client
and lawyer, where the lawyer pays all of the litigation costs and receives a fraction of the
award. In these models lawyers have an incentive to bargain harder at the settlement
phase (see Kahan and Tuckman (1995), Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2002), and Chen and
Wang (2006)). Alternatively, when lawyers are paid by the hour, their incentives are to
prolong the litigation (see Spier 1998, Miller 1987). There are some empirical studies
that focus on the relationship between lawyer compensation schemes and the likelihood of
settlement (see for example Brickman 2003, and Kritzer, 1998, 2002).
Finally, there are papers that deviate from the assumptions of rationality and assume
(based on anecdotal or experimental evidence) optimism (of the litigants and/or their
lawyers) to the point of there not being any mutual acceptable settlement amounts (see
Loewenstein et al (1993) and Mnookin (1993)).
As to trials at the appellate level, there is some work examining the role of the appellate
level and the function of appeal courts (see for example Shavell 1995, and Daughety and
Reinganum 2000). However, there has been much less empirical work on predictability and
selection in appeals. Of most relevance is the Clermont and Eisenberg (2001) paper that
looks at an earlier smaller sample than that considered here and finds large differences
between appellate courts and trial juries which they claim to result from appellate judges
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"sizeable misperceptions regarding the jury" and some advantages to defendant-appellants
which they see as misperceptions regarding pro-plaintiff biases in trial courts. They also
find an affirmance rate of about 80% of appeals which they conclude is evidence that case
selection has a limited effect at the appellate level and can be ignored in the interpretation
of the results.
In sum, many of the models do not generate predictions amenable to their empirical
validation, especially across the many dimensions of the potential biases explored here.
Furthermore, the appellate environment changes some of the predictions. For example,
Waldfogel's (1999) claim that there is more uncertainty with juries refers to the trial level
and says nothing about the appeal where, as mentioned, we may actually expect more
certainty. The approach taken here is thus to estimate the significant tendencies in the
data for the selection of cases for appeal and the appeal outcomes and then to informally
discuss the implications for the main classes of models. This work can thus be seen as
preliminary work in preparation for the estimation of the magnitudes of the particular form
of settlement breakdown, such as informational asymmetry or agency costs from a more
general structural model, which I plan to explore in the future.
3.4 Data
I used the data on civil terminations and on appellate terminations from the Federal Inte-
grated Data Base. This data is gathered by the administrative office of the United States
Courts, assembled by the Federal Judicial Center, and disseminated by the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). It includes information on every
federal case terminated since 1970. The procedure is that whenever a federal case is ter-
minated a court clerk submits a form with information about the case, including (but not
limited to) the names of the parties, the category of the subject manner (there are 98 cate-
gories), the jurisdictional basis for the case (i.e. why federal?), the amount demanded, the
amount received, the dates of filing and termination, the procedural method of disposition,
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and which party prevailed.
I chose the years 1992 - 2003. This, since in my dataset the median amount of time
in the third time category (of the time categories discussed above) is 32.4 months and I
wanted to capture a sufficiently long period. I chose to go back to 1992 since there were
some differences in the coding of variables in earlier years. The civil datasets are linked
to each other and to the appeal datasets, using the docket number that each case receives
when it is filed. I also used the year, circuit and district in which the cases were filed, and
the category for the area of law which they regard. For duplicates (which largely result
from several decisions being made on a given case), I chose the latest appellate decision and
the last civil decision, which is generally the most substantial one. This leaves out about
10% of the appeal decisions and approximately 0.65% of the district court cases. Next I
chose to limit the categories to cases largely involving monetary claims7 . I drop prisoner
petitions, and require that each case have a nonzero monetary demand (at the district
level). The categories with which I remained are detailed in a chart 1 in the appendix.
I am left with 17,679 cases which terminated between the years 1992 - 2003 for which
there is both civil and appellate data, and 469,764 district cases in total (from which
appeals are made).
3.5 Methodology and Results
3.5.1 Legal Biases
As mentioned, given the deference to the district level, absent settlement, we expect a
high level of rejected appeals. And indeed, the percentage of appeals that are rejected
is overwhelming: In my dataset, out of my 17,680 observations, only 12.42% of the cases
7It may be possible to refine the categories further in order to isolate, from within the cases that are
financially motivated, the cases that are primarily concerned with the specific case at hand (rather than
the effects on other future cases), such as by looking at the identity of the parties. I plan to return to this
in future work.
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achieved some goal, either reversing, entirely or in part, or remanding the case to the district
court. Only 7.94% of the cases were considered to have been reversed. The percentage of
cases in which there were differing opinions in the panel is also exceedingly small. Of the
cases for which this was tracked8 , in 91.86% of the cases there was only one opinion of the
court and the court did not sit en banc (i.e. did not expand the panel 9). This may be seen
as evidence of the simplicity of most appeals. Thus, a simple and robust coarse prediction
for appellate outcomes is that they will be rejected. Both findings therefore, are facts to
be explained by a model of appeal incentives, although, as mentioned, the second findings
may be explained in other ways including the time constraints and strategic interactions
between judges as repeated players. There is therefore no evidence that appealed cases
are particularly complex cases.
Appeals as a Low Probability - High Return Gamble
This overwhelming large percentage of rejections naturally leads to the question of whether
appeals are seen as a costly low probability gamble with high expected returns. The data
does not include the amounts received on appeal, is top-coded at 10 million dollars at the
civil level, and the ability to follow through cases that are remanded to the district court
is limited. In addition, it is hard to get a reliable estimate of the actual attorney costs
expended on a given appeal. Thus, the strategy I employed was to compute a generous
proxy for the amount awarded in the appeal (as captured by the "stakes" variable described
above). The amount is calculated as the amount awarded at the trial level - if an amount
was awarded at the trial level and the appeal was accepted - and at the amount demanded
at the trial level - if the plaintiff lost at the trial level and won on appeal. This measure
is particularly generous, since the awards are generally only a very small fraction of the
amount demanded, and, as mentioned, my definition of winning if very broad. The mean
8This is slightly over 40% of the cases.
9There may be some issues with the coding of this last variable.
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of the amount received on appeal is $366, 000 while the mean of the amount demanded is
$2, 014, 000. Now, adding up these inflated wins and dividing them by the total number
of appeals, yields an expected gain of $258,640 dollars per appeal. The average length
of an appeal (the time from when the appeal is filed until the final judgment is given)
is 9.7 months and the average attorney fee is 250 dollars per hour, and so it is hard to
conclude from this generous measure whether the appeal is, on average, wasteful. Chart 2
details the average success rates, winnings, and duration of the case, by case category. The
results are mixed. Thus for example for category 355, "Motor Vehicle Product Liability"
the expected winnings are approximately 550 thousand dollars, where for category 152,
which deals with student loans, they are under 700 dollars. It is clear that there is much
dispersion in the expected winnings, and that, for some categories, appeals may indeed be
profitable, but for others they are clearly not. There is likely much dispersion in the costs
of legal representation for the various categories. More detailed work is required to model
and to understand the motivations in the specific categories. While the precise objective
function for appellants, and the manner in which they form beliefs are not known, Fournier
and Zuehlke (1989) find, for example, that movements in the awards in completed trials in
the same category, influence the litigants' settlement decisions. This suggests that such
calculations are being made to some degree and that these expected measures should be
considered. Cases with a negative expected value for appeals require an explanation for
why they are filed in the first place. Here, the motivation for the lack of settlement by
the defendant is clear: there is no reason for her to pay when the outside option of the
appellant can be reasonably expected to be negative. The motivation for the appellant is
more difficult to rationalize. Such cases may be more amenable to an explanation regarding
the agency problems with the attorneys (rather than sustainable optimistic beliefs in an
environment where appeals are, on average, wasteful to file). Attorneys may not have
the incentives to provide accurate information to the clients (for example in one shot
relationships with clients with little ramifications on future business, where the attorney is
186
__:_;:l___ir__ll 1_~lf^l~-^l~lll--iiil -- II___I- _ii-~.Ti:iiili;i~ _ ~--1--~----- -i- l -r--~ -- i-l~li--~- i.. _.-~ilC-iii i; 1 l:iil ___ ~-~-=l-i~--:l---~~ ~ -i. -i- i
compensated based on the amount of time worked and not as a percentage of winnings).
The validity of such rationales can be explored by looking more closely at these classes
of cases. There also may be room for behavioral biases to explain such cases, where the
appellant wrongly believes that even though, on expectation, appeals are a bad idea in this
class of cases, his case is special. Once again, such explanations require more structure as
to the exact nature of the behavioral bias in the given case.
3.5.2 Systemic Biases
I use simple probability models for both the selection of cases for appeal (from the cases
tried), and the propensity of the appellant to succeed. The right-hand-side variables are
similar in both specifications, with the obvious exception of the variables that are not
available at the time of appeal (such as some of the time categories). Naturally, for the
selection equation I used the entire merged database of district and appellate cases, while
for the outcome equation I only used the cases which could successfully be linked. I
control for the case categories, circuit fixed effects, and time fixed effects (for the year
the trial case and appeals were decided), and for district fixed effects when estimating
the selection equation for the trial districts. I compare average marginal effects under a
logit and probit model with a linear probability model. Note that my data is a panel
of repeat cross sections of cases (which sometimes take several periods to be decided).
Despite the many fixed effects, the large number of observations (on average there are
over 1000 observations per fixed effect) in this static model should compensate for them
(as the bias is proportional to the variance of the parameter estimate) especially when
average marginal effects are used, or in other words the bias arising from the "incidental
parameter problem" is likely to be small (compare Hahn and Newey, 2004; Fernandez-Val
2009). Standard errors are clustered by districts to account for serial correlation.
As mentioned, the key omitted variable is whether the trial level decision resulted in
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a mistake that merits appellate intervention i0 . However, there is no obvious endogeneity
problem (and thus no obvious instruments). Similarly, while the sample of cases ending
up in an appeal is likely not random, this paper focuses on the determinants of the cases
which have been appealed (rather that all cases).
Specifications
Tables 3 and 4 present the results for the two specifications below respectively:
appealed = appealed(category, district, circuit, time, bef oretrial, districttime, demanded
jury, plaintif fwon, plaintiff wonjury, self rep, self red)
won = won(category, circuit, time, bef oretrial, usappellant, us_respondent, totaltime, appealtime,
districtime, jury, plaintiff won, plaintiff wonjury, self rep, self repa)
Summary statistics for the variables are detailed in tables 1 and 2 below. The binary
variable "Appealed" indicates whether the trial case appears in the appeal database,
during the time frame. Only a small percentage of cases are appealed. As mentioned above,
only about 4% of the cases show up as appeals, which is consistent with the percentages
which can be inferred from the US Courts publications. The binary variable "Won" is
a dummy variable denoting a successful appeal. An appeal was deemed to have been
successful (or "won"), when the trial decision was reversed, entirely or in part, and when
0oAs discussed above, this is when there is a mistake in law, or an extreme patenly obvious error in
determining the factual basis of the case. See also note 2.
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the case was remanded to the district court. Cases were not followed to their final outcome
when they are sent back to the lower level.
"Before Trial" is a dummy for cases that were dismissed at early stages of the trial,
including before the issue was joined, and before or during pretrial. "Jury" is a dummy
variable denoting whether the district trial was by jury. "US Appellate", and "US Re-
spondent" are dummy variables indicating whether the US initiated or was a respondent
to the appeal. "Total Time" is the total time the case was alive from the time it was filed
until a final decision was reached on appeal; "District Time" is the length of time from
the time the case was filed until a final decision was reached at the district court; "Appeal
Time" is the total amount of time that elapsed from the time the appeal was filed until
a final decision was reached on appeal. "Plaintiff Won" is a dummy variable indicating
whether the plaintiff won at the district level. "Plaintiff Won-Jury" is an interaction
dummy variable indicating whether the plaintiff won and it was a jury trial. "Amount
Demanded" indicates the amount demanded at the district level.
The self representation dummy variables include: "Self Rep" indicating whether the
plaintiff represented himself at the district level; "Self Rep (defendant)" indicating
whether the defendant represented himself at the district level; and "Self Rep (appeal)"
indicating whether the appellant represented himself on appeal""11
Finally, fixed effects for case categories, circuit, district, and time period (for the year
the trial case and appeal were decided) are included.
1 1As mentioned above, in other specifications (not reported I have also looked at whether the plaintiff
represented himself at the district level and won; whether the plaintiff represented himself at the district
level and lost; whether the defendant represented himself at the district level and won; indicating whether
the defendant represented himself at the district level and lost; whether both the defendant and plaintiff
represented themselves at the district level; whether the defendant represented himself on appeal; and
whether both the plaintiff and the defendant represented themselves on appeal. The variables presented
are representative for the effects of self representation.
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Summary of Findings
Given the fewer observations for self representation, I present the specifications with and
without these variables. As can be seen, there are several systemic factors that significantly
influence the probability of winning the appeal:
As a rule, jury trials are less likely to be overturned. However, when the plaintiff
wins at the trial level, appeals are more likely to be successful. The US seems to do
better, as it is more likely to win when it is the appellant, and less likely to lose when it
is a defendant. Note that this does not imply favoritism, since cases can not be assumed
to be selected at random. Cases that took longer either at the district level or at the
appeal level, have a slightly better chance at being successful; and the time it takes for the
decision to be rendered is a positive predictor of success. Once again, this result should
be interpreted with caution. It is likely that many cases are thrown out immediately, and
so, conditional on surviving for a small period of time, the length of time it takes to get a
decision may not be as predictive. An appeal when the plaintiff won at the district level
is more likely to be successful, but, as mentioned, the added likelihood of success increases
dramatically when the lower level trial was by jury. This suggests that appeal courts are
comfortable trusting juries when they throw out the case, but not when they make awards
for the plaintiff. Finally, as expected, self representation is not a good idea. Parties that
represent themselves at either the trial or appellate level are less likely to win an appeal.
Looking at the selection equation results, we find, once again, that the length of time is
positively related to the decision to appeal (although the magnitude is very small). As the
stakes are higher, and the amounts demanded increase, parties are more likely to appeal as
well. Appeals are made more frequently when the plaintiff wins, which is consistent with
the outcome equation, however jury decisions are more commonly appealed, even though
these appeals are less likely to succeed. Furthermore, there seems to be a tendency NOT
to appeal jury trials when the plaintiff is successful in a jury trial, which is inconsistent
with the higher tendency for such appeals to be overturned.
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It is on this last point where the three types of probability models most differ (and even
sometimes have opposing signs). Recall from the summary statistics that the plaintiffs
winning in jury trials is a pretty infrequent event in the data, which happens less than
1% of the time. Interestingly, other than this difference, the probability models generally
behave in the same way, despite less than 4% of the cases going to appeal. In parallel work
with Whitney Newey I am exploring a more general categorization of cases under which
these models differ.
Discussion
As mentioned, these findings both are influenced by and inform the modeling of the incen-
tives to appeal. I illustrate some of the implications of the findings belowl 2:
Jury trials are more likely to be appealed. However, consistent with the cases surviving
to appeal being representative of the general body of cases, jury trials are deferred to at
the appellate level. Similarly, while the results regarding the propensity to appeal are not
consistent across specifications, in the two (preferred) average marginal effect specifications,
jury trials where the plaintiff won at the district level are slightly less likely to survive to
appeal. However, those that do survive are more likely to succeed, which may be explained
by the common perception of juries being plaintiff biased. Subject to the further caveat of
there being very few jury trials 13 , these findings challenge the explanations for settlement
breakdown.
For the bargaining breakdown explanations, we would expect jury trials to be more
likely to settle and less likely to survive, since they generally present less grounds for
intervention, and thus there should be more agreement, based on an interpretation of the
law and the district court decision. A model would thus have to produce results where
12Given the small impact of the life of the case, and the insignificant impact of the procedural stage,
these are omitted from the discussion.1 3A separate interesting question is the selection of cases for jury. As mentioned, either party can request
this unilaterally.
there is more private information (perhaps stemming from other sources) in these cases,
or some reason to have more inconsistent priors. Similarly, we may expect there to be
more asymmetric information when the plaintiff wins in jury trials since there are the two
(potentially opposing) effects: the general deference to juries (due to the nature of their
decision making process and short judgments) and the various perceptions regarding the
juries potentially being too friendly to the plaintiff. Parties may also differ in their beliefs
regarding how fair the awards were (especially in the absence of written formal decisions).
However, in the probit and logit specifications we find the opposite tendency of these cases
being less likely to show up as appeals. Once again, the model would have to explain
why the surviving cases exhibit similar tendencies, regarding appeal success rates, to those
which could have been predicted absent selection, despite the cases surviving to appeal
not being random with respect to these variables. Here structural estimation which could
produce estimates of magnitudes would be useful. Informally, the findings could result
from the tendencies speculated (the nature of the jury decision), but, potentially, also from
these cases being more (or less) likely to survive to appeal, where even if the entire universe
of decided jury cases are similar in the validity of the judgment to all cases, the selected
sample of those appealed is less (or more) likely to be worthy of intervention.
An agency story would have to explain why clients may be more easily fooled (into
proceeding to trial) in jury trials. For example it could be claimed that juries can be
portrayed as being less professional and thereby "wrong" and clients may believe they
can indeed "remedy" this wrong on appeal. Similarly a behavioral bias would give some
foundations to litigants being less likely to agree when the trial was by jury, perhaps feeling
that a "true understanding" of their case requires expert judges.
Regarding cases involving the US as a party, we do not have information on the propen-
sity to appeal. However, the results on the US being more likely to succeed - or a deference
to the federal government - which is consistent with the perceptions discussed above, still
requires an explanation as to why these tendencies are not purged by settlement. In other
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words, why are cases with the US as a party not settled more frequently leading to a se-
lected sample of cases that go to trial in which, on average, the US has a weaker case, where
the outcome would be less expected? Once again returning to the potential explanations,
an asymmetric information story would have to claim perhaps that there is more private
information in cases in which the US is a party, where certain judges are more friendly to
the government or more variance in the noise for the inconsistent prior explanation. Such
claims require a closer look at cases involving the US. Similarly, agency or behavioral
stories would have to argue that clients do not internalize the US tendencies. It is of course
also possible that the reason for the finding is that selection works the other way, and cases
involving the US settle in proportions leaving the appealed cases to be those where the
US has a stronger case. Once again such explanations would have to incorporated in the
model.
Cases in which plaintiffs won are more likely to reach appeal and are more likely to be
successful on appeal, although the latter magnitude is significantly smaller. Appellants
seem to be acting based upon the perception of some plaintiff bias and the selected cases
tried at the appellate level seem to still be more stronger. This can be explained if
there is more uncertainty in such cases or more private information, but seems more likely
to be related to a behavioral biases. These can include an effect of plaintiffs winning
in court reinforcing their belief regarding the merits of their case and causing them to
refuse to settle, or alternatively a sunk cost effect, where defendants refusing to accept the
loss in trial (compare for example Genesove and Mayer, 2001). However, a full analysis
of magnitudes (and the interpretation of the difference in magnitudes and the predicted
features of the surviving cases) likely requires the structural estimation of a particular
model.
The size of the stakes makes appeals more likely. As mentioned, this result naturally
feeds into models of bargaining failure. When there are large amounts at stake even small
disagreements (in terms of the deviation in subjective probabilities) may make the high
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costs of litigation worthwhile. It may, however, also feed into behavioral models regarding
the refusal to accept large losses (if the defendant loses), or large incentives for the lawyers
to push forward when their compensation scheme justifies it (such as when their hourly
compensation is higher).
Finally self representation leading to more appeals is most likely to be the result of
"crazy" litigants. Recall that these are generally unskilled litigants that "believe" in their
own skills to the degree that they do not feel it worthwhile to hire (or accept) representa-
tion. It is thus easy to think of similar reasons for them rejecting reasonable offers in the
settlement phase and for them to still perform poorly at the appeal.
Taken as a whole, the results of this preliminary work can be seen as stylistic facts that
structural models of appeal motivation and selection must explain. On the face of it, it
seems highly unlikely for one model to explain all of the results. However, there is clearly
room for much theoretical work and more precise structural estimation of such models and
the testing of competing predictions that may differentiate them in more specific scenarios.
3.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In the above I used a relative new and unexplored dataset to examine the issue of the
predictability of judicial decisions. I found that first and foremost appeals are predictably
rejected. I cannot conclude from this inspection of the data whether it would be possible
to form rational predictions when more features of the case are taken into account, which
would make the decision to appeal justified in terms of the expected profits the appeal
generates. It seems that this is true for some types of cases but not for others. There is
no evidence of settlements having a selection effect whereby cases that survive to appeal
are complex and have uncertain outcomes. The predictability of appeals can be explained,
to some degree, as though there were no outside settlement option at all. I have very
informally discussed how different models of settlement failure and appellate incentives
may go about explaining some of the main findings.
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A more complete understanding of the realities at the appellate level then feeds into the
consideration of reform. If indeed frivolous litigation is to be deterred, an understanding of
the motivation of negative expected value appeals is needed. Similarly, a finding concluding
that there are inexplicable breakdowns of bargaining, questions whether the number of cases
tried could not be reduced by simply improving the settlement process, such as by offering
venues for the parties to discuss settlement and more indications of the expected reality at
the appellate level.
The extremely preliminary nature of this work makes the extensions straightforward.
As mentioned, first and foremost, a formal model of appeal incentives which can yield
predictions consistent with these findings should be specified. Such a model should be
amenable to the structural estimation of the magnitude of the underlying causes for ap-
peals (such as agency costs or asymmetric information), which would feed into the policy
recommendations of the sort sketched above. I plan to return to these in future work.
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Chart 1
Description of Case Categories
Contracts Real Property Torts - Personal Injury
Indemnity on admiralty cases Land Condemnation Airplane
Insurance Foreclosure Airplane product liability
Marine Rent, lease, ejectment Assault, libel and slander
Miller Act Torts to land Federal Employers' liability
Negotiable Instruments Tort - product liability Marine
Judgments overpayments, enforcements Other real property actions Marine - product liability
Medicare Act: Overpayments Motor vehicle
Student loans Motor vehicle - product liability
Veteran benefits Other personal injury
Stockholders suits Workman's Compensation(Accidents)
Other contract actions Personal Injury - medical malpractice
Employee relations Personal Injury - product liability
State Fair Trade Act Asbestos personal injury - product liability
Hospital Care Act
Contract product liability
Torts - Personal Property Damage Property Right Misc.
Other Fraud Copyright Antitrust
Truth In Lending Patent Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Other personal property damage Trademark Tax Suits
Property damage - product liability
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Chart 2
Category Average Winnings Average Duration Success Rate Nonconsensus Observations
110
120
130
140
150
151
152
160
190
195
210
220
230
240
245
290
310
315
320
330
340
345
232.5783
145.1517
79.58156
123.6514
26.07813
563.0833
.6984925
837.6515
196.1671
339.7209
78.11765
83.65086
180.9828
371.217
224.6522
201.5667
279.5347
390.8333
314.0583
295.6583
114.5632
447.4211
10.05249
9.196581
9.29078
8.637019
10.48438
10.33333
4.743719
9.712121
9.379337
9.883721
11.94118
8.538794
9.172414
10.07752
13.17391
9.6
11.0297
13.2
9.220834
8.967626
9.296492
9.631579
.1465084
.1324786
.106383
.0889423
.078125
.1666667
.0251256
.1969697
.1238612
.127907
.1176471
.0517241
.0862069
.1782946
.173913
.1190476
.1386139
.1
.0979167
.1366906
.1
.1052632
.0859564
.0320513
.0714286
.0323887
.0714286
.1666667
.030303
.1
.0528455
.0833333
.2
0
.047619
.1132075
.1
.091954
.175
.2
.0869565
.0763359
.0357143
.1111111
2191
468
141
416
64
36
199
66
5159
86
17
232
58
129
23
210
101
30
480
278
570
19
204
Category Average Winnings Average Duration Success Rate Nonconsensus Observations
345 447.4211 9.631579 .1052632 .1111111 19
350 257.4851 8.483734 .1074965 .0462046 707
355 549.7806 10.70323 .1290323 .0784314 155
360 235.3898 9.044063 .1023152 .0715726 2678
362 375.8875 9.05726 .1042945 .0722222 489
365 310.8146 9.741617 .122288 .0941176 1014
368 1429.74 25.13842 .3531073 .361194 354
410 666.6558 11.21311 .1229508 .1157895 244
850 502.1284 10.34925 .1432836 .0980392 335
870 130.552 9.40411 .1383562 .0939597 730
This table is computed for the purposes of examining the legal biases in section 5.1. Average winnings
are in thousands of dollars. Average duration is in months. Nonconsensus represents the percentage of
cases for which the court did Not sit en banc and there were no concurring or dissenting opinions.
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Statistics (District Court Decisions)
Variable
Very Early
Early
During Pretrial
During Trial
After Trial
After Arbitration
Jury
US Appellate
US Respondent
Plaintiff Won
Self Rep
Plaintiff Won - Jury
District Time
Mean
0.419
0.34
0.104
0.006
0.027
0.001
0.017
0.002
0.007
0.221
0.024
0.008
11.803
Std. Dev.
0.493
0.474
0.306
0.077
0.161
0.036
0.13
0.044
0.086
0.415
0.154
0.092
14.786
N
479092
479092
479092
479092
479092
479092
479092
479092
479092
479092
251977
479092
469764
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Table 3.1: Summary
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics (Appeals)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Very Early 0.175 0.38 17679
Early 0.485 0.5 17679
During Pretrial 0.125 0.33 17679
During Trial 0.024 0.153 17679
After Trial 0.216 0.412 17679
After Arbitration 0.002 0.046 17679
Jury 0.14 0.347 17679
US Appellate 0.031 0.173 17679
US Respondent 0.125 0.331 17679
Plaintiff Won 0.259 0.438 17679
Self Rep 0.109 0.312 7375
Self Rep (Appeal) 0.068 0.252 17679
Plaintiff Won - Jury 0.084 0.277 17679
Total Time 32.423 21.643 17679
Appeal Time 9.700 8.178 17679
These summary statistics refer to the variables used in the selection and outcome mod-
els.
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Table 3
Outcome Equation
Probit Logit LPM
(1) (2) (3)
Before Trial
Jury
US Appellate
US Respondent
Total Time
Appeal Time
District Time
Plaintiff Won
Plaintiff Won-Jury
Self Rep.
Self Rep (Appeal)
-.001
(.006)
-.031**
(.015)
.035
(.028)
-.007
(.014)
-.0006
(.0004)
.013***
(.0009)
.001**
(.0004)
.0003
(.012)
.075**
(.030)
-.023*
(.014)
-. 064"**
(.009)
-.002
(.006)
-.029*
(.015)
.039
(.029)
-.005.
(.015)
-.0006
(.0004)
.012**
(.0009)
.001**
(.0004)
.0005
(.013)
.072**
(.031)
-.032**
(.014)
-.071'**
(.009)
-.003
(.007)
-.030*
(.016)
.046*
(.026)
-.007
(.013)
-.0007
(.0005)
.016***
(.001)
.001"*
(.0005)
.003
(.013)
.069***
(.023)
-. 011
(.010)
-.050***
(.010)
Probit Logit LPM
(1) (2) (3)
.0005
(.004)
-.031'**
(.009)
.026
(.017)
-.024"**
(.009)
.00004
(.0002)
.011***
(.0006)
.0005**
(.0003)
.014*
(.007)
.076***
(.019)
.0005
(.005)
-.032***
(.009)
.032*
(.017)
-. 026**
(.010)
-1.00e-05
(.0002)
.011**
(.0006)
.0006**
(.0003)
.015**
(.007)
.081***
(.021)
.0006
(.005)
-. 033**
(.010)
.041***
(.015)
-.026"**
(.009)
-.0001
(.0002)
.015***
(.0007)
.0008***
(.0003)
.017**
(.008)
.081***
(.015)
Circuit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects No No No No No No
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7359 7359 7375 17679 17679 17679
208
-j: c~-~~~~~~ii-r;?~~ci-~~- ;r~~r~~l"i-~~ ~; -~---~---';;----";:'"'l'"i"~i~~"-":"~'~ --- : -
..
II
Table 4
Probit
Selection
Logit
Equation
LPM
(2) (3)
Before Trial
District Time
Amount Demanded
plaintiffwon
Jury
Plaintiff Won-Jury
Self Rep.
Self Rep. (defendent)
Circuit Fixed Effects
District Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
.002
(.002)
.0007***
(.0001)
1.51e-06***
(2.54e-07)
.032***
(.003)
.102***
(.011)
-. 004
(.003)
.061**
(.006)
.007*
(.004)
.002
(.002)
.0006***
(.o0001)
1.49e-06***
(2.39e-07)
.035* **
(.003)
.095***
(.011)
-. 007***
(.002)
.058***
(.006)
.005
(.003)
.002
(.002)
.001"**
(.0003)
2.69e-06***
(4.77e-07)
.024***
(.004)
.161***
(.013)
.085***
(.014)
.084***
(.012)
.003
(.004)
probit logit
.0(
2.6(
(1.
.0
.1
(1) (2) (3)
.0005 -.0005 -.003
(.002) (.002) (.003)
009*** .0008*** .001**
.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
3e-06*** 2.60e-06*** 3.92e-06***
97e-07) (1.87e-07) (4.26e-07)
)35*** .038*** .029***
(.003) (.003) (.004)
12*** .106*** .172***
(.009) (.010) (.010)
.002 -.004 .102***
(.006) (.004) (.024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
e(N) 251964 251964 251977 469764 469764 469764
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